Subject: [Dtls-iot] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-schmitt-two-way-authentication-for-iot-00.txt

From: Corinna Schmitt <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 04 Jul 2013 12:16:13 +0200

Dear DICE members,

please, find below the announcement of our submission dealing with first 
ideas to brind dtls-based security with two-way authentication to IoT.
See you in Berlin.

Regards,
Corinna

A new version of I-D, draft-schmitt-two-way-authentication-for-iot-00.txt
has been successfully submitted by Corinna Schmitt and posted to the
IETF repository.

Filename:	 draft-schmitt-two-way-authentication-for-iot
Revision:	 00
Title:		 DTLS-based Security with two-way Authentication for IoT
Creation date:	 2013-07-04
Group:		 Individual Submission
Number of pages: 12
URL:             http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-schmitt-two-way-authentication-for-iot-00.txt
Status:          http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-schmitt-two-way-authentication-for-iot
Htmlized:        http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-schmitt-two-way-authentication-for-iot-00

Abstract:
    In this draft the first key idea for a full two-way authentication
    security scheme for the Internet of Things (IoT) based on existing
    Internet standards, specifically the Datagram Transport Layer
    Security (DTLS) protocol, is introduced.  By relying on an
    established standard, existing implementations, engineering
    techniques, and security infrastructure can be reused, which enables
    an easy security uptake.  The proposed security scheme is, therefore,
    based on RSA, the most widely used public key cryptography algorithm.
    It is designed to work over standard communication stacks that offer
    UDP/IPv6 networking for Low power Wireless Personal Area Networks
    (6LoWPANs).

The IETF Secretariat

---

From: Rene Struik <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 04 Jul 2013 14:44:42 -0400

Dear Corinna:

I read your draft and reflected somewhat upon the implications should 
RSA-2048, as you suggest, be implemented with, potentially, billions of 
constrained devices. While the paper by Hu et al that you referenced 
(your ref [4]) to illustrate viability does provide some data points re 
computational complexity, code size, etc., also relative to using, e.g., 
a P-192 curve, it does seem to suggest that public/private key pairs are 
to be installed on each device prior to operational use, presumably 
during device manufacturing, after generating these *off-device*. I am 
curious as to whether you also considered *on-device* public key pair 
generation and have some insight on viability of doing so with RSA on a 
constrained device (e.g., Rabin test, timings, code size, and 
vulnerability against implementation attacks). When DTLS is used with 
RSA-2048 and communication relies on small-sized links (such as is the 
case with IEEE 802.15.4), fragmentation may occur. It would help to 
understand the impact of fragmentation, also in light of reported 
communication overhead and success/failure rates in, e.g., Section 5.3 
of draft-keoh-lwig-dtls-iot-01.

Best regards, Rene

On 7/4/2013 6:16 AM, Corinna Schmitt wrote:
> Dear DICE members,
>
> please, find below the announcement of our submission dealing with 
> first ideas to brind dtls-based security with two-way authentication 
> to IoT.
> See you in Berlin.
>
> Regards,
> Corinna
>
> URL: 
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-schmitt-two-way-authentication-for-iot-00.txt
> Status: 
> http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-schmitt-two-way-authentication-for-iot
> Htmlized: 
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-schmitt-two-way-authentication-for-iot-00
>
>
> Abstract:
> _______________________________________________
> dtls-iot mailing list
> [email-masked]
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dtls-iot

-- 
email: [email-masked] | Skype: rstruik
cell: +1 (647) 867-5658 | US: +1 (415) 690-7363

---

From: Corinna Schmitt <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 05 Jul 2013 10:08:54 +0200

Dear Rene,

thanks for comment.
This is just a preliminary draft and we are still under development. But 
you are right with your argument.
The solution we currently have is working with keys and certificates 
that must be put on the devices before deployment. Our future plan is to 
make it more flexible and, therefore, we have to face your suggestions 
for sure.

Sorry, for not presenting a proper and more detailed answer but this is 
currently insight knowledge. In order to present a better answer soon 
(e.g. Berlin) I send your comment also to Wen Hu who is the best person 
to answer it proper.

Best regards,
Corinna

Am 04.07.13 20:44, schrieb Rene Struik:
> RSA-2048, as you suggest, be implemented with, potentially, billions 
> of constrained devices. While the paper by Hu et al that you 
> referenced (your ref [4]) to illustrate viability does provide some 
> data points re computational complexity, code size, etc., also 
> relative to using, e.g., a P-192 curve, it does seem to suggest that 
> public/private key pairs are to be installed on each device prior to 
> operational use, presumably during device manufacturing, after 
> generating these *off-device*. I am curious as to whether you also 
> considered *on-device* public key pair generation and have some 
> insight on viability of doing so with RSA on a constrained device 
> (e.g., Rabin test, timings, code size, and vulnerability against 
> implementation attacks). When DTLS is used with RSA-2048 and 
> communication relies on small-sized links (such as is the case with 
> IEEE 802.15.4), fragmentation may occur. It would help to understand 
> the impact of fragmentation, also in light of reported communication 
> overhead and success/failure rates in, e.g., Section 5.3 of 
> draft-keoh-lwig-dtls-iot-01.
>
> Best regards, Rene
>
>
>

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