Subject: [dnsop] BIND and OpenSSL's RSA signature forging issue

From: Ben Laurie <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 08 Sep 2006 11:40:44 +0100

I've just noticed that BIND is vulnerable to:

http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20060905.txt

Executive summary:

RRSIGs can be forged if your RSA key has exponent 3, which is BIND's
default. Note that the issue is in the resolver, not the server.

Fix:

Upgrade OpenSSL.

Issue:

Since I've been told often that most of the world won't upgrade
resolvers, presumably most of the world will be vulnerable to this
problem for a long time.

Solution:

Don't use exponent 3 anymore. This can, of course, be done server-side,
where the responsible citizens live, allegedly.

Side benefit:

You all get to test emergency key roll! Start your motors, gentlemen!

Cheers,

Ben.

-- 
http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html           http://www.links.org/

"There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he
doesn't mind who gets the credit." - Robert Woodruff
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