Subject: Re: [5gangip] The Private LTE & 5G Network Ecosystem: 2018 - 2030 - Opportunities, Challenges, Strategies, Industry Verticals & Forecasts

From: Dr Stephen P CASTELL <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 17 Feb 2018 23:10:05 +0100

Cannes

At that price it should be interesting.  Astonishingly, no mention of
blockchain, distributed ledger or even crypto…

Googling ‘blockchain and the LTE & 5G Network’: [Take a deep breath and
settle down with une verre ou deux]

https://www.rcrwireless.com/20171218/the-role-of-blockchain-in-telecommunica
tions-tag27-tag99

The role of blockchain in telecommunications  By Nathan Cranford on DECEMBER
18, 2017   Beyond Bitcoin

Blockchain is a buzzword frequently making news headlines, largely due to
the numerous use cases it opens up. With roots tracing back to Bitcoin, the
potential of blockchain exceeds digital currency and to a host of other
industries, including telecommunications. The only question is how?  What is
blockchain?  Blockchain is a type of software that powers a database for
verifying transactions made online. The idea is that by making the database
public, no one can cheat the system by editing records because everyone
using the system spots them in the act. The decentralized and distributed
nature of blockchain prevents one person or company from reigning supreme
over system; instead, everyone can help run, manage and secure it.  A user
helps run the system using a computer to store forwarded bundles of records,
known as blocks, into a chronological chain. The technology uses a kind of
mathematical language called cryptology to assure records are not altered.
By holding data in multiple, cryptographically validated ledger copies
throughout a network, blockchain thwarts a single point of failure a hacker
might seize to crash the system.  Applying blockchain to telecom  The
infrastructure of the telecom industry is currently undergoing an evolution
as service providers transition from using proprietary hardware to virtual
software to manage their networks. The advantages and challenges of
introducing blockchain to telecom networks must therefore be considered.
While telecom core management systems are expected to feel the impact of
blockchain, the technology is applicable to telcos networks in a variety of
ways. ...

https://steemit.com/cryptocurrency/@sparcer1/5g-lte-and-blockchain

5G LTE and Blockchain  sparcer1 in cryptocurrency •  9 months ago

What is driving cryptocurrencies?  Blockchain which bypasses any need for
central command

5th iteration of mobile networks are coming and there is no doubt that it
will be integrated with blockchain technology. Combined together these two
will redefine how mobile services are built or even how apps are created.
AT&T recently announced its 5G LTE technology in select cities, so the
future is not that far. Verizon also has jumped on blockchain technology and
already registered a patent to built their DRM using blockchain. Who knows
what new innovation this will bring, only time will tell. ...

http://disruptivewireless.blogspot.fr/2017/08/blockchain-for-telecoms-and-ne
tworks.html

Dean Bubley's Disruptive Wireless: Thought-leading wireless industry
analysis  Tuesday, August 22, 2017

Blockchain for telecoms and networks: the emergence of ICOs & token-based
platforms

There's a new trend I'm currently seeing emerge: ICOs (Initial Coin
Offerings) for network/Internet-related businesses and communities. These
use blockchain-based "tokens" (or coins) as a way to build decentralised
marketplaces, for Internet connectivity or other communications capabilities
like phone calls. Most have visions for long-term disruption of existing
models, although they tend to start from more humble niches.  ICOs both
establish a "currency" for these future markets, and provide funding for
organisations responsible for their creation and maintenance. At least five
network-related ICOs have been announced already, and more seem likely to
follow in due course. (Disclosure: I'm an advisor to one of these five -
more details below).  Note: If you've found this post through a link from a
mainstream ICO/Bitcoin site or link, a quick introduction: I'm primarily a
mobile and telecoms analyst. I study and advise on technology and
business-model trends relating to network evolution and communications
applications. I cover areas like 5G, IoT-oriented networks, voice & video
communications, regulatory policy, the future role of telecom operators, and
the impact of "futures" innovations like AI / ML, blockchain and drones on
telecoms. Most of my clients are telcos or network equipment/software
vendors. I'm not a fintech or blockchain generalist.  Note 2: I am also not
an investment advisor of any sort. I'm not making recommendations here.
I've been covering the role of blockchains and distributed ledgers in
telecoms and networks for well over a year now. I've spoken at events run by
TMForum, IIT, Comptel and others about the telecom-sector use-cases (and
complexities), and ran a recent public workshop in London alongside Caroline
Gabriel (link). I recently participated in a webinar for Juniper Networks
(link) and have a forthcoming white-paper in preparation for Juniper as
well.  My general stance is "pragmatic optimism": Blockchain technology has
many possible touch-points with the telecoms industry, from data-integrity
management to back-office systems to billing - but maturity will take time.
Some of the utopian "it'll change the world" and "telcos are obsolete"
rhetoric is overblown. Distributed ledgers will have many uses and
opportunities in telecoms/networking - but are unlikely to overturn or
radically-disrupt industry structures, at least on a 5-10 year view.  Most
of the uses I've seen discussed until recently have been around private
(permissioned) blockchains...

http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8260929/

Blockchain network slice broker in 5G: Slice leasing in factory of the
future use case

Abstract:  5G Network Slice Broker concept aims to enable mobile virtual
network operators, over-the-top providers, and industry vertical market
players to request and lease resources from infrastructure providers
dynamically according to needs. In the future digital factory, the leasing
of resources could also happen autonomously by manufacturing equipment. This
paper presents Blockchain Slice Leasing Ledger Concept and analysis of its
applicability in the Factory of the Future. The novel concept utilizes 5G
Network Slice Broker in a Blockchain to reduce service creation time and
enable manufacturing equipment autonomously and dynamically acquire the
slice needed for more efficient operations.  Published in: Internet of
Things Business Models, Users, and Networks, 2017 ...

https://www.mobileeurope.co.uk/press-wire/telefonica-seat-to-work-on-what-5g
-blockchain-can-do-for-car-industry

http://e.huawei.com/us/publications/global/ict_insights/201703141505/core-co
mpetency/201703150928

https://knect365.com/5g-virtualisation/article/a2ba2cab-6977-4858-a500-e4f83
92dde51/5g-and-fintech

5G and FinTech  AUTHOR  Gabriella Jeakins  PUBLISHED  18 Aug 2017

The commercial launch of 5G will no doubt transform mobile banking with
higher data speeds driving internet use within every aspect of our lives.
Payment technology will likely grow in use rapidly as a result. 5G will also
be a key enabler of the Internet of Things (IoT), where we will see far more
connected devices and a much higher level of automation. Connected devices
such as wearables may also see significant development and have a major role
in financial transactions.

Blockchain and 5G for Finance - hype vs reality

The faster, more responsive, more pervasive wireless coverage of 5G networks
will provide the backdrop for breakthrough changes in numerous industries.
At 5G World 2017 the London Futurists put together a panel on better
networks for better financial services to discuss the potential for this
industry when the next generation mobile network arrives.

Richard Burton, co-founder of Balance spoke about the rise of bitcoin and
other cryptocurrencies and the way it is changing the way we think about
finance: "As interesting as bitcoin is, what's more interesting is the set
of ideas that came out, the change in the way that people started building
software."

Burton believes there will be a re-balancing of where the world's assets are
kept: "the 50 year bet is that 50% of the world's assets are created, upon
or moved to a blockchain." His co-panellist Anish Mohammed, Lead Security
Architect and Co-founder of Obol & Openeth, thinks it will be even more than
that: "What is value? Value is an arbitrary process. It's a belief."
Blockchain was invented to prevent offline double spending and he believes
that through blockchain we will soon begin to value these digital currencies
possibly even more than traditional currencies.

Burton sees this as a huge opportunity to change and  rebalance global
financial systems: "Let's have a crack at the existing financial system.
Let's build an alternative to the insurers, let's build an alternative to
the pension systems. Let's do trading slow. Why do we need high-frequency
trading? Does McDonalds really change that much in 0.3 seconds? I don't
think they do. And so the beautiful thing about all the blockchains and when
they're linked together, the interchain, and if the wealth shifts in the way
I think it will, is that we get an opportunity for the next few decades to
reprogram things a little bit more fairly."

 <https://www.ericsson.com/research-blog/blockchain/>
https://www.ericsson.com/research-blog/blockchain/

Revisiting the blockchain  Patrik Ekdahl  Oct 27, 2016

The buzz around blockchain technology is louder than ever. Blockchains are
no longer limited to the financial world – they have been linked to
potential applications within areas such as identity and security, the
property market, and the sharing economy. As the list of conceivable use
cases grows, let’s take a moment to revisit some basic facts and limitations
of blockchain technology.

In this blog post I will compare permissionless blockchains (like Bitcoin)
with so-called ‘permissioned’ blockchains that also pop up in discussions
about uses for blockchain technology. Let’s start with the famous Bitcoin.
Nobody seems to know the real reason why the mysterious Satoshi Nakamoto
invented and deployed Bitcoin, but it is safe to say that it is one of the
largest financial experiments the world has seen so far with around 10
billion dollars in market capitalization to date.

A clue to the Bitcoin’s raison d’être can be found in the very first
sentence of the abstract of his 2008 paper Bitcoin, A Peer-to-Peer
Electronic Cash System, in which he introduces Bitcoin as a “purely
peer-to-peer version of electronic cash”. This, to me, says it all as
Bitcoin consists of three important parts:

A transaction system for storing and transferring assets between users

A peer-to-peer network that makes the system robust

A transaction history – called a ledger – and an algorithm to reach
consensus of what is included in the ledger as it grows

For those of you less familiar with financial terminology, a ‘ledger’ is a
tool designed to keep track of your transactions and accounts. In the case
of Bitcoin, the ledger is implemented using a blockchain. I will use the
terms ledger and blockchain interchangeably to denote the instrument that
records the transaction. In order to understand some of the properties of
the blockchain technology, we will look at the requirements for a ledger for
cash handling and in particular Bitcoin’s ledger.

Three properties of cash

So, what is it that characterizes handling cash and what is bitcoin trying
to mimic? Here we’ll look at three main properties. (Adopted and modified
from Richard Brown’s blog):

Cash is an asset you hold. There is no way for anyone to take away your
money unless they rob you of it. And governments and banks cannot devaluate
your cash without affecting everybody else too.

It is intrinsically a peer-to-peer instrument. There is no need for a
trusted third party (TTP) involvement for me to give you some cash, assuming
we are in geographical proximity. Note that there is a need for a TTP (the
central bank) in order to give the pieces of metal coins and paper notes a
value, but a TTP does not need to be involved in the transaction per se.

There is also no way a central authority can stop me from giving you cash.
The distribution of cash is non-discriminatory.

These three properties together are called ‘censorship-resistance’ and
Bitcoin is more or less derived to meet these goals. Take for example the
first property. It is addressed by the use of public/private keys to control
the assets. The third one means that there cannot be a central identifiable
issuer of money. Because this issuer could act in a discriminatory way and
favor some participants over others, which leads to the fact that the
currency must be created automatically in the system. In Bitcoin’s case, it
is created on the blockchain as part of the mining process.

The third property also implies that the users of an electronic cash system
cannot be identifiable, since then the validators could choose to block
certain transactions and that would violate the third property. We can also
see that the non-discriminatory goal makes it natural to avoid the use of a
central validator and to treat each participant in the network equally.
Hence, it must be permitted (and encouraged) for each anonymous participant
to act as a validator and to keep and maintain their own complete copy of
the ledger.

Now, in order for the transactional system to work, there must be a way of
reaching consensus about the order of transactions to prohibit
double-spending of assets. The FLP-theorem tells us that in general we
cannot reach consensus in an asynchronous network with faulty (malicious)
nodes, but Bitcoin weakens the consensus rules to one that could be
described as asymptotic consensus. There could be a fork in the chain a few
blocks down, producing two paths with similar length, but eventually one of
them will supersede the other and become the dominant chain. There is so
much work (energy) invested in the history of the chain that it becomes
impossible for anyone to alter the chain a few blocks back and grow the
chain longer than the “correct” one unless they control the majority of the
compute power. Because of this weakened variant of consensus, it is
recommended to wait for at least six blocks (about an hour) before regarding
a transaction as final. The Proof-of-Work (PoW) algorithm works as both a
consensus mechanism and as an insurance of immutability. Consensus about
which block should grow the chain is simply reached by saying that whoever
is fastest in solving the problem involved in the PoW gets to decide the
next block.

Other consensus algorithms have been proposed for blockchains similar to
Bitcoin. For example, those using the Proof-of-Stake (PoS) class of
algorithms. The PoS build on the notion that only those holding assets in
the system may participate in the consensus process growing the chain.
Simplified, it works as follow. Those users that want to participate in the
consensus protocol must have assets (coins) on the chain. They lock their
assets by cryptographic means for a period of time and thus have “a stake”
at progressing the chain in order to be able to unlock their assets. An
algorithm chooses which of the participants are selected to sign the next
block. A majority of the selected participants then need to sign off the new
block and it is added to the ledger. After some time, their assets are
unlocked. Since the selection is random, it is argued that the probability
of participants teaming up in a collusion is very low, and they are in power
only for a short period of time so they cannot cause much mayhem.

This has been criticized by some as fundamentally flawed. For example,
Andrew Poelstra writes in the paper Distributed Consensus from Proof of
Stake is Impossible:

“Suppose that at some early point in consensus time, a single person has the
ability to extend history. (For example, they have control over every key
which a new block is required to be signed by.) This may have happened
organically, if this person’s keys were chosen randomly by the
stake-choosing algorithm, but it could also happen if this person tracks
down the other keyholders and buys their keys. This may happen much later in
consensus time (and real time), so there is no reason to believe these
keyholders are still incentivized to keep their keys secret. Alternately,
they may have revealed the keys through some honest mistake, the chances of
which increase as time passes, backups are lost, etc.

Now, we have a consensus history and an attacker who is able to fork it at
some early time. To actually replace the entire consensus history, he needs
to produce an alternate history, starting from his fork, which is longer
than the existing history. But every block needs a new random selection of
signers, so is this possible? The answer is absolutely yes: we have been
using this word “random”, but in fact we have required consensus on the set
of signers (otherwise forks would trivially happen), so even a random
selection must be seeded from past consensus history. Therefore, an attacker
with enough past signing keys can modify the history he has direct control
over, causing future signer selections to always happen in his favour. (It
is likely he needs to “grind” through many choices of block before he finds
one which lets him keep control of the signer selection. In effect, he has
replaced proof-of-stake with proof-of-work, but a centralized one.)“

Poelstra goes even further to state that he believes it is impossible to
reach consensus in a specific space without consuming resources in that
space. In our case, as we are living on planet Earth, we need to produce
entropy in the real world in order to reach consensus. In this thermodynamic
viewing, you (locally) decrease the entropy when you reach consensus amongst
a number of participants, hence you need to increase entropy somewhere else
in the system. This is done by consuming energy in CPU-cycles. If Poelstra’s
hypotheses turns out to be true, a global economy based on virtual coins
will be hard to achieve when considering environmental aspects. The
collected amount of power consumed by the Bitcoin miners is today greater
than the total power consumed by the Republic of Ireland.

Permissionless or permissioned ledgers?

At a recent workshop I attended, one potential application from the industry
representatives was to have production and product audit trails in a
blockchain to be able to trace components and services for a product. Take
for example a car. They would like to register all the components of the car
in a blockchain and whenever there is a service of the car or some parts are
exchanged, it is recorded in the ledger who did the service and what the new
part is. It would be like having a complete list of components for each car
in the market. When you go to the owned car sales lot, you can query the
ledger about the car you are interested in and get a complete history of
ownership and services.

Can we use a Bitcoin-like ledger to achieve this? More generally, can a
cash-related blockchain be used? I believe that the answer in general is no.
Since the users of such blockchain must be anonymous, there is no way to tie
the user’s actions on the blockchain to actions in the real world. In fact,
there is no way a user can put trustworthy information about the real world
on the chain, so applications such as identity management cannot be
supported in these types of chains. This type of blockchain is normally
called a permissionless blockchain. You don’t need a permission to submit
transactions and you don’t need to be validated to participate in growing
the chain. In order to achieve what we want here, we need to authenticate
the users of the blockchain. This is called a permissioned blockchain. In
the permissioned blockchain implementations we see today, it is the
validators that receive the transactions from the users. And to be able to
authenticate a user on behalf of the blockchain, the validator needs to be
trusted and authenticated. So in essence all users of the blockchain must be
identifiable.

Only permissioned blockchains can track and operate on real world assets.

Several very interesting things happen when we go from anonymity to
identification of users. Firstly, there is no need to run the expensive PoW
algorithm to reach consensus. Since all validators are known we can adopt
much lighter schemes such as the Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT)
algorithm, or some 2-phase commit scheme. Secondly, there is no purpose of
having coins generated in the blockchain. The mining of coins is the
incentive of the permissionless blockchain to make the miners perform the
work. If we have simpler (in terms of energy consumption) consensus
algorithms we don’t need to reward the miners. In fact, the miners probably
have some real world incentive to operate the blockchain. In the car
example, it would be reasonable to think that car manufactures all over the
world operate this blockchain in order to get better audit trails of cars,
or perhaps that each car manufacture runs their own blockchain, tracking
only a specific brand.

Permissionless blockchains and electronic cash appears to be closely linked
together. We have seen that operating a virtual cash system requires a
permissionless blockchain. Also the opposite seems true, if we have a
permissionless blockchain there needs to be some incentive for the
validators/miners. And the only thing that is possible to control are
on-chain assets. Hence, to operate a permissionless blockchain we need some
form of virtual currency living on the chain.

To operate a permissionless blockchain, there needs to be an on-chain
currency to incentivize the mining process. And to operate an electronic
cash system, a permissionless blockchain is needed.

Another aspect of permissionless vs permissioned blockchains is the legal
status of transactions on the blockchain. We have stated that permissionless
blockchains can only handle on-chain assets. This also comes down to the
fact the if all users are anonymous, there is no way to enforce actions on
the chain in the real world. There is no one to hold accountable. The only
way we have is to enforce actions is by cryptography and that can only be
applied to assets living on the chain. Permissioned blockchains on the other
hand have identifiable users and they can be held accountable by law. This
makes it possible to track and trade off-chain assets with the same
protection as in the real world. If someone behaves maliciously we can take
that person or organization to court and resolve the issue.

Permissioned blockchain versus distributed database.

First of all, I don’t think a blockchain is comparable to a database in the
normal sense. A blockchain is more of a write-once/read-many (WORM) type of
storage, possibly with integrity protection depending on how the new blocks
in the chained are created and how the consensus algorithm works. For a PoW
type we have a seemingly strong integrity protection after 15-20 blocks or
so. But even that is not totally immutable. The occurrences of the hard fork
in the Ethereum chain in June 2016 proved that . The short story is that a
lot of investments into a smart contract were stolen because of a bug in the
scripting language and the question was whether to back the chain before the
attack and fork it, creating an alternate future in where the bug was fixed
and the money still in the right place. The Ethereum consortium chose this
path and now there are two chains of Ethereum, one “official” backed by the
consortium and one called “classic” in which the stolen money is still in
control of the attacker(s).

I think that most people in the blockchain business consider permissioned
blockchains a way of implementing a WORM distributed database. And as always
with different implementations, you get benefits and disadvantages. The
benefits mostly listed includes less administration and less required trust
in administrators, more cost efficient, and increased robustness. The
disadvantages are less confidentiality, worse performance, and that the
blockchain technology is less tested in production system.

Yet, there are certainly areas where a permissioned blockchain is a better
choice. A lot of activities have recently been seen in the financial and
banking sector, trying to implement permissioned blockchains . I think that
this mainly happens for two reasons: Firstly, banks are intrigued by Bitcoin
and virtual currencies. It is still unclear whether this is just curiosity
and a large-scale experiment or if it will fundamentally disrupt the
monetary system. Faced with this uncertainty, they believe it is better to
join the game and try to be part of it instead of being left behind.

The second reason is that the financial sector utilizes a vast number of
databases that need to interoperate with each other. This costs a great deal
of money in terms of maintenance and they look to blockchain technologies to
replace legacy systems and at the same time make them more interoperable.

Either way, the blockchain technology is evolving fast and it will be
interesting to follow the potential applications and use cases.

 <https://www.ericsson.com/research-blog/author/patrikekdahl/>
https://www.ericsson.com/research-blog/author/patrikekdahl/
<https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=G5sxSCYAAAAJ>
https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=G5sxSCYAAAAJ 

Patrik Ekdahl joined Ericsson Research in 2007 and is the manager of the
Platform Security research team. His research interests include platform
security, trusted execution environments and cryptography in general. Patrik
holds an M.Sc. in Electronic Engineering and a Ph.D. in Cryptology, both
from LTH, the Faculty of Engineering at Lund University. His Ph.D. thesis
includes the co-authored work on the stream cipher SNOW, which in a modified
version is the primary air encryption algorithm for LTE.

NOTE HERE THE INTERWEAVING/RESONANCES OF (1) TRUSTED THIRD PARTY SERVICES
(TTPs); AND (2) DISTRIBUTED DATABASES.

I DID A DEFINITIVE STUDY ON TTPs FOR INFOSEC/THE EC, 1993.  AND ‘INVENTED’
DISTRIBUTED DATABASES [‘DRIP-FEED’ UPDATEABLE; NON-WORM; FOR
POINT-TO-MULTIPOINT DATACASTING], PUBLISHED IN TELECOMS JOURNALS, 1987 ff.;
CITED IN US PATENT US6076094A (‘Distributed database system and database
received therefor’).

(1)  TTPS, 1993

Dr Stephen Castell CITP is Chairman of CASTELL Consulting, and has for over
twenty-five years acted internationally as an expert witness in major
complex computer software and systems disputes and litigation, including the
largest and longest such actions to have reached the English High Court, and
Sydney Supreme Court ( <http://www.castellconsulting.com/>
http://www.castellconsulting.com/).

Twenty years ago Dr Castell pointed out that ‘open’ Von Neumann computer
architecture – now, as then, still the basis for software design and
construction of all commercial ICT devices and systems – was inherently
insecure (See ‘A computer of the simplest kind’, Computer Law and Security
Report 10, May-June 1994).  Five years before that, Dr Castell authored the
APPEAL Report, May 1990, a major study commissioned by the CCTA (H M
Treasury), on admissibility of computer evidence in court and the legal
reliability/security of IT systems, still seen by many practitioners as a
definitive study in the field.  This concluded with what became known as
Castell’s Dictum: “You cannot secure an ontologically unreliable technology
by use of an ontologically unreliable technology”.

Electronic Evidence has been acknowledged to be based on the concept of a
transactional chain of trust.  Dr Castell identified as far back as 1993 the
latter’s dependency on Trusted Third Party Services (‘TTPs’): 

“As described by Castell, ‘A Trusted Third Party is an impartial
organization delivering business confidence, through commercial and
technical security features, to an electronic transaction.  It supplies
technically and legally reliable means of carrying out, facilitating,
producing independent evidence about and/or arbitrating on an electronic
transaction.  Its services are provided and underwritten by technical,
legal, financial and/or structural means’ [10].  TTPs are provided and
underwritten not only by technical, but also by legal, financial, and
structural means [10,11].  TTPs are operationally connected through chains
of trust (usually called certificate paths) in order to provide a web of
trust…
[10] S. Castell, Code of practice and management guidelines for trusted
third party services, INFOSEC Project Report S2101/02, 1993.
[11] Commission of the European Community. Green paper on the security of
information systems, ver. 4.2.1, 1994. …”

In Security Issues On Cloud Computing.  Pratibha Tripathi, Mohammad Suaib;

Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Integral University,
Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh, India.
International Journal of Engineering Technology, Management and Applied
Sciences
 <http://www.ijetmas.com/> http://www.ijetmas.com/ November2014, Volume 2
Issue 6, ISSN 2349-44761.
Available from:
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/272945014_Security_Issues_On_Cloud
_Computing>
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/272945014_Security_Issues_On_Cloud_
Computing  

And see:
<https://www.researchgate.net/post/Does_anyone_in_this_community_have_any_th
oughts_about_or_insight_into_the_latest_BITCOIN_revelations>
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Does_anyone_in_this_community_have_any_tho
ughts_about_or_insight_into_the_latest_BITCOIN_revelations

(2)  DISTRIBUTED DATABASES, 1987 ff.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO  CIVIL
ACTION NO. 01-WY-2201-AJ (BNB)

BROADCAST INNOVATION, L.L.C., Plaintiff, 

v.

ECHOSTAR COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION, HUGHES ELECTRONICS CORPORATION,
DIRECTV, INC., THOMSON, INC., Defendants.

June 12, 2003, EXPERT REPORT OF DR. STEPHEN CASTELL REGARDING THE VALIDITY
OF U.S. PATENT NO.  6,076,094   SUBMITTED BY ECHOSTAR COMMUNICATIONS
CORPORATION

18.         Stephen Castell, “Nationwide information services using
databroadcasting,” Telecommunications Policy Journal (Butterworths), Dec.
1987, 391-397.

•            ‘Point-to-Multipoint Services and BBC EUROCAST on Olympus: the
new wave in pan-European information services,’ NETWORKS Journal, Update,
Jan. 1990.

•            ‘A Deregulated Radiospectrum Revolution: Through Mobile Phones
and Data Broadcasting to Digital Broadband Communications and Multimedia
Services,’ Information Technology & Public Policy Journal, Vol. 8, No. 3,
Summer 1990, pp. 226-233.

US6076094A Citations:

Castell, S., "Databroadcasting and beyond," Telecommunications
(International Edition), 1990, 24(7), 63-64, 67.

Castell, S., "Professional Data Broadcasting the New Wave in Information and
Communications Technology," Conference Title: EuroComm 88: Proceedings of
the International Congress, 1989, 169-188.

BTW  My McAfee comes up with “http://www.snstelecomresearch.com/ may be
risky to visit” and won’t let me go there.

Dr Stephen Castell CITP CPhys FIMA MEWI MIoD

Chairman, CASTELL Consulting

PO Box 334, Witham, Essex CM8 3LP, UK

Tel: +44 1621 891 776        Mob: +44 7831 349 162

Email:  <mailto:[email-masked]> [email-masked]

 <http://www.castellconsulting.com/> http://www.CastellConsulting.com
<http://www.e-expertwitness.com/> http://www.e-expertwitness.com

Crypto: the Millennials’ Rock’n’Roll

Committee Member, Programme Development & IT Professionalism, British
Computer Society Law Specialist Group

<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.bcs.or
g%2Fcategory%2F10868&data=02%7C01%7C%7C8e3d10e02a214552270e08d56b2cf546%7C84
df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C636532763239292474&sdata=t2KELz1bYW
qsYWDQrSXXzsUUuMVgU1HQa5BnLJ2IbPE%3D&reserved=0>
http://www.bcs.org/category/10868

Accredited Member, Forensic Expert Witness Association, Los Angeles Chapter

Castell’s Dictum: “You cannot secure an ontologically unreliable technology
by use of an ontologically unreliable technology”.  (1990)

Castell’s Second Dictum: “You cannot construct an algorithm that will
reliably decide whether or not any algorithm is ethical”.  (2017)

From: furlongs2 [mailto:[email-masked]] 
Sent: 17 February 2018 18:04
To: [email-masked]; [email-masked]
Subject: Fwd: The Private LTE & 5G Network Ecosystem: 2018 – 2030 –
Opportunities, Challenges, Strategies, Industry Verticals & Forecasts

I don't know how i got this, but it's interesting

Sent from my T-Mobile 4G LTE Device

-------- Original message --------

From: James Bennett <[email-masked]
<mailto:[email-masked]> > 

Date: 2/16/18 16:41 (GMT-08:00) 

To: [email-masked] <mailto:[email-masked]>  

Subject: The Private LTE & 5G Network Ecosystem: 2018 – 2030 –
Opportunities, Challenges, Strategies, Industry Verticals & Forecasts 

The Private LTE & 5G Network Ecosystem: 2018 – 2030 – Opportunities,
Challenges, Strategies, Industry Verticals & Forecasts

Report Information

Release Year: 2018

Number of Pages: 904

Number of Figures: 259

Report Overview

With the standardization of capabilities such as MCPTT (Mission-Critical
PTT) by the 3GPP, LTE is increasingly being viewed as an all-inclusive
critical communications platform for the delivery of multiple
mission-critical services ranging from PTT group communications to real-time
video surveillance, and organizations across the critical communications
industry – from public safety agencies to railway operators – are making
sizeable investments in private LTE and 5G-ready networks.

By providing authority over wireless coverage and capacity, private LTE and
5G networks can ensure guaranteed connectivity, while supporting a wide
range of applications and usage scenarios. Small-scale private LTE and
5G-ready networks are also beginning to be deployed in industrial IoT
(Internet of Things) settings – where LTE and 5G can fulfill the stringent
reliability, availability and low latency requirements for connectivity in
industrial control and automation systems, besides supporting mobility for
robotics and machines.

In addition, with the emergence of capabilities such as multi-operator small
cells and shared/unlicensed spectrum access schemes, the use of private LTE
and 5G networks – in enterprise buildings, campuses and public venues, for
localized connectivity – is expected to grow significantly over the coming
years.

Expected to surpass $2.5 Billion in annual spending by the end of 2018,
private LTE and 5G networks are increasingly becoming the preferred approach
to deliver wireless connectivity for critical communications, industrial
IoT, enterprise & campus environments, and public venues. SNS Telecom & IT
estimates that the market will further grow at a CAGR of approximately 30%
between 2018 and 2021, eventually accounting for more than $5 Billion by the
end of 2021.

The “Private LTE & 5G Network Ecosystem: 2018 – 2030 – Opportunities,
Challenges, Strategies, Industry Verticals & Forecasts” report presents an
in-depth assessment of the private LTE and 5G network ecosystem including
market drivers, challenges, enabling technologies, vertical market
opportunities, applications, key trends, standardization, spectrum
availability/allocation, regulatory landscape, deployment case studies,
opportunities, future roadmap, value chain, ecosystem player profiles and
strategies. The report also presents forecasts for private LTE and 5G
network infrastructure investments from 2018 till 2030. The forecasts cover
3 submarkets, 10 vertical markets and 6 regions.

The report comes with an associated Excel datasheet suite covering
quantitative data from all numeric forecasts presented in the report.

More information is available at:  <http://www.snstelecom.com/private-lte>
http://www.snstelecom.com/private-lte

Topics Covered

The report covers the following topics:

*	Private LTE & 5G network ecosystem
*	Market drivers and barriers
*	Architectural components and operational models for private LTE & 5G
networks
*	Analysis of vertical markets and applications – ranging from mobile
broadband and mission-critical voice to domain-specific applications such as
the delay-sensitive control of railway infrastructure
*	Key enabling technologies and concepts including MCPTT, deployable
LTE/5G systems, eMTC, NB-IoT, unlicensed/shared spectrum, neutral-host small
cells and network slicing
*	Review of private LTE & 5G network engagements worldwide, including
case studies of 30 live networks
*	Spectrum availability, allocation and usage for private LTE & 5G
networks
*	Standardization, regulatory and collaborative initiatives
*	Industry roadmap and value chain
*	Profiles and strategies of over 440 ecosystem players including
LTE/5G network infrastructure OEMs and vertical-domain specialists
*	Strategic recommendations for end users, LTE/5G network
infrastructure OEMs, system integrators and commercial/private mobile
operators
*	Market analysis and forecasts from 2018 till 2030

Forecast Segmentation
Market forecasts are provided for each of the following submarkets and their
subcategories:

Submarkets

*	RAN (Radio Access Network)
*	Mobile Core
*	Backhaul & Transport

Vertical Markets

*	Critical Communications & Industrial IoT 

*	Public Safety
*	Military
*	Energy
*	Utilities
*	Mining
*	Transportation
*	Factories & Warehousing
*	Others

*	Enterprise & Campus Environments
*	Public Venues & Other Neutral Hosts

Regional Markets

*	Asia Pacific
*	Eastern Europe
*	Latin & Central America
*	Middle East & Africa
*	North America
*	Western Europe

Key Questions Answered

The report provides answers to the following key questions:

*	How big is the private LTE & 5G network opportunity?
*	What trends, challenges and barriers are influencing its growth?
*	How is the ecosystem evolving by segment and region?
*	What will the market size be in 2021 and at what rate will it grow?
*	Which vertical markets will see the highest percentage of growth?
*	How will unlicensed and shared spectrum schemes – such as CBRS in
the United States – accelerate the adoption of private LTE & 5G networks for
enterprises, public venues and neutral hosts?
*	How does standardization impact the adoption of LTE & 5G networks
for critical communications and industrial IoT?
*	When will MCPTT and other 3GPP-compliant mission-critical
capabilities become commercially mature for implementation?
*	What opportunities exist for commercial mobile operators in the
private LTE & 5G network ecosystem?
*	Will private LTE & 5G networks replace GSM-R and other legacy
technologies for railway communications?
*	What are the prospects of deployable LTE & 5G systems?
*	Who are the key market players and what are their strategies?
*	What strategies should LTE/5G infrastructure OEMs, system
integrators and mobile operators adopt to remain competitive?

Report Pricing

Single User License: USD 2,500
Company Wide License: USD 3,500

Ordering Process

Please contact James Bennett on  <mailto:[email-masked]>
[email-masked]
And provide the following information:
Report License - (Single User/Company Wide)
Name -
Email -
Company -
Payment Method - (Credit Card/Wire Transfer)

Table of Contents

1 Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Executive Summary

1.2 Topics Covered

1.3 Forecast Segmentation

1.4 Key Questions Answered

1.5 Key Findings

1.6 Methodology

1.7 Target Audience

1.8 Companies & Organizations Mentioned

2 Chapter 2: An Overview of Private LTE & 5G Networks

2.1 Private Wireless Networks

2.1.1 Addressing the Needs of the Critical Communications Industry

2.1.2 The Limitations of LMR (Land Mobile Radio) Networks

2.1.3 Moving Towards Commercial Mobile Broadband Technologies

2.1.4 Connectivity Requirements for the Industrial IoT (Internet of Things)

2.1.5 Localized Mobile Networks for Buildings, Campuses & Public Venues

2.2 LTE & 5G for Private Networking

2.2.1 Why LTE?

2.2.2 Performance Metrics

2.2.3 Coexistence, Interoperability and Spectrum Flexibility

2.2.4 A Thriving Ecosystem

2.2.5 Economic Feasibility

2.2.6 Moving Towards LTE-Advanced & LTE-Advanced Pro Networks

2.2.7 5G Capabilities & Usage Scenarios

2.3 Architectural Components of Private LTE & 5G Networks

2.3.1 UE (User Equipment)

2.3.2 E-UTRAN – The LTE RAN (Radio Access Network)

2.3.2.1 eNB Base Stations

2.3.2.2 TDD vs. FDD

2.3.3 Transport Network

2.3.4 EPC (Evolved Packet Core) – The LTE Mobile Core

2.3.4.1 SGW (Serving Gateway)

2.3.4.2 PGW (Packet Data Network Gateway)

2.3.4.3 MME (Mobility Management Entity)

2.3.4.4 HSS (Home Subscriber Server)

2.3.4.5 PCRF (Policy Charging and Rules Function)

2.3.5 IMS (IP-Multimedia Subsystem), Application & Service Elements

2.3.5.1 IMS Core & VoLTE

2.3.5.2 eMBMS (Enhanced Multimedia Broadcast Multicast Service)

2.3.5.3 ProSe (Proximity Services)

2.3.5.4 Group Communication & Mission-Critical Services

2.3.6 Gateways for LTE-External Network Interworking

2.3.7 Proposed 5G Architectural Elements

2.3.7.1 5G NR (New Radio)

2.3.7.2 NextGen Core Network

2.4 Key Enabling Technologies & Concepts

2.4.1 Critical Communications

2.4.1.1 MCPTT (Mission-Critical PTT) Voice & Group Communications

2.4.1.2 Mission-Critical Video & Data

2.4.1.3 ProSe (Proximity Services) for D2D Connectivity & Communications

2.4.1.4 IOPS (Isolated E-UTRAN Operation for Public Safety)

2.4.1.5 Deployable LTE & 5G Systems

2.4.1.6 UE Enhancements

2.4.2 eMTC & NB-IoT: Wide Area & High Density IoT Applications

2.4.3 QPP (QoS, Priority & Preemption)

2.4.4 End-to-End Security

2.4.5 Licensed Spectrum Sharing & Aggregation

2.4.6 Unlicensed & Shared Spectrum Usage

2.4.6.1 LSA (Licensed Shared Access): Two-Tiered Sharing

2.4.6.2 CBRS (Citizens Broadband Radio Service): Three-Tiered Sharing

2.4.6.3 LAA (License Assisted Access) & LTE-U: Licensed & Unlicensed
Spectrum Aggregation

2.4.6.4 MulteFire

2.4.7 Network Sharing & Slicing

2.4.7.1 MOCN (Multi-Operator Core Network)

2.4.7.2 DECOR (Dedicated Core)

2.4.7.3 Network Slicing

2.4.8 Software-Centric Networking

2.4.8.1 NFV (Network Functions Virtualization)

2.4.8.2 SDN (Software Defined Networking)

2.4.9 C-RAN (Centralized RAN)

2.4.10 MEC (Multi-Access Edge Computing)

2.5 Private LTE & 5G Network Operational Models

2.5.1 Independent Private Network

2.5.2 Managed Private Network

2.5.3 MVNO: Commercial Network with a Private Mobile Core

2.5.4 Other Approaches

2.6 Key Applications of Private LTE & 5G Networks

2.6.1 Secure & Seamless Mobile Broadband Access

2.6.2 Bandwidth-Intensive & Latency-Sensitive Field Applications

2.6.3 Bulk Multimedia & Data Transfers

2.6.4 In-Building Coverage & Capacity

2.6.5 Seamless Roaming & Mobile VPN Access

2.6.6 Mission-Critical HD Voice & Group Communications

2.6.7 Video & High-Resolution Imagery

2.6.8 Messaging & Presence Services

2.6.9 Location Services & Mapping

2.6.10 Command & Control Systems

2.6.11 Smart Grid Operations

2.6.12 Industrial Automation

2.6.13 High-Speed Railway Connectivity

2.6.14 PIS (Passenger Information System)

2.6.15 Delay-Sensitive Control of Railway Infrastructure

2.6.16 In-Flight Connectivity for Passengers & Airline Operators

2.6.17 Maritime Connectivity for Ships & Offshore Facilities

2.6.18 Telemetry, Control & Remote Diagnostics

2.6.19 Emerging 5G Applications

2.7 Market Growth Drivers

2.7.1 Recognition of LTE as the De-Facto Mobile Broadband Standard

2.7.2 Spectral Efficiency, Flexible Bandwidth, Regional Interoperability &
Cost Efficiency

2.7.3 Endorsement from the Critical Communications Industry

2.7.4 Emergence of Unlicensed & Shared Spectrum Technologies

2.7.5 Growing Demands for High-Speed Data Applications

2.7.6 Limited Coverage in Indoor, Industrial & Remote Environments

2.7.7 Control over QoS (Quality of Service)

2.8 Market Barriers

2.8.1 Lack of Licensed Spectrum

2.8.2 Funding Challenges for Large-Scale Networks

2.8.3 Smaller Coverage Footprint than Legacy LMR Systems

2.8.4 Delayed Standardization

3 Chapter 3: Vertical Markets, Case Studies & Private LTE/5G Engagements

3.1 Vertical Markets

3.1.1 Critical Communications & Industrial IoT

3.1.1.1 Public Safety

3.1.1.2 Military

3.1.1.3 Energy

3.1.1.4 Utilities

3.1.1.5 Mining

3.1.1.6 Transportation

3.1.1.7 Factories & Warehouses

3.1.1.8 Others

3.1.2 Enterprise & Campus Environments

3.1.3 Public Venues & Other Neutral Hosts

3.2 Private LTE & 5G Network Case Studies

3.2.1 Air France

3.2.2 ASTRID

3.2.3 Beach Energy

3.2.4 Busan Transportation Corporation

3.2.5 China Southern Power Grid

3.2.6 EAN (European Aviation Network)

3.2.7 FirstNet (First Responder Network) Authority

3.2.8 French Army

3.2.9 German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr)

3.2.10 Gold Fields

3.2.11 Halton Regional Police Service

3.2.12 INET (Infrastructure Networks)

3.2.13 Kenyan Police Service

3.2.14 KRNA (Korea Rail Network Authority)

3.2.15 LG Chem

3.2.16 Nedaa

3.2.17 Ocado

3.2.18 PSCA (Punjab Safe Cities Authority)

3.2.19 Qatar MOI (Ministry of Interior)

3.2.20 RESCAN (Canary Islands Network for Emergency and Security)

3.2.21 Rio Tinto Group

3.2.22 Rivas Vaciamadrid City Council

3.2.23 Shanghai Police Department

3.2.24 South Korea’s Safe-Net (National Disaster Safety Communications
Network)

3.2.25 Southern Linc

3.2.26 Tampnet

3.2.27 U.S. Navy

3.2.28 Ukkoverkot

3.2.29 United Kingdom’s ESN (Emergency Services Network)

3.2.30 Zhengzhou Metro

3.3 Review of Other Private LTE & 5G Network Engagements

3.3.1 Asia Pacific

3.3.1.1 Australia

3.3.1.2 China

3.3.1.3 Hong Kong

3.3.1.4 India

3.3.1.5 Indonesia

3.3.1.6 Japan

3.3.1.7 Laos

3.3.1.8 Malaysia

3.3.1.9 New Zealand

3.3.1.10 Pakistan

3.3.1.11 Philippines

3.3.1.12 Singapore

3.3.1.13 South Korea

3.3.1.14 Thailand

3.3.2 Europe

3.3.2.1 Austria

3.3.2.2 Belgium

3.3.2.3 Denmark

3.3.2.4 Finland

3.3.2.5 France

3.3.2.6 Germany

3.3.2.7 Italy

3.3.2.8 Netherlands

3.3.2.9 Norway

3.3.2.10 Poland

3.3.2.11 Russia

3.3.2.12 Spain

3.3.2.13 Sweden

3.3.2.14 Switzerland

3.3.2.15 Turkey

3.3.2.16 United Kingdom

3.3.2.17 Other Countries

3.3.3 Latin & Central America

3.3.3.1 Brazil

3.3.3.2 Mexico

3.3.3.3 Other Countries

3.3.4 Middle East & Africa

3.3.4.1 GCC (Gulf Corporation Council) Countries

3.3.4.2 Ghana

3.3.4.3 Israel

3.3.4.4 Kenya

3.3.4.5 South Africa

3.3.4.6 Other Countries

3.3.5 North America

3.3.5.1 Canada

3.3.5.2 United States

4 Chapter 4: Spectrum Availability, Allocation & Usage

4.1 Frequency Bands for Private LTE & 5G Networks

4.1.1 Licensed Spectrum

4.1.1.1 400/450 MHz

4.1.1.2 700 MHz

4.1.1.3 800 MHz

4.1.1.4 900 MHz

4.1.1.5 1.4 GHz

4.1.1.6 1.8 GHz

4.1.1.7 2 GHz

4.1.1.8 2.6 GHz

4.1.1.9 3.5 GHz & Higher Frequencies

4.1.2 Unlicensed & Shared Spectrum

4.1.2.1 3.5 GHz CBRS

4.1.2.2 5 GHz Unlicensed

4.1.2.3 Other Frequencies

4.2 Spectrum Regulation, Sharing & Management

4.2.1 ITU-R (International Telecommunication Union Radiocommunication
Sector)

4.2.2 450 MHz Alliance

4.2.3 CBRS Alliance

4.2.4 DSA (Dynamic Spectrum Alliance)

4.2.5 MulteFire Alliance

4.2.6 WinnForum (Wireless Innovation Forum)

5 Chapter 5: Standardization, Regulatory & Collaborative Initiatives

5.1 3GPP (Third Generation Partnership Project)

5.1.1 Public Safety & Critical Communications Enhancements in Releases 11-14

5.1.2 Industrial IoT Enhancements in Releases 13 & 14: eMTC & NB-IoT

5.1.3 Release 15 & Beyond: Mission-Critical Service Requirements for
Railways & Transportation

5.2 AGURRE (Association of Major Users of Operational Radio Networks,
France)

5.2.1 Advocacy Efforts for Private LTE Networks in the Transportation &
Energy Sectors

5.3 ATIS (Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions)

5.3.1 Standardization Efforts Relevant to Private & Critical Communications
LTE

5.4 China Association of Metros

5.4.1 Adoption of LTE as the Communications Standard for Urban Rail Systems

5.5 CRC (Communications Research Centre Canada)

5.5.1 Interoperability Research and Evaluation of Public Safety LTE Networks

5.6 DRDC (Defence Research and Development Canada)

5.6.1 R&D Efforts in Public Safety & Military LTE Networks

5.7 ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards Institute)

5.7.1 TCCE (TETRA and Critical Communications Evolution) Technical Committee

5.8 EUAR (European Union Agency for Railways)

5.8.1 Coordinating Efforts for FRMCS (Future Railway Mobile Communication
System)

5.9 Home Office, United Kingdom

5.9.1 Public Safety LTE Standardization Efforts

5.10 KRRI (Korea Railroad Research Institute)

5.10.1 LTE-Based KRTCS (Korean Radio-Based Train Control System)

5.11 PSCE (Public Safety Communications Europe)

5.11.1 Standardization & Readiness Efforts for Mission-Critical Mobile
Broadband

5.12 PSCR (Public Safety Communications Research) Program

5.12.1 Technology Development & Standardization Efforts for Public Safety
LTE

5.13 Public Safety Canada

5.13.1 Participation in the Federal PSBN (Public Safety Broadband Network)
Task Team

5.14 Safe-Net Forum

5.14.1 Guidance & Ecosystem Development for Public Safety LTE Networks

5.15 SCF (Small Cell Forum)

5.15.1 Specifications for Enterprise & Unlicensed Small Cells

5.16 TCCA (TETRA and Critical Communications Association)

5.16.1 CCBG (Critical Communications Broadband Group)

5.16.2 BIG (Broadband Industry Group)

5.17 TIA (Telecommunications Industry Association)

5.17.1 TR-8.8: Subcommittee on Broadband Data Systems

5.18 TTA (Telecommunications Technology Association of Korea)

5.18.1 Functional Requirements for Public Safety LTE

5.18.2 LTE-R (LTE Based Railway Communication System)

5.18.3 LTE-M (LTE-Maritime)

5.19 U.S. NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology)

5.19.1 CTL (Communications Technology Laboratory): R&D Leadership for
FirstNet

5.20 U.S. NPSTC (National Public Safety Telecommunications Council)

5.20.1 Early Leadership in Public Safety LTE

5.21 U.S. NTIA (National Telecommunications and Information Administration)

5.21.1 FirstNet Governance & Funding

5.22 UIC (International Union of Railways)

5.22.1 Replacing GSM-R with LTE

5.22.2 FRMCS (Future Railway Mobile Communication System) Initiative

5.23 UTC (Utilities Telecom Council) & EUTC (European UTC)

5.23.1 Advocacy Efforts for Critical Infrastructure Private LTE Networks

5.24 Vendor-Led Alliances

5.24.1 Huawei's eLTE Industry Alliance

5.24.2 Nokia's Mission Critical Communications Alliance

5.25 Others

6 Chapter 6: Industry Roadmap & Value Chain

6.1 Industry Roadmap

6.1.1 Pre-2020: Large-Scale Investments in Critical Communications LTE
Networks

6.1.2 2020 – 2025: Commercial Maturity of Unlicensed & Shared Spectrum

6.1.3 2025 – 2030: Continued Investments in Private 5G Networks

6.2 Value Chain

6.2.1 Enabling Technology Providers

6.2.2 RAN, Mobile Core & Transport Infrastructure OEMs

6.2.3 Device OEMs

6.2.4 System Integrators

6.2.5 Application Developers

6.2.6 Test, Measurement & Performance Specialists

6.2.7 Mobile Operators

6.2.8 MVNOs

6.2.9 Vertical Market End Users

7 Chapter 7: Key Ecosystem Players

7.1 Alliander (450connect/Utility Connect)

7.2 4K Solutions

7.3 AAS (Amphenol Antenna Solutions)

7.4 Accelleran

7.5 Ace Technologies Corporation

7.6 AceAxis

7.7 Adax

7.8 ADLINK Technology

7.9 ADRF (Advanced RF Technologies)

7.10 ADTRAN

7.11 ADVA Optical Networking

7.12 Advantech

7.13 Advantech Wireless

7.14 Affarii Technologies

7.15 Affirmed Networks

7.16 Airbus Defence and Space

7.17 Air-Lynx

7.18 Airspan Networks

7.19 Alea

7.20 Alepo

7.21 Allied Telesis

7.22 Alpha Networks

7.23 Alpha Technologies

7.24 Alstom

7.25 Altaeros Energies

7.26 Altair Semiconductor

7.27 Altiostar Networks

7.28 Alvarion Technologies

7.29 AM Telecom

7.30 Ambra Solutions/Ecotel

7.31 Amarisoft

7.32 Amdocs

7.33 American Tower Corporation

7.34 Anritsu Corporation

7.35 Ansaldo STS

7.36 Arcadyan Technology Corporation

7.37 Arete M

7.38 Argela/Netsia

7.39 ArgoNET

7.40 Aricent

7.41 ARM Holdings

7.42 Arqiva

7.43 Artemis Networks

7.44 Artesyn Embedded Technologies

7.45 Artiza Networks

7.46 ASELAN

7.47 ASOCS

7.48 Assured Wireless Corporation

7.49 ASTRI (Hong Kong Applied Science and Technology Research Institute)

7.50 AT&T

7.51 Atel Antennas

7.52 Athonet

7.53 Atos

7.54 AttoCore

7.55 Avanti Communications Group

7.56 Aviat Networks

7.57 Azcom Technology

7.58 Azetti Networks

7.59 BAE Systems

7.60 Baicells Technologies

7.61 Barrett Communications

7.62 BATS (Broadband Antenna Tracking Systems)

7.63 BCE (Bell Canada)

7.64 Benetel

7.65 BFDX (BelFone)

7.66 Bird Technologies

7.67 Bittium Corporation

7.68 Black & Veatch

7.69 Black Box Corporation

7.70 Blackned

7.71 Bombardier Transportation

7.72 BridgeWave Communications

7.73 Broadcom

7.74 BTI Wireless

7.75 C Spire

7.76 CACI International

7.77 CalAmp Corporation

7.78 Cambium Networks

7.79 Cambridge Consultants

7.80 Casa Systems

7.81 CCI (Communication Components Inc.)

7.82 CCI Systems

7.83 CCN (Cirrus Core Networks)

7.84 cellXica

7.85 Ceragon Networks

7.86 Challenge Networks

7.87 Chemring Technology Solutions

7.88 Cielo Networks

7.89 Ciena Corporation

7.90 Cirpack

7.91 Cisco Systems

7.92 Cloudstreet

7.93 CND (Core Network Dynamics)

7.94 Cobham Wireless

7.95 Codan Radio Communications

7.96 Coherent Logix

7.97 Collinear Networks

7.98 Comba Telecom

7.99 COMLAB

7.100 CommAgility

7.101 CommScope

7.102 Comrod Communication Group

7.103 Comtech Telecommunications Corporation

7.104 CONET Technologies

7.105 Connect Tech

7.106 Contela

7.107 Coriant

7.108 Cornet Technology

7.109 Corning/Spider Cloud Wireless

7.110 Cradlepoint

7.111 Crown Castle International Corporation

7.112 CS Corporation

7.113 CybertelBridge

7.114 CyPhy Works

7.115 Dali Wireless

7.116 DAMM Cellular Systems

7.117 Datang Mobile

7.118 Dell Technologies

7.119 Delta Electronics

7.120 Dialogic

7.121 DragonWave-X

7.122 Druid Software

7.123 DT (Deutsche Telekom)

7.124 Duons

7.125 EchoStar Corporation

7.126 EE

7.127 EION Wireless

7.128 Elbit Systems

7.129 ELUON Corporation

7.130 Embraer Defense & Security

7.131 ENENSYS Technologies

7.132 Ericsson

7.133 ETELM

7.134 Etherstack

7.135 Ethertronics

7.136 ETRI (Electronics & Telecommunications Research Institute, South
Korea)

7.137 Exalt Wireless

7.138 Excelerate Technology

7.139 EXFO

7.140 Expeto Wireless

7.141 Expway

7.142 ExteNet Systems

7.143 Eyecom Telecommunications Group

7.144 Facebook

7.145 Fairwaves

7.146 FastBack Networks

7.147 Federated Wireless

7.148 Fenix Group

7.149 Flash Private Mobile Networks

7.150 Foxcom

7.151 Fraunhofer FOKUS (Institute for Open Communication Systems)

7.152 Fraunhofer HHI (Heinrich Hertz Institute)

7.153 FreeWave Technologies

7.154 Ice Group

7.155 MVM Net

7.156 FRTek

7.157 Fujian Sunnada Network Technology

7.158 Fujitsu

7.159 Funkwerk

7.160 Future Technologies

7.161 Galtronics Corporation

7.162 GCT Semiconductor

7.163 GE (General Electric)

7.164 Gemtek Technology

7.165 Genaker

7.166 General Dynamics Mission Systems

7.167 GenXComm

7.168 GIKO GROUP

7.169 Gilat Satellite Networks

7.170 Globalstar

7.171 Goodman Networks

7.172 Goodmill Systems

7.173 Google/Alphabet

7.174 GRENTECH

7.175 GSI (GS Instech)

7.176 Guangzhou Iplook Technologies

7.177 GWT (Global Wireless Technologies)

7.178 Harris Corporation

7.179 HCL Technologies

7.180 HISPASAT Group

7.181 Hitachi

7.182 Hoimyung ICT

7.183 Honeywell International

7.184 Horsebridge Defence & Security

7.185 HPE (Hewlett Packard Enterprise)

7.186 Huawei

7.187 Hughes Network Systems

7.188 Hunter Technology

7.189 Hytera Communications

7.190 IAI (Israel Aerospace Industries)

7.191 Icom

7.192 IDY Corporation

7.193 Indra

7.194 InfoVista

7.195 Inmarsat

7.196 InnoWireless

7.197 Intel Corporation

7.198 InterDigital

7.199 Intracom Telecom

7.200 ip.access

7.201 IPITEK

7.202 Iridium Communications

7.203 ISCO International

7.204 IS-Wireless

7.205 Italtel

7.206 ITRI (Industrial Technology Research Institute, Taiwan)

7.207 JMA Wireless

7.208 JRC (Japan Radio Company)

7.209 Juni Global

7.210 Juniper Networks

7.211 JVCKENWOOD Corporation

7.212 Kapsch CarrierCom

7.213 Kathrein-Werke KG

7.214 KBR

7.215 Keysight Technologies

7.216 Kisan Telecom

7.217 Klas Telecom

7.218 Kleos

7.219 KMW

7.220 Koning & Hartman

7.221 Kontron S&T

7.222 KPN

7.223 KRTnet Corporation

7.224 KT Corporation

7.225 Kudelski Group

7.226 Kumu Networks

7.227 Kyocera Corporation

7.228 L3 Technologies

7.229 LCR Embedded Systems

7.230 Lemko Corporation

7.231 Leonardo

7.232 LG Electronics

7.233 LG Uplus

7.234 LGS Innovations

7.235 Ligado Networks

7.236 Lime Microsystems

7.237 LOCIVA

7.238 Lockheed Martin Corporation

7.239 LS telcom

7.240 Luminate Wireless

7.241 M87

7.242 Macquarie Group

7.243 Marlink

7.244 Martin UAV

7.245 Marvell Technology Group/Cavium

7.246 Mavenir Systems

7.247 MediaTek

7.248 Mellanox Technologies

7.249 MER Group

7.250 Metaswitch Networks

7.251 Microlab

7.252 Microwave Networks

7.253 MitraStar Technology Corporation

7.254 Mitsubishi Electric Corporation

7.255 Mobilicom

7.256 MoMe

7.257 Moseley Associates

7.258 Motorola Solutions

7.259 MP Antenna

7.260 MRV Communications

7.261 MTI (Microelectronics Technology, Inc.)

7.262 Mutualink

7.263 N.A.T.

7.264 Nash Technologies

7.265 NEC Corporation

7.266 Nemergent Solutions

7.267 Netas

7.268 NetMotion

7.269 NETSCOUT Systems

7.270 New Postcom Equipment

7.271 Nextivity

7.272 NI (National Instruments)

7.273 Node-H

7.274 Nokia Networks

7.275 Northrop Grumman Corporation

7.276 NuRAN Wireless

7.277 NVIS Communications

7.278 NXP Semiconductors

7.279 Oceus Networks

7.280 Octasic

7.281 ODN (Orbital Data Network)

7.282 Omnitele

7.283 Omoco

7.284 One2many

7.285 Oracle Communications

7.286 Orange

7.287 PacStar (Pacific Star Communications)

7.288 Panasonic Corporation

7.289 Panda Electronics Group

7.290 Panorama Antennas

7.291 Parallel Wireless

7.292 Parsons Corporation

7.293 PCTEL

7.294 pdvWireless

7.295 Pepro

7.296 Persistent Telecom

7.297 Phluido

7.298 Plover Bay Technologies

7.299 PMN (Private Mobile Networks)

7.300 Polaris Networks

7.301 Potevio

7.302 PRISMA Telecom Testing

7.303 Pulse Electronics

7.304 Qinetiq

7.305 Qualcomm

7.306 Quanta Computer

7.307 Qucell

7.308 Quintel

7.309 Quortus

7.310 RACOM Corporation

7.311 RAD Data Communications

7.312 Radio IP Software

7.313 Radisys Corporation

7.314 RADWIN

7.315 Rafael Advanced Defense Systems

7.316 Rajant Corporation

7.317 Range Networks

7.318 Raycap

7.319 Raytheon Company

7.320 Red Hat

7.321 RED Technologies

7.322 REDCOM Laboratories

7.323 Redline Communications

7.324 Rescue 42

7.325 RF Window

7.326 RFS (Radio Frequency Systems)

7.327 Ribbon Communications

7.328 RIVA Networks

7.329 Rivada Networks

7.330 Rockwell Collins

7.331 Rogers Communications

7.332 Rohde & Schwarz

7.333 Rohill

7.334 ROK Mobile

7.335 Rosenberger

7.336 Ruckus Wireless/ARRIS International

7.337 Saab

7.338 SAI Technology

7.339 SAIC (Science Applications International Corporation)

7.340 Samji Electronics

7.341 Samsung Electronics

7.342 Sapient Consulting

7.343 Sepura

7.344 Sequans Communications

7.345 SerComm Corporation

7.346 SES

7.347 Sevis Systems

7.348 SFR

7.349 Shentel (Shenandoah Telecommunications Company)

7.350 SIAE Microelettronica

7.351 Siemens

7.352 Sierra Wireless

7.353 Signal Information & Communication Corporation

7.354 Siklu Communication

7.355 Silicom

7.356 Simoco Wireless Solutions

7.357 Singtel/Optus

7.358 SiRRAN

7.359 Sistelbanda

7.360 SITRONICS

7.361 Siyata Mobile

7.362 SK Telecom

7.363 SK Telesys

7.364 SLA Corporation

7.365 SmartSky Networks

7.366 Smith Micro Software

7.367 Softil

7.368 SOLiD

7.369 Soliton Systems

7.370 Sonim Technologies

7.371 Sooktha

7.372 Southern Linc

7.373 Space Data Corporation

7.374 Spectra Group

7.375 Spirent Communications

7.376 Spreadtrum Communications

7.377 Sprint Corporation

7.378 SRS (Software Radio Systems)

7.379 Star Solutions

7.380 STMicroelectronics

7.381 sTraffic

7.382 StreamWIDE

7.383 Sumitomo Electric Industries

7.384 Swisscom

7.385 TacSat Networks

7.386 Tait Communications

7.387 Tampa Microwave

7.388 Tampnet

7.389 TASSTA

7.390 Tata Elxsi

7.391 TCL Communication

7.392 TCOM

7.393 Tech Mahindra

7.394 Tecom

7.395 Tecore Networks

7.396 TEKTELIC Communications

7.397 Telco Systems

7.398 Telefónica Group

7.399 Telenor Group

7.400 Tellabs

7.401 Telrad Networks

7.402 Telstra

7.403 Teltronic

7.404 Telum

7.405 Telus Corporation

7.406 TESSCO Technologies

7.407 Thales

7.408 TI (Texas Instruments)

7.409 TIM (Telecom Italia Mobile)

7.410 TLC Solutions

7.411 T-Mobile USA

7.412 Trópico

7.413 U.S. Cellular

7.414 UANGEL

7.415 UK Broadband

7.416 Ukkoverkot

7.417 URSYS

7.418 Utility Associates

7.419 Vanu

7.420 Vencore Labs

7.421 Verizon Communications

7.422 ViaSat

7.423 Viavi Solutions

7.424 VMware

7.425 VNC (Virtual Network Communications)

7.426 VNL (Vihaan Networks Limited)

7.427 Vodafone Group

7.428 VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland

7.429 Westell Technologies

7.430 WiPro

7.431 Wireless Telecom Group

7.432 WNC (Wistron NeWeb Corporation)

7.433 WTL (World Telecom Labs)

7.434 Wytec International

7.435 xG Technology

7.436 Xilinx

7.437 Z-Com

7.438 Zetel Solutions

7.439 Zinwave

7.440 ZMTel (Shanghai Zhongmi Communication Technology)

7.441 ZTE

8 Chapter 8: Market Sizing & Forecasts

8.1 Global Outlook for Private LTE & 5G Network Investments

8.2 Segmentation by Technology

8.2.1 LTE

8.2.2 5G

8.3 Segmentation by Submarket

8.3.1 RAN

8.3.2 Mobile Core

8.3.3 Backhaul & Transport

8.4 Segmentation by Vertical Market

8.4.1 Critical Communications & Industrial IoT

8.4.1.1 RAN

8.4.1.2 Mobile Core

8.4.1.3 Backhaul & Transport

8.4.2 Public Safety

8.4.2.1 RAN

8.4.2.2 Mobile Core

8.4.2.3 Backhaul & Transport

8.4.3 Military

8.4.3.1 RAN

8.4.3.2 Mobile Core

8.4.3.3 Backhaul & Transport

8.4.4 Energy

8.4.4.1 RAN

8.4.4.2 Mobile Core

8.4.4.3 Backhaul & Transport

8.4.5 Utilities

8.4.5.1 RAN

8.4.5.2 Mobile Core

8.4.5.3 Backhaul & Transport

8.4.6 Mining

8.4.6.1 RAN

8.4.6.2 Mobile Core

8.4.6.3 Backhaul & Transport

8.4.7 Transportation

8.4.7.1 RAN

8.4.7.2 Mobile Core

8.4.7.3 Backhaul & Transport

8.4.8 Factories & Warehouses

8.4.8.1 RAN

8.4.8.2 Mobile Core

8.4.8.3 Backhaul & Transport

8.4.9 Other Critical Communications & Industrial IoT Sectors

8.4.9.1 RAN

8.4.9.2 Mobile Core

8.4.9.3 Backhaul & Transport

8.4.10 Enterprise & Campus Environments

8.4.10.1 RAN

8.4.10.2 Mobile Core

8.4.10.3 Backhaul & Transport

8.4.11 Public Venues & Other Neutral Hosts

8.4.11.1 RAN

8.4.11.2 Mobile Core

8.4.11.3 Backhaul & Transport

8.5 Segmentation by Region

8.5.1 Submarkets

8.5.1.1 RAN

8.5.1.2 Mobile Core

8.5.1.3 Backhaul & Transport

8.5.2 Vertical Markets

8.5.2.1 Critical Communications & Industrial IoT

8.5.2.2 Enterprise & Campus Environments

8.5.2.3 Public Venues & Other Neutral Hosts

8.6 Asia Pacific

8.6.1 Submarkets

8.6.1.1 RAN

8.6.1.2 Mobile Core

8.6.1.3 Backhaul & Transport

8.6.2 Vertical Markets

8.6.2.1 Critical Communications & Industrial IoT

8.6.2.2 Enterprise & Campus Environments

8.6.2.3 Public Venues & Other Neutral Hosts

8.7 Eastern Europe

8.7.1 Submarkets

8.7.1.1 RAN

8.7.1.2 Mobile Core

8.7.1.3 Backhaul & Transport

8.7.2 Vertical Markets

8.7.2.1 Critical Communications & Industrial IoT

8.7.2.2 Enterprise & Campus Environments

8.7.2.3 Public Venues & Other Neutral Hosts

8.8 Latin & Central America

8.8.1 Submarkets

8.8.1.1 RAN

8.8.1.2 Mobile Core

8.8.1.3 Backhaul & Transport

8.8.2 Vertical Markets

8.8.2.1 Critical Communications & Industrial IoT

8.8.2.2 Enterprise & Campus Environments

8.8.2.3 Public Venues & Other Neutral Hosts

8.9 Middle East & Africa

8.9.1 Submarkets

8.9.1.1 RAN

8.9.1.2 Mobile Core

8.9.1.3 Backhaul & Transport

8.9.2 Vertical Markets

8.9.2.1 Critical Communications & Industrial IoT

8.9.2.2 Enterprise & Campus Environments

8.9.2.3 Public Venues & Other Neutral Hosts

8.10 North America

8.10.1 Submarkets

8.10.1.1 RAN

8.10.1.2 Mobile Core

8.10.1.3 Backhaul & Transport

8.10.2 Vertical Markets

8.10.2.1 Critical Communications & Industrial IoT

8.10.2.2 Enterprise & Campus Environments

8.10.2.3 Public Venues & Other Neutral Hosts

8.11 Western Europe

8.11.1 Submarkets

8.11.1.1 RAN

8.11.1.2 Mobile Core

8.11.1.3 Backhaul & Transport

8.11.2 Vertical Markets

8.11.2.1 Critical Communications & Industrial IoT

8.11.2.2 Enterprise & Campus Environments

8.11.2.3 Public Venues & Other Neutral Hosts

9 Chapter 9: Conclusion & Strategic Recommendations

9.1 Why is the Market Poised to Grow?

9.2 Competitive Industry Landscape: Acquisitions, Alliances & Consolidation

9.3 Geographic Outlook: Which Regions Offer the Highest Growth Potential?

9.4 Which Vertical will Lead the Market?

9.5 Which Spectrum Bands Dominate the Market?

9.6 Prospects of Unlicensed & Shared Spectrum Networks

9.7 Opening the Door for Industrial & Mission-Critical IoT

9.8 The Race for 5G: Implications for Private Wireless Networks

9.9 MVNO Arrangements for Critical Communications: Opportunities for Mobile
Core Investments

9.10 Emergence of the BYON (Build Your Own Network) Business Model

9.11 Commercial Operator-Branded Critical Communications LTE Platforms

9.12 Replacing GSM-R with LTE for Railway Communications

9.13 Growing Use of Deployable LTE Systems

9.14 Strategic Recommendations

9.14.1 Vertical Markets & End Users

9.14.2 LTE & 5G Network Infrastructure OEMs

9.14.3 System Integrators

9.14.4 Commercial & Private Mobile Operators

Please contact me if you have any questions, or wish to purchase a copy

I look forward to hearing from you.

Kind Regards

James Bennett
Director
SNS Research
Reef Tower
Jumeirah Lake Towers
Sheikh Zayed Road
Dubai, UAE

Email:  <mailto:[email-masked]> [email-masked]

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