Subject: [Cfrg] Shared Secret Provisioning Protocol

From: Robert Moskowitz <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 19 Dec 2002 08:12:32 -0500

The referenced Internet Draft has evolved out of my work to better manage 
the RADIUS Client secret that will become very important with the 
deployment of 802.1x authenticators (switches and wireless APs).  It has 
become apparent, that there are many shared secrets that can be provisioned 
in this manner so I separated the provisioning protocol off as a 'theory' 
document and will follow with first implementations of SSPP over SNMP and 
HTTP and then applying SSPP for RADIUS Client secrets and User secrets.

I offer this document to this group, as I heavily cut and pasted the crypto 
portion from the NIST KMS workshop document, that in turn took from X9.42 
and X9.63.

Did I get the crypto copying right (going from PFS graphics to asccii)?

NIST 'allows' for key expansion to supply the number of keying bits needed 
from lesser bits.  I do not get into the discussion (beyond basic warnings 
I copied from the NIST doc) about how much expansion you can do.

And, of course, when I apply this to RADIUS client secret, I am going to 
actually provide values for the Diffie-Hellman parameters and keysizes and 
which SHA hash to use....

http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-moskowitz-shared-secret-provprotocol-00.txt

I already have one erratta:

I left out the logic in the protocol for the case where the SSPP server 
cannot validate the signature sent by the client.

Robert Moskowitz
TruSecure Corporation
Security Interest EMail: [email-masked]

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