Subject: 7. Best Practices (was RE: [Asrg] Trustic anti-spam system closes down because it doesn 't work)

From: Yakov Shafranovich <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 06 Aug 2003 14:03:13 -0400

At 12:52 PM 8/6/2003, Bob Wyman wrote:
>Margie Arbon wrote:
>.......
> > IMO, there is as much, if not more, danger in "censoring" mail
> > with contect filters - particularly the "black box" types.
>         You are, of course, correct. As you acknowledge, there is a
>danger that DNSBLs will be used to "censor" traffic on the net -- one
>may argue whether this danger is greater or less than the danger of
>censorship that is presented by content filters, nonetheless, it is
>important to acknowledge that the danger exists. Just as the dangers of
>content filters have been discussed in this group, it is appropriate
>that we should discuss the danger of censorship that can come from
>DNSBLS.

This danger would apply to many other anti-spam technologies. It seems that 
this more of a policy issue with specific parties operating the DNSBLs and 
other tools, rather than a technical one. The various issues of how a 
specific tool operates, how its data is collected, whether its operations 
are audited, etc. are very important and should mentioned in a BCP for 
anti-spam tool developers.

Within a consent framework, the individual administrator or developer would 
choose which sources of information to rely on. While the dangers of using 
incorrect information apply, it is really the fault of the individual 
administrators or developers who choose to rely on unaudited or incorrect 
data coming from anti-spam tools. No one forces administrators today to use 
specific DNSBLs, they choose to do so themselves. The issues of choosing a 
reliable source of information is something to be mentioned in a BCP for 
mail administrators.

In any case, anti-spam tools and proposals including DNSBLs must be 
accurate as stated in the requirements document 
(http://www.irtf.org/asrg/draft-irtf-asrg-requirements-xx-01.txt):

----------------snip---------------
2.9  Doesn't Interfere With The Delivery Of Legitimate Mail

The proposal MUST consider, address and keep at a minimum impacts on 
[legitimate] messaging traffic within the MTS.

2.9.1     Rationale:

Proposals must consider the reasons for successful widespread deployment of 
the current MTS: low latency, high deliverability, scalability, 
functionality for multiple content types, etc.  Authors should develop 
proposals that minimize impact in these critical areas for [legitimate] MTS 
uses.  Thus a successful proposal will impact only [spam] and not 
[legitimate] messaging traffic.
------------snip----------  

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