Subject: [dtn-security] Re(many): Is there a "secure" referenceimplementation of the DTN stack?
From: Peter Lovell <[email-masked]>
To: "Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)" <[email-masked]>, "Eddy, Wesley M. (GRC-MS00)[Verizon]" <[email-masked]>
Cc: [email-masked]
Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2009 08:28:42 -0400
List-Id: DTN Security Discussion <dtn-security.maillists.intel-research.net>

Hi Graham,

yes - an ad-hoc key server in a DTN environment doesn't make a lot of sense.

We've tended to use PKI keys in examples as they simplify the
distribution issue and have reasonable lifetimes for the tasks but, as
you point out, key loss is problematic. Requiring CRL access does rather
defeat the whole point of DTN.

If it is important that you react very quickly to key loss, then group
keying may be a better solution. If a node is compromised, the group is
rekeyed as quickly as the key server can do it (after it finds out).
Some nodes might be disconnected for a while and still have old keys but
they won't be getting much (or any) traffic so this can be dealt with.
The new key from the key server should arrive about the same time as any
bundles using the new key. Obviously, group membership in this scenario
is based upon being authorized, rather than which authorized nodes are
currently connected (many groups work this way).

Cheers.....Peter

On Tue, Jun 30, 2009, Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
<[email-masked]> wrote:

>Eddy, Wesley M. (GRC-MS00)[Verizon] wrote:
>> As Peter mentioned earlier, even with a complete BSP implementation,
>> you still have to figure out how to do key management on your own.
>> This is the hardest and most complex part,
>It certainly is. Since we are worried about security, we can consider
>military or banking use, and think about the use cases, for isntance,
>for 1) initial key distribution to the whole network 2) addition of a
>new member 3) individual key revocation 4) mass update of all key? (if
>even needed, and probably just use case 1)
>
>Some schemes, like Prophet, seem ok, but, if I understand correctly,
>keys have a specific lifetime and then expire. What if the DTN device
>falls into the wrong hands before then? One would want to revoke it
>immediately, would one not?
>
>How does one distribute the keys, given that it makes little on no sense
>to have a key server in an ad hoc network? (I suppose that before every
>battle or at the start of each work day, each user could bring their
>device within range of a "secure" key server, but that seems rather
>contrived). If the number of nodes will never vary, then each could be
>pre-programmed with the appropriate keys, but this seems rather
>restrictive, and again there is the problem of revocation.
>
>This does need some serious thinking, which is probably why I have been
>instructed to "ignore it until a  future release" (lucky me ;-)
>
>Thanks again for the input. I am now off to struggle with Peter's
>"stony" description of the existing security mechanism.
>
>With best wishes,
>
>Graham
>
>
>>  if you need it to scale
>> to some level, be robust to disconnection, delay, and low bandwidth,
>> and if you rely on the established keys to carry critical traffic.
>> The BSP is only part of the solution you need, and the rest is left
>> as an exercise to the user ...
>>
>> ---------------------------
>> Wes Eddy

Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2009 10:40:04 +0800
From: "Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)" <[email-masked]>
Organization: Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd
To: "Eddy, Wesley M. (GRC-MS00)[Verizon]" <[email-masked]>
Cc: "[email-masked]" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: [dtn-security] Re(2): Re(2): Is there a "secure" referenceimplementation of the DTN stack?

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Eddy, Wesley M. (GRC-MS00)[Verizon] wrote:
> As Peter mentioned earlier, even with a complete BSP implementation,
> you still have to figure out how to do key management on your own.
> This is the hardest and most complex part,
It certainly is. Since we are worried about security, we can consider 
military or banking use, and think about the use cases, for isntance, 
for 1) initial key distribution to the whole network 2) addition of a 
new member 3) individual key revocation 4) mass update of all key? (if 
even needed, and probably just use case 1)

Some schemes, like Prophet, seem ok, but, if I understand correctly, 
keys have a specific lifetime and then expire. What if the DTN device 
falls into the wrong hands before then? One would want to revoke it 
immediately, would one not?

How does one distribute the keys, given that it makes little on no sense 
to have a key server in an ad hoc network? (I suppose that before every 
battle or at the start of each work day, each user could bring their 
device within range of a "secure" key server, but that seems rather 
contrived). If the number of nodes will never vary, then each could be 
pre-programmed with the appropriate keys, but this seems rather 
restrictive, and again there is the problem of revocation.

This does need some serious thinking, which is probably why I have been 
instructed to "ignore it until a  future release" (lucky me ;-)

Thanks again for the input. I am now off to struggle with Peter's 
"stony" description of the existing security mechanism.

With best wishes,

Graham

>  if you need it to scale
> to some level, be robust to disconnection, delay, and low bandwidth,
> and if you rely on the established keys to carry critical traffic.
> The BSP is only part of the solution you need, and the rest is left
> as an exercise to the user ...
>
> ---------------------------
> Wes Eddy
> Network & Systems Architect
> Verizon FNS / NASA GRC
> Office: (216) 433-6682
> ---------------------------
>
>   
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: [email-masked] [mailto:dtn-
>> [email-masked]] On Behalf Of Peter Lovell
>> Sent: Monday, June 29, 2009 8:34 AM
>> To: Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
>> Cc: [email-masked]
>> Subject: [dtn-security] Re(2): Re(2): Is there a "secure"
>> referenceimplementation of the DTN stack?
>>
>> Hi Graham,
>>
>> the best document at this time is the Bundle Security Protocol
>> Specification, available at <http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-irtf-dtnrg-
>> bundle-security-08.txt>
>>
>> This is quite a long document and describes both the general approach
>> with ciphersuites and the specific implementation of suites for Bundle
>> Authentication (BA), Payload Integrity (PI), Payload Confidentiality
>> (PC) and Extension Security (EA). In your search for A Rosetta Stone,
>> you'll find that this is about as stony as it gets. It will take some
>> time to discern the humour in that statement :)
>>
>> Regards.....Peter
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Jun 29, 2009, Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
>> <[email-masked]> wrote:
>>
>>     
>>> hi, Peter,
>>>
>>>   firs dumb question - is here a single document which discusses the
>>> security aspects built into the reference stack?
>>>
>>> What I have is someone who "wants DTN with security" but only because
>>>       
>> he
>>     
>>> has been told from above that that is what he wants.
>>>
>>> He wants to take "a slow, phased approach, maybe just starting with
>>> adding (H)MAC to the link establish, then working up to more in later
>>> phases". It sounds from what you say that HMAC is already there (for
>>> data bundles only? Control plane too?)
>>>
>>> He is not too clear about what he wants, possibly because he himself
>>>       
>> is
>>     
>>> being given instructions which vary. He has a cryptography (but not
>>> necessarily a security) expert from the local university who is
>>> "analyzing the code to find weak points" - some weeks I am just
>>>       
>> supposed
>>     
>>> to fill these weak points with code, and other weeks I am supposed to
>>>       
>> be
>>     
>>> providing security analysis and advice
>>>
>>> I have been looking around, but I suppose that I ought have started by
>>> asking if there is a Rosseta Stone for security in the reference stack.
>>>
>>> Sorry to be such a nuisance.
>>>
>>> Thanks, as always, for your help.
>>>
>>> With best wishes,
>>>
>>> Graham
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Peter Lovell wrote:
>>> Hi Graham,
>>>
>>> threats such as the ones you describe are handled by the Bundle
>>>       
>> Security
>>     
>>> Protocol (BSP) code in the RI. Your application does not have to do
>>> encryption etc - that is part of BSP RI code.
>>>
>>> You *do* have to handle management of keys and that means that you have
>>> to write some code that the RI code will call. The thumbnail sketch is
>>> that the RI code needs protection applied to something (small, such as
>>> an ephemeral key) and your code needs to select an appropriate key and
>>> do it. There will be some sample code for this but it's not there yet.
>>>
>>> Each bundle can have HMAC to protect against changes and also against
>>> DOS injection attacks. This is standard already.
>>>
>>> In short, you'll find that the fundamental capabilities you need are
>>> already present but you have to supply the key-management code as
>>> appropriate for your key mechanism.
>>>
>>> Regards.....Peter
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sun, Jun 28, 2009, Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
>>> <[email-masked]> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> That;'s the problem - I am not a security expert?
>>>
>>> I guess encryption would be provided by the application which uses DTN?
>>>
>>> What about add a MAC (or HMAC) for the link established stuff (or even
>>> every bundle)?
>>>
>>> How to denying man in the middle attacks or spoofed bundles, DOS at the
>>> network layer by injecting many fake packets? That sort of thing ...
>>>
>>> Thanks again for your help, Peter.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Peter Lovell wrote:
>>>
>>> Hi Graham,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> there is an agreed upon standard "reference implementation" of DTN 2.6
>>> and Oasys 1.3, but  it lacks security features.
>>>
>>>
>>> what security features do you find missing? The RI is not a turnkey
>>> solution but more of a "reference framework".
>>>
>>> I'm trying to help but am unsure of what's lacking.
>>>
>>> Regards.....Peter
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sun, Jun 28, 2009, Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
>>> <[email-masked]> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> hi, Peter,
>>>
>>> there is an agreed upon standard "reference implementation" of DTN 2.6
>>> and Oasys 1.3, but  it lacks security features.
>>>
>>> Now, let us say that someone wants a "secure" implementation - but
>>> doesn't care about the details of "secure", just that it is generally
>>> agreed to be "secure" (or (much) more so than the standard
>>> implementation. Is there a reference build for that which can be
>>>
>>> downloaded?
>>>
>>> My guess is that everyone's perception of "secure" differs and that
>>>       
>> even
>>     
>>> for one person it is a matter of trade-offs, but I just though that I
>>> would  ask if there is some consensus on what it means for DTN to be
>>> "secure".
>>>
>>> Thanks very much for taking the time to reply.
>>>
>>> With best wishes,
>>>
>>> Graham
>>>
>>>
>>> Peter Lovell wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sun, Jun 28, 2009, Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
>>> <[email-masked]> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Is there a "secure" reference implementation of the DTN stack available
>>> for download? Is there even agreement of what a "secure" implementation
>>> should be, or is it all a question of trade-offs?
>>>
>>> Thanks in advance for any help.
>>>
>>> Graham
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Hi Graham,
>>>
>>> I'm not sure what you're expecting when you refer to a "secure"
>>> reference implementation. Do you mean one with the security protocols,
>>> or one that had been hardened, or one that has been certified by some
>>> organization or other?
>>>
>>> If you can give a little more context we can help fill in what you
>>>       
>> need.
>>     
>>> Cheers.....Peter
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> Technical Director
>>> Leonix Solutions (Pte) Ltd
>>> 18 Boon Lay Way
>>> #09-95 TradeHub 21
>>> Singapore 609966
>>> Telephone:+65 6316 9968
>>> Fax: +65 6316 9208
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> Technical Director
>>> Leonix Solutions (Pte) Ltd
>>> 18 Boon Lay Way
>>> #09-95 TradeHub 21
>>> Singapore 609966
>>> Telephone:+65 6316 9968
>>> Fax: +65 6316 9208
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> dtn-security mailing list
>>> [email-masked]
>>> http://maillists.intel-research.net/mailman/listinfo/dtn-security
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> Technical Director
>>> Leonix Solutions (Pte) Ltd
>>> 18 Boon Lay Way
>>> #09-95 TradeHub 21
>>> Singapore 609966
>>> Telephone:+65 6316 9968
>>> Fax: +65 6316 9208
>>>       
>> _______________________________________________
>> dtn-security mailing list
>> [email-masked]
>> http://maillists.intel-research.net/mailman/listinfo/dtn-security
>>     
>
>   

-- 
Technical Director
Leonix Solutions (Pte) Ltd
18 Boon Lay Way
#09-95 TradeHub 21
Singapore 609966
Telephone:+65 6316 9968
Fax: +65 6316 9208

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Eddy, Wesley M. (GRC-MS00)[Verizon] wrote:
<blockquote
 cite="mid:[email-masked]"
 type="cite">
  <pre wrap="">As Peter mentioned earlier, even with a complete BSP implementation,
you still have to figure out how to do key management on your own.
This is the hardest and most complex part,</pre>
</blockquote>
It certainly is. Since we are worried about security, we can consider
military or banking use, and think about the use cases, for isntance,
for 1) initial key distribution
to the whole network 2) addition of a new member 3) individual key
revocation 4) mass update of all key? (if even needed, and probably
just use case 1)<br>
<br>
Some schemes, like Prophet, seem ok, but, if I understand correctly,
keys have a specific lifetime and then expire. What if the DTN device
falls into the wrong hands before then? One would want to revoke it
immediately, would one not?<br>
<br>
How does one distribute the keys, given that it makes little on no
sense to have a key server in an ad hoc network? (I suppose that before
every battle or at the start of each work day, each user could bring
their device within range of a "secure" key server, but that seems
rather contrived). If the number of nodes will never vary, then each
could be pre-programmed with the appropriate keys, but this seems
rather restrictive, and again there is the problem of revocation.<br>
<br>
This does need some serious thinking, which is probably why I have been
instructed to "ignore it until a&nbsp; future release" (lucky me ;-)<br>
<br>
Thanks again for the input. I am now off to struggle with Peter's
"stony" description of the existing security mechanism.<br>
<br>
With best wishes,<br>
<br>
Graham<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote
 cite="mid:[email-masked]"
 type="cite">
  <pre wrap=""> if you need it to scale
to some level, be robust to disconnection, delay, and low bandwidth,
and if you rely on the established keys to carry critical traffic.
The BSP is only part of the solution you need, and the rest is left
as an exercise to the user ...

---------------------------
Wes Eddy
Network &amp; Systems Architect
Verizon FNS / NASA GRC
Office: (216) 433-6682
---------------------------

  </pre>
  <blockquote type="cite">
    <pre wrap="">-----Original Message-----
From: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:[email-masked]">[email-masked]</a> [<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="mailto:dtn">mailto:dtn</a>-
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:[email-masked]">[email-masked]</a>] On Behalf Of Peter Lovell
Sent: Monday, June 29, 2009 8:34 AM
To: Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
Cc: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:[email-masked]">[email-masked]</a>
Subject: [dtn-security] Re(2): Re(2): Is there a "secure"
referenceimplementation of the DTN stack?

Hi Graham,

the best document at this time is the Bundle Security Protocol
Specification, available at <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-irtf-dtnrg-bundle-security-08.txt">&lt;http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-irtf-dtnrg-
bundle-security-08.txt&gt;</a>

This is quite a long document and describes both the general approach
with ciphersuites and the specific implementation of suites for Bundle
Authentication (BA), Payload Integrity (PI), Payload Confidentiality
(PC) and Extension Security (EA). In your search for A Rosetta Stone,
you'll find that this is about as stony as it gets. It will take some
time to discern the humour in that statement :)

Regards.....Peter

On Mon, Jun 29, 2009, Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:[email-masked]">&lt;[email-masked]&gt;</a> wrote:

    </pre>
    <blockquote type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">hi, Peter,

&nbsp; firs dumb question - is here a single document which discusses the
security aspects built into the reference stack?

What I have is someone who "wants DTN with security" but only because
      </pre>
    </blockquote>
    <pre wrap="">he
    </pre>
    <blockquote type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">has been told from above that that is what he wants.

He wants to take "a slow, phased approach, maybe just starting with
adding (H)MAC to the link establish, then working up to more in later
phases". It sounds from what you say that HMAC is already there (for
data bundles only? Control plane too?)

He is not too clear about what he wants, possibly because he himself
      </pre>
    </blockquote>
    <pre wrap="">is
    </pre>
    <blockquote type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">being given instructions which vary. He has a cryptography (but not
necessarily a security) expert from the local university who is
"analyzing the code to find weak points" - some weeks I am just
      </pre>
    </blockquote>
    <pre wrap="">supposed
    </pre>
    <blockquote type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">to fill these weak points with code, and other weeks I am supposed to
      </pre>
    </blockquote>
    <pre wrap="">be
    </pre>
    <blockquote type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">providing security analysis and advice

I have been looking around, but I suppose that I ought have started by
asking if there is a Rosseta Stone for security in the reference stack.

Sorry to be such a nuisance.

Thanks, as always, for your help.

With best wishes,

Graham

Peter Lovell wrote:
Hi Graham,

threats such as the ones you describe are handled by the Bundle
      </pre>
    </blockquote>
    <pre wrap="">Security
    </pre>
    <blockquote type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">Protocol (BSP) code in the RI. Your application does not have to do
encryption etc - that is part of BSP RI code.

You *do* have to handle management of keys and that means that you have
to write some code that the RI code will call. The thumbnail sketch is
that the RI code needs protection applied to something (small, such as
an ephemeral key) and your code needs to select an appropriate key and
do it. There will be some sample code for this but it's not there yet.

Each bundle can have HMAC to protect against changes and also against
DOS injection attacks. This is standard already.

In short, you'll find that the fundamental capabilities you need are
already present but you have to supply the key-management code as
appropriate for your key mechanism.

Regards.....Peter

On Sun, Jun 28, 2009, Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:[email-masked]">&lt;[email-masked]&gt;</a> wrote:

That;'s the problem - I am not a security expert?

I guess encryption would be provided by the application which uses DTN?

What about add a MAC (or HMAC) for the link established stuff (or even
every bundle)?

How to denying man in the middle attacks or spoofed bundles, DOS at the
network layer by injecting many fake packets? That sort of thing ...

Thanks again for your help, Peter.

Peter Lovell wrote:

Hi Graham,

there is an agreed upon standard "reference implementation" of DTN 2.6
and Oasys 1.3, but  it lacks security features.

what security features do you find missing? The RI is not a turnkey
solution but more of a "reference framework".

I'm trying to help but am unsure of what's lacking.

Regards.....Peter

On Sun, Jun 28, 2009, Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:[email-masked]">&lt;[email-masked]&gt;</a> wrote:

hi, Peter,

there is an agreed upon standard "reference implementation" of DTN 2.6
and Oasys 1.3, but  it lacks security features.

Now, let us say that someone wants a "secure" implementation - but
doesn't care about the details of "secure", just that it is generally
agreed to be "secure" (or (much) more so than the standard
implementation. Is there a reference build for that which can be

downloaded?

My guess is that everyone's perception of "secure" differs and that
      </pre>
    </blockquote>
    <pre wrap="">even
    </pre>
    <blockquote type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">for one person it is a matter of trade-offs, but I just though that I
would  ask if there is some consensus on what it means for DTN to be
"secure".

Thanks very much for taking the time to reply.

With best wishes,

Graham

Peter Lovell wrote:

On Sun, Jun 28, 2009, Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:[email-masked]">&lt;[email-masked]&gt;</a> wrote:

Is there a "secure" reference implementation of the DTN stack available
for download? Is there even agreement of what a "secure" implementation
should be, or is it all a question of trade-offs?

Thanks in advance for any help.

Graham

Hi Graham,

I'm not sure what you're expecting when you refer to a "secure"
reference implementation. Do you mean one with the security protocols,
or one that had been hardened, or one that has been certified by some
organization or other?

If you can give a little more context we can help fill in what you
      </pre>
    </blockquote>
    <pre wrap="">need.
    </pre>
    <blockquote type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">Cheers.....Peter

--
Technical Director
Leonix Solutions (Pte) Ltd
18 Boon Lay Way
#09-95 TradeHub 21
Singapore 609966
Telephone:+65 6316 9968
Fax: +65 6316 9208

--
Technical Director
Leonix Solutions (Pte) Ltd
18 Boon Lay Way
#09-95 TradeHub 21
Singapore 609966
Telephone:+65 6316 9968
Fax: +65 6316 9208

_______________________________________________
dtn-security mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:[email-masked]">[email-masked]</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://maillists.intel-research.net/mailman/listinfo/dtn-security">http://maillists.intel-research.net/mailman/listinfo/dtn-security</a>

--
Technical Director
Leonix Solutions (Pte) Ltd
18 Boon Lay Way
#09-95 TradeHub 21
Singapore 609966
Telephone:+65 6316 9968
Fax: +65 6316 9208
      </pre>
    </blockquote>
    <pre wrap="">
_______________________________________________
dtn-security mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:[email-masked]">[email-masked]</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://maillists.intel-research.net/mailman/listinfo/dtn-security">http://maillists.intel-research.net/mailman/listinfo/dtn-security</a>
    </pre>
  </blockquote>
  <pre wrap=""><!---->
  </pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
<pre class="moz-signature" cols="80">-- 
Technical Director
Leonix Solutions (Pte) Ltd
18 Boon Lay Way
#09-95 TradeHub 21
Singapore 609966
Telephone:+65 6316 9968
Fax: +65 6316 9208
</pre>
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From: Peter Lovell <[email-masked]>
To: "Eddy, Wesley M. (GRC-MS00)[Verizon]" <[email-masked]>, "Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2009 10:02:54 -0400
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: [dtn-security] Re(2): Re(2): Re(2): Is there a "secure" referenceimplementation of the DTN stack?

Hi Wes,

very true. 

I will soon be doing some work to help this within RI. I regard key
distribution between nodes as a control-plane issue and one with which
systems designers must deal. But we can help the problem of using keys
within an individual node. Pre-placing PKI certificates will be an
adequate solution for some systems and that's what I'll be using to
start with.

Regards.....Peter

On Mon, Jun 29, 2009, Eddy, Wesley M. (GRC-MS00)[Verizon]
<[email-masked]> wrote:

>As Peter mentioned earlier, even with a complete BSP implementation,
>you still have to figure out how to do key management on your own.
>This is the hardest and most complex part, if you need it to scale
>to some level, be robust to disconnection, delay, and low bandwidth,
>and if you rely on the established keys to carry critical traffic.
>The BSP is only part of the solution you need, and the rest is left
>as an exercise to the user ...
>
>---------------------------
>Wes Eddy
>Network & Systems Architect
>Verizon FNS / NASA GRC
>Office: (216) 433-6682
>---------------------------
>
>>-----Original Message-----
>>From: [email-masked] [mailto:dtn-
>>[email-masked]] On Behalf Of Peter Lovell
>>Sent: Monday, June 29, 2009 8:34 AM
>>To: Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
>>Cc: [email-masked]
>>Subject: [dtn-security] Re(2): Re(2): Is there a "secure"
>>referenceimplementation of the DTN stack?
>>
>>Hi Graham,
>>
>>the best document at this time is the Bundle Security Protocol
>>Specification, available at <http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-irtf-dtnrg-
>>bundle-security-08.txt>
>>
>>This is quite a long document and describes both the general approach
>>with ciphersuites and the specific implementation of suites for Bundle
>>Authentication (BA), Payload Integrity (PI), Payload Confidentiality
>>(PC) and Extension Security (EA). In your search for A Rosetta Stone,
>>you'll find that this is about as stony as it gets. It will take some
>>time to discern the humour in that statement :)
>>
>>Regards.....Peter

From: Peter Lovell <[email-masked]>
To: "Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2009 08:34:00 -0400
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: [dtn-security] Re(2): Re(2): Is there a "secure" reference implementation of the DTN stack?

Hi Graham,

the best document at this time is the Bundle Security Protocol
Specification, available at <http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-irtf-dtnrg-
bundle-security-08.txt>

This is quite a long document and describes both the general approach
with ciphersuites and the specific implementation of suites for Bundle
Authentication (BA), Payload Integrity (PI), Payload Confidentiality
(PC) and Extension Security (EA). In your search for A Rosetta Stone,
you'll find that this is about as stony as it gets. It will take some
time to discern the humour in that statement :)

Regards.....Peter

On Mon, Jun 29, 2009, Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
<[email-masked]> wrote:

>hi, Peter,
>
>  firs dumb question - is here a single document which discusses the
>security aspects built into the reference stack? 
>
>What I have is someone who "wants DTN with security" but only because he
>has been told from above that that is what he wants. 
>
>He wants to take "a slow, phased approach, maybe just starting with
>adding (H)MAC to the link establish, then working up to more in later
>phases". It sounds from what you say that HMAC is already there (for
>data bundles only? Control plane too?)
>
>He is not too clear about what he wants, possibly because he himself  is
>being given instructions which vary. He has a cryptography (but not
>necessarily a security) expert from the local university who is
>"analyzing the code to find weak points" - some weeks I am just supposed
>to fill these weak points with code, and other weeks I am supposed to be
>providing security analysis and advice
>
>I have been looking around, but I suppose that I ought have started by
>asking if there is a Rosseta Stone for security in the reference stack.
>
>Sorry to be such a nuisance.
>
>Thanks, as always, for your help.
>
>With best wishes,
>
>Graham 
>
>
>
>Peter Lovell wrote:
>Hi Graham,
>
>threats such as the ones you describe are handled by the Bundle Security
>Protocol (BSP) code in the RI. Your application does not have to do
>encryption etc - that is part of BSP RI code.
>
>You *do* have to handle management of keys and that means that you have
>to write some code that the RI code will call. The thumbnail sketch is
>that the RI code needs protection applied to something (small, such as
>an ephemeral key) and your code needs to select an appropriate key and
>do it. There will be some sample code for this but it's not there yet.
>
>Each bundle can have HMAC to protect against changes and also against
>DOS injection attacks. This is standard already.
>
>In short, you'll find that the fundamental capabilities you need are
>already present but you have to supply the key-management code as
>appropriate for your key mechanism.
>
>Regards.....Peter
>
>
>On Sun, Jun 28, 2009, Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
><[email-masked]> wrote:
>
>  
>That;'s the problem - I am not a security expert?
>
>I guess encryption would be provided by the application which uses DTN?
>
>What about add a MAC (or HMAC) for the link established stuff (or even
>every bundle)?
>
>How to denying man in the middle attacks or spoofed bundles, DOS at the
>network layer by injecting many fake packets? That sort of thing ...
>
>Thanks again for your help, Peter.
>
>
>
>Peter Lovell wrote:
>    
>Hi Graham,
>
>
>      
> there is an agreed upon standard "reference implementation" of DTN 2.6
>and Oasys 1.3, but  it lacks security features.
>
>        
>what security features do you find missing? The RI is not a turnkey
>solution but more of a "reference framework".
>
>I'm trying to help but am unsure of what's lacking.
>
>Regards.....Peter
>
>
>
>On Sun, Jun 28, 2009, Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
><[email-masked]> wrote:
>
>
>      
>hi, Peter,
>
> there is an agreed upon standard "reference implementation" of DTN 2.6
>and Oasys 1.3, but  it lacks security features.
>
>Now, let us say that someone wants a "secure" implementation - but
>doesn't care about the details of "secure", just that it is generally
>agreed to be "secure" (or (much) more so than the standard
>implementation. Is there a reference build for that which can be
>        
>downloaded?
>    
>My guess is that everyone's perception of "secure" differs and that even
>for one person it is a matter of trade-offs, but I just though that I
>would  ask if there is some consensus on what it means for DTN to be
>"secure".
>
>Thanks very much for taking the time to reply.
>
>With best wishes,
>
>Graham
>
>
>Peter Lovell wrote:
>
>        
>On Sun, Jun 28, 2009, Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
><[email-masked]> wrote:
>
>
>
>          
>Is there a "secure" reference implementation of the DTN stack available
>for download? Is there even agreement of what a "secure" implementation
>should be, or is it all a question of trade-offs?
>
>Thanks in advance for any help.
>
>Graham
>
>
>            
>Hi Graham,
>
>I'm not sure what you're expecting when you refer to a "secure"
>reference implementation. Do you mean one with the security protocols,
>or one that had been hardened, or one that has been certified by some
>organization or other?
>
>If you can give a little more context we can help fill in what you need.
>
>Cheers.....Peter
>
>
>
>
>          
>--
>Technical Director
>Leonix Solutions (Pte) Ltd
>18 Boon Lay Way
>#09-95 TradeHub 21
>Singapore 609966
>Telephone:+65 6316 9968
>Fax: +65 6316 9208
>
>
>        
>
>
>      
>--
>Technical Director
>Leonix Solutions (Pte) Ltd
>18 Boon Lay Way
>#09-95 TradeHub 21
>Singapore 609966
>Telephone:+65 6316 9968
>Fax: +65 6316 9208
>
>    
>
>
>_______________________________________________
>dtn-security mailing list
>[email-masked]
>http://maillists.intel-research.net/mailman/listinfo/dtn-security
>
>  
>
>
>-- 
>Technical Director
>Leonix Solutions (Pte) Ltd
>18 Boon Lay Way
>#09-95 TradeHub 21
>Singapore 609966
>Telephone:+65 6316 9968
>Fax: +65 6316 9208

Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2009 16:17:42 +0800
From: "Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)" <[email-masked]>
Organization: Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd
To: Peter Lovell <[email-masked]>
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: Re: [dtn-security] Re(2): Is there a "secure" reference implementation of the DTN stack?

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--------------020502060700010401050006
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
	boundary="------------010506000502030400080007"

--------------010506000502030400080007
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

hi, Peter,

firs dumb question - is here a single document which discusses the 
security aspects built into the reference stack?

What I have is someone who "wants DTN with security" but only because he 
has been told from above that that is what he wants.

He wants to take "a slow, phased approach, maybe just starting with 
adding (H)MAC to the link establish, then working up to more in later 
phases". It sounds from what you say that HMAC is already there (for 
data bundles only? Control plane too?)

He is not too clear about what he wants, possibly because he himself is 
being given instructions which vary. He has a cryptography (but not 
necessarily a security) expert from the local university who is 
"analyzing the code to find weak points" - some weeks I am just supposed 
to fill these weak points with code, and other weeks I am supposed to be 
providing security analysis and advice

I have been looking around, but I suppose that I ought have started by 
asking if there is a Rosseta Stone for security in the reference stack.

Sorry to be such a nuisance.

Thanks, as always, for your help.

With best wishes,

Graham

Peter Lovell wrote:
> Hi Graham,
>
> threats such as the ones you describe are handled by the Bundle Security
> Protocol (BSP) code in the RI. Your application does not have to do
> encryption etc - that is part of BSP RI code.
>
> You *do* have to handle management of keys and that means that you have
> to write some code that the RI code will call. The thumbnail sketch is
> that the RI code needs protection applied to something (small, such as
> an ephemeral key) and your code needs to select an appropriate key and
> do it. There will be some sample code for this but it's not there yet.
>
> Each bundle can have HMAC to protect against changes and also against
> DOS injection attacks. This is standard already.
>
> In short, you'll find that the fundamental capabilities you need are
> already present but you have to supply the key-management code as
> appropriate for your key mechanism.
>
> Regards.....Peter
>
>
> On Sun, Jun 28, 2009, Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
> <[email-masked]> wrote:
>
>   
>> That;'s the problem - I am not a security expert?
>>
>> I guess encryption would be provided by the application which uses DTN?
>>
>> What about add a MAC (or HMAC) for the link established stuff (or even
>> every bundle)?
>>
>> How to denying man in the middle attacks or spoofed bundles, DOS at the
>> network layer by injecting many fake packets? That sort of thing ...
>>
>> Thanks again for your help, Peter.
>>
>>
>>
>> Peter Lovell wrote:
>>     
>>> Hi Graham,
>>>
>>>
>>>       
>>>>  there is an agreed upon standard "reference implementation" of DTN 2.6
>>>> and Oasys 1.3, but  it lacks security features.
>>>>
>>>>         
>>> what security features do you find missing? The RI is not a turnkey
>>> solution but more of a "reference framework".
>>>
>>> I'm trying to help but am unsure of what's lacking.
>>>
>>> Regards.....Peter
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sun, Jun 28, 2009, Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
>>> <[email-masked]> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>       
>>>> hi, Peter,
>>>>
>>>>  there is an agreed upon standard "reference implementation" of DTN 2.6
>>>> and Oasys 1.3, but  it lacks security features.
>>>>
>>>> Now, let us say that someone wants a "secure" implementation - but
>>>> doesn't care about the details of "secure", just that it is generally
>>>> agreed to be "secure" (or (much) more so than the standard
>>>> implementation. Is there a reference build for that which can be
>>>>         
>> downloaded?
>>     
>>>> My guess is that everyone's perception of "secure" differs and that even
>>>> for one person it is a matter of trade-offs, but I just though that I
>>>> would  ask if there is some consensus on what it means for DTN to be
>>>> "secure".
>>>>
>>>> Thanks very much for taking the time to reply.
>>>>
>>>> With best wishes,
>>>>
>>>> Graham
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Peter Lovell wrote:
>>>>
>>>>         
>>>>> On Sun, Jun 28, 2009, Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
>>>>> <[email-masked]> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>           
>>>>>> Is there a "secure" reference implementation of the DTN stack available
>>>>>> for download? Is there even agreement of what a "secure" implementation
>>>>>> should be, or is it all a question of trade-offs?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thanks in advance for any help.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Graham
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>             
>>>>> Hi Graham,
>>>>>
>>>>> I'm not sure what you're expecting when you refer to a "secure"
>>>>> reference implementation. Do you mean one with the security protocols,
>>>>> or one that had been hardened, or one that has been certified by some
>>>>> organization or other?
>>>>>
>>>>> If you can give a little more context we can help fill in what you need.
>>>>>
>>>>> Cheers.....Peter
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>           
>>>> --
>>>> Technical Director
>>>> Leonix Solutions (Pte) Ltd
>>>> 18 Boon Lay Way
>>>> #09-95 TradeHub 21
>>>> Singapore 609966
>>>> Telephone:+65 6316 9968
>>>> Fax: +65 6316 9208
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>         
>>>
>>>
>>>       
>> --
>> Technical Director
>> Leonix Solutions (Pte) Ltd
>> 18 Boon Lay Way
>> #09-95 TradeHub 21
>> Singapore 609966
>> Telephone:+65 6316 9968
>> Fax: +65 6316 9208
>>
>>     
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> dtn-security mailing list
> [email-masked]
> http://maillists.intel-research.net/mailman/listinfo/dtn-security
>
>   

-- 
Technical Director
Leonix Solutions (Pte) Ltd
18 Boon Lay Way
#09-95 TradeHub 21
Singapore 609966
Telephone:+65 6316 9968
Fax: +65 6316 9208

--------------010506000502030400080007
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<html>
<head>
  <meta content="text/html;charset=us-ascii" http-equiv="Content-Type">
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</head>
<body bgcolor="#ffffff" text="#000000">
hi, Peter,<br>
<br>
&nbsp; firs dumb question - is here a single document which discusses the
security aspects built into the reference stack? <br>
<br>
What I have is someone who "wants DTN with security" but only because
he has been told from above that that is what he wants. <br>
<br>
He wants to take "a slow, phased approach, maybe just starting with
adding (H)MAC to the link establish, then working up to more in later
phases". It sounds from what you say that HMAC is already there (for
data bundles only? Control plane too?)<br>
<br>
He is not too clear about what he wants, possibly because he himself&nbsp;
is being given instructions which vary. He has a cryptography (but not
necessarily a security) expert from the local university who is
"analyzing the code to find weak points" - some weeks I am just
supposed to fill these weak points with code, and other weeks I am
supposed to be providing security analysis and advice<br>
<br>
I have been looking around, but I suppose that I ought have started by
asking if there is a Rosseta Stone for security in the reference stack.<br>
<br>
Sorry to be such a nuisance.<br>
<br>
Thanks, as always, for your help.<br>
<br>
With best wishes,<br>
<br>
Graham <br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Peter Lovell wrote:
<blockquote cite="mid:[email-masked]"
 type="cite">
  <pre wrap="">Hi Graham,

threats such as the ones you describe are handled by the Bundle Security
Protocol (BSP) code in the RI. Your application does not have to do
encryption etc - that is part of BSP RI code.

You *do* have to handle management of keys and that means that you have
to write some code that the RI code will call. The thumbnail sketch is
that the RI code needs protection applied to something (small, such as
an ephemeral key) and your code needs to select an appropriate key and
do it. There will be some sample code for this but it's not there yet.

Each bundle can have HMAC to protect against changes and also against
DOS injection attacks. This is standard already.

In short, you'll find that the fundamental capabilities you need are
already present but you have to supply the key-management code as
appropriate for your key mechanism.

Regards.....Peter

On Sun, Jun 28, 2009, Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:[email-masked]">&lt;[email-masked]&gt;</a> wrote:

  </pre>
  <blockquote type="cite">
    <pre wrap="">That;'s the problem - I am not a security expert?

I guess encryption would be provided by the application which uses DTN?

What about add a MAC (or HMAC) for the link established stuff (or even
every bundle)?

How to denying man in the middle attacks or spoofed bundles, DOS at the
network layer by injecting many fake packets? That sort of thing ...

Thanks again for your help, Peter.

Peter Lovell wrote:
    </pre>
    <blockquote type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">Hi Graham,

      </pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre wrap=""> there is an agreed upon standard "reference implementation" of DTN 2.6
and Oasys 1.3, but  it lacks security features.

        </pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre wrap="">what security features do you find missing? The RI is not a turnkey
solution but more of a "reference framework".

I'm trying to help but am unsure of what's lacking.

Regards.....Peter

On Sun, Jun 28, 2009, Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:[email-masked]">&lt;[email-masked]&gt;</a> wrote:

      </pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre wrap="">hi, Peter,

 there is an agreed upon standard "reference implementation" of DTN 2.6
and Oasys 1.3, but  it lacks security features.

Now, let us say that someone wants a "secure" implementation - but
doesn't care about the details of "secure", just that it is generally
agreed to be "secure" (or (much) more so than the standard
implementation. Is there a reference build for that which can be
        </pre>
      </blockquote>
    </blockquote>
    <pre wrap="">downloaded?
    </pre>
    <blockquote type="cite">
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre wrap="">My guess is that everyone's perception of "secure" differs and that even
for one person it is a matter of trade-offs, but I just though that I
would  ask if there is some consensus on what it means for DTN to be
"secure".

Thanks very much for taking the time to reply.

With best wishes,

Graham

Peter Lovell wrote:

        </pre>
        <blockquote type="cite">
          <pre wrap="">On Sun, Jun 28, 2009, Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:[email-masked]">&lt;[email-masked]&gt;</a> wrote:

          </pre>
          <blockquote type="cite">
            <pre wrap="">Is there a "secure" reference implementation of the DTN stack available
for download? Is there even agreement of what a "secure" implementation
should be, or is it all a question of trade-offs?

Thanks in advance for any help.

Graham

            </pre>
          </blockquote>
          <pre wrap="">Hi Graham,

I'm not sure what you're expecting when you refer to a "secure"
reference implementation. Do you mean one with the security protocols,
or one that had been hardened, or one that has been certified by some
organization or other?

If you can give a little more context we can help fill in what you need.

Cheers.....Peter

          </pre>
        </blockquote>
        <pre wrap="">--
Technical Director
Leonix Solutions (Pte) Ltd
18 Boon Lay Way
#09-95 TradeHub 21
Singapore 609966
Telephone:+65 6316 9968
Fax: +65 6316 9208

        </pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre wrap="">

      </pre>
    </blockquote>
    <pre wrap="">
--
Technical Director
Leonix Solutions (Pte) Ltd
18 Boon Lay Way
#09-95 TradeHub 21
Singapore 609966
Telephone:+65 6316 9968
Fax: +65 6316 9208

    </pre>
  </blockquote>
  <pre wrap=""><!---->

_______________________________________________
dtn-security mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:[email-masked]">[email-masked]</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://maillists.intel-research.net/mailman/listinfo/dtn-security">http://maillists.intel-research.net/mailman/listinfo/dtn-security</a>

  </pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
<pre class="moz-signature" cols="80">-- 
Technical Director
Leonix Solutions (Pte) Ltd
18 Boon Lay Way
#09-95 TradeHub 21
Singapore 609966
Telephone:+65 6316 9968
Fax: +65 6316 9208
</pre>
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--------------020502060700010401050006--

From: Peter Lovell <[email-masked]>
To: "Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)" <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 28 Jun 2009 10:13:13 -0400
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: [dtn-security] Re(2): Is there a "secure" reference implementation of the DTN stack?

Hi Graham,

threats such as the ones you describe are handled by the Bundle Security
Protocol (BSP) code in the RI. Your application does not have to do
encryption etc - that is part of BSP RI code.

You *do* have to handle management of keys and that means that you have
to write some code that the RI code will call. The thumbnail sketch is
that the RI code needs protection applied to something (small, such as
an ephemeral key) and your code needs to select an appropriate key and
do it. There will be some sample code for this but it's not there yet.

Each bundle can have HMAC to protect against changes and also against
DOS injection attacks. This is standard already.

In short, you'll find that the fundamental capabilities you need are
already present but you have to supply the key-management code as
appropriate for your key mechanism.

Regards.....Peter

On Sun, Jun 28, 2009, Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
<[email-masked]> wrote:

>That;'s the problem - I am not a security expert?
>
>I guess encryption would be provided by the application which uses DTN?
>
>What about add a MAC (or HMAC) for the link established stuff (or even
>every bundle)?
>
>How to denying man in the middle attacks or spoofed bundles, DOS at the
>network layer by injecting many fake packets? That sort of thing ...
>
>Thanks again for your help, Peter.
>
>
>
>Peter Lovell wrote:
>> Hi Graham,
>>
>>
>>>  there is an agreed upon standard "reference implementation" of DTN 2.6
>>> and Oasys 1.3, but  it lacks security features.
>>>
>>
>> what security features do you find missing? The RI is not a turnkey
>> solution but more of a "reference framework".
>>
>> I'm trying to help but am unsure of what's lacking.
>>
>> Regards.....Peter
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Jun 28, 2009, Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
>> <[email-masked]> wrote:
>>
>>
>>> hi, Peter,
>>>
>>>  there is an agreed upon standard "reference implementation" of DTN 2.6
>>> and Oasys 1.3, but  it lacks security features.
>>>
>>> Now, let us say that someone wants a "secure" implementation - but
>>> doesn't care about the details of "secure", just that it is generally
>>> agreed to be "secure" (or (much) more so than the standard
>>> implementation. Is there a reference build for that which can be
>downloaded?
>>>
>>> My guess is that everyone's perception of "secure" differs and that even
>>> for one person it is a matter of trade-offs, but I just though that I
>>> would  ask if there is some consensus on what it means for DTN to be
>>> "secure".
>>>
>>> Thanks very much for taking the time to reply.
>>>
>>> With best wishes,
>>>
>>> Graham
>>>
>>>
>>> Peter Lovell wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Sun, Jun 28, 2009, Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
>>>> <[email-masked]> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Is there a "secure" reference implementation of the DTN stack available
>>>>> for download? Is there even agreement of what a "secure" implementation
>>>>> should be, or is it all a question of trade-offs?
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks in advance for any help.
>>>>>
>>>>> Graham
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> Hi Graham,
>>>>
>>>> I'm not sure what you're expecting when you refer to a "secure"
>>>> reference implementation. Do you mean one with the security protocols,
>>>> or one that had been hardened, or one that has been certified by some
>>>> organization or other?
>>>>
>>>> If you can give a little more context we can help fill in what you need.
>>>>
>>>> Cheers.....Peter
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>> --
>>> Technical Director
>>> Leonix Solutions (Pte) Ltd
>>> 18 Boon Lay Way
>>> #09-95 TradeHub 21
>>> Singapore 609966
>>> Telephone:+65 6316 9968
>>> Fax: +65 6316 9208
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
>--
>Technical Director
>Leonix Solutions (Pte) Ltd
>18 Boon Lay Way
>#09-95 TradeHub 21
>Singapore 609966
>Telephone:+65 6316 9968
>Fax: +65 6316 9208
>

Date: Sun, 28 Jun 2009 14:25:27 +0800
From: "Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)" <[email-masked]>
Organization: Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd
To: Peter Lovell <[email-masked]>
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: Re: [dtn-security] Is there a "secure" reference implementation of the DTN stack?

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--------------040502040607010203000007
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
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That;'s the problem - I am not a security expert?

I guess encryption would be provided by the application which uses DTN?

What about add a MAC (or HMAC) for the link established stuff (or even 
every bundle)?

How to denying man in the middle attacks or spoofed bundles, DOS at the 
network layer by injecting many fake packets? That sort of thing ...

Thanks again for your help, Peter.

Peter Lovell wrote:
> Hi Graham,
>
>   
>>  there is an agreed upon standard "reference implementation" of DTN 2.6
>> and Oasys 1.3, but  it lacks security features.
>>     
>
> what security features do you find missing? The RI is not a turnkey
> solution but more of a "reference framework".
>
> I'm trying to help but am unsure of what's lacking.
>
> Regards.....Peter
>
>
>
> On Sun, Jun 28, 2009, Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
> <[email-masked]> wrote:
>
>   
>> hi, Peter,
>>
>>  there is an agreed upon standard "reference implementation" of DTN 2.6
>> and Oasys 1.3, but  it lacks security features.
>>
>> Now, let us say that someone wants a "secure" implementation - but
>> doesn't care about the details of "secure", just that it is generally
>> agreed to be "secure" (or (much) more so than the standard
>> implementation. Is there a reference build for that which can be downloaded?
>>
>> My guess is that everyone's perception of "secure" differs and that even
>> for one person it is a matter of trade-offs, but I just though that I
>> would  ask if there is some consensus on what it means for DTN to be
>> "secure".
>>
>> Thanks very much for taking the time to reply.
>>
>> With best wishes,
>>
>> Graham
>>
>>
>> Peter Lovell wrote:
>>     
>>> On Sun, Jun 28, 2009, Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
>>> <[email-masked]> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>       
>>>> Is there a "secure" reference implementation of the DTN stack available
>>>> for download? Is there even agreement of what a "secure" implementation
>>>> should be, or is it all a question of trade-offs?
>>>>
>>>> Thanks in advance for any help.
>>>>
>>>> Graham
>>>>
>>>>         
>>> Hi Graham,
>>>
>>> I'm not sure what you're expecting when you refer to a "secure"
>>> reference implementation. Do you mean one with the security protocols,
>>> or one that had been hardened, or one that has been certified by some
>>> organization or other?
>>>
>>> If you can give a little more context we can help fill in what you need.
>>>
>>> Cheers.....Peter
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>       
>> --
>> Technical Director
>> Leonix Solutions (Pte) Ltd
>> 18 Boon Lay Way
>> #09-95 TradeHub 21
>> Singapore 609966
>> Telephone:+65 6316 9968
>> Fax: +65 6316 9208
>>
>>     
>
>
>
>   

-- 
Technical Director
Leonix Solutions (Pte) Ltd
18 Boon Lay Way
#09-95 TradeHub 21
Singapore 609966
Telephone:+65 6316 9968
Fax: +65 6316 9208

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That;'s the problem - I am not a security expert?<br>
<br>
I guess encryption would be provided by the application which uses DTN?
<br>
<br>
What about add a MAC (or HMAC) for the link established stuff (or even
every bundle)?<br>
<br>
How to denying man in the middle attacks or spoofed bundles, DOS at the
network layer by injecting many fake packets? That sort of thing ... <br>
<br>
Thanks again for your help, Peter.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Peter Lovell wrote:
<blockquote cite="mid:[email-masked]" type="cite">
  <pre wrap="">Hi Graham,

  </pre>
  <blockquote type="cite">
    <pre wrap=""> there is an agreed upon standard "reference implementation" of DTN 2.6
and Oasys 1.3, but  it lacks security features.
    </pre>
  </blockquote>
  <pre wrap=""><!---->
what security features do you find missing? The RI is not a turnkey
solution but more of a "reference framework".

I'm trying to help but am unsure of what's lacking.

Regards.....Peter

On Sun, Jun 28, 2009, Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:[email-masked]">&lt;[email-masked]&gt;</a> wrote:

  </pre>
  <blockquote type="cite">
    <pre wrap="">hi, Peter,

 there is an agreed upon standard "reference implementation" of DTN 2.6
and Oasys 1.3, but  it lacks security features.

Now, let us say that someone wants a "secure" implementation - but
doesn't care about the details of "secure", just that it is generally
agreed to be "secure" (or (much) more so than the standard
implementation. Is there a reference build for that which can be downloaded?

My guess is that everyone's perception of "secure" differs and that even
for one person it is a matter of trade-offs, but I just though that I
would  ask if there is some consensus on what it means for DTN to be
"secure".

Thanks very much for taking the time to reply.

With best wishes,

Graham

Peter Lovell wrote:
    </pre>
    <blockquote type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">On Sun, Jun 28, 2009, Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:[email-masked]">&lt;[email-masked]&gt;</a> wrote:

      </pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre wrap="">Is there a "secure" reference implementation of the DTN stack available
for download? Is there even agreement of what a "secure" implementation
should be, or is it all a question of trade-offs?

Thanks in advance for any help.

Graham

        </pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre wrap="">
Hi Graham,

I'm not sure what you're expecting when you refer to a "secure"
reference implementation. Do you mean one with the security protocols,
or one that had been hardened, or one that has been certified by some
organization or other?

If you can give a little more context we can help fill in what you need.

Cheers.....Peter

      </pre>
    </blockquote>
    <pre wrap="">
--
Technical Director
Leonix Solutions (Pte) Ltd
18 Boon Lay Way
#09-95 TradeHub 21
Singapore 609966
Telephone:+65 6316 9968
Fax: +65 6316 9208

    </pre>
  </blockquote>
  <pre wrap=""><!---->

  </pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
<pre class="moz-signature" cols="80">-- 
Technical Director
Leonix Solutions (Pte) Ltd
18 Boon Lay Way
#09-95 TradeHub 21
Singapore 609966
Telephone:+65 6316 9968
Fax: +65 6316 9208
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From: Peter Lovell <[email-masked]>
To: "Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)" <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 28 Jun 2009 01:22:55 -0400
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: [dtn-security] Re(2): Is there a "secure" reference implementation of the DTN stack?

Hi Graham,

>  there is an agreed upon standard "reference implementation" of DTN 2.6
>and Oasys 1.3, but  it lacks security features.

what security features do you find missing? The RI is not a turnkey
solution but more of a "reference framework".

I'm trying to help but am unsure of what's lacking.

Regards.....Peter

On Sun, Jun 28, 2009, Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
<[email-masked]> wrote:

>hi, Peter,
>
>  there is an agreed upon standard "reference implementation" of DTN 2.6
>and Oasys 1.3, but  it lacks security features.
>
>Now, let us say that someone wants a "secure" implementation - but
>doesn't care about the details of "secure", just that it is generally
>agreed to be "secure" (or (much) more so than the standard
>implementation. Is there a reference build for that which can be downloaded?
>
>My guess is that everyone's perception of "secure" differs and that even
>for one person it is a matter of trade-offs, but I just though that I
>would  ask if there is some consensus on what it means for DTN to be
>"secure".
>
>Thanks very much for taking the time to reply.
>
>With best wishes,
>
>Graham
>
>
>Peter Lovell wrote:
>> On Sun, Jun 28, 2009, Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
>> <[email-masked]> wrote:
>>
>>
>>> Is there a "secure" reference implementation of the DTN stack available
>>> for download? Is there even agreement of what a "secure" implementation
>>> should be, or is it all a question of trade-offs?
>>>
>>> Thanks in advance for any help.
>>>
>>> Graham
>>>
>>
>>
>> Hi Graham,
>>
>> I'm not sure what you're expecting when you refer to a "secure"
>> reference implementation. Do you mean one with the security protocols,
>> or one that had been hardened, or one that has been certified by some
>> organization or other?
>>
>> If you can give a little more context we can help fill in what you need.
>>
>> Cheers.....Peter
>>
>>
>>
>
>
>--
>Technical Director
>Leonix Solutions (Pte) Ltd
>18 Boon Lay Way
>#09-95 TradeHub 21
>Singapore 609966
>Telephone:+65 6316 9968
>Fax: +65 6316 9208
>

Date: Sun, 28 Jun 2009 13:12:18 +0800
From: "Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)" <[email-masked]>
Organization: Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd
To: Peter Lovell <[email-masked]>
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: Re: [dtn-security] Is there a "secure" reference implementation of the DTN stack?

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
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hi, Peter,

  there is an agreed upon standard "reference implementation" of DTN 2.6 
and Oasys 1.3, but  it lacks security features.

Now, let us say that someone wants a "secure" implementation - but 
doesn't care about the details of "secure", just that it is generally 
agreed to be "secure" (or (much) more so than the standard 
implementation. Is there a reference build for that which can be downloaded?

My guess is that everyone's perception of "secure" differs and that even 
for one person it is a matter of trade-offs, but I just though that I 
would  ask if there is some consensus on what it means for DTN to be 
"secure".

Thanks very much for taking the time to reply.

With best wishes,

Graham

Peter Lovell wrote:
> On Sun, Jun 28, 2009, Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
> <[email-masked]> wrote:
>
>   
>> Is there a "secure" reference implementation of the DTN stack available
>> for download? Is there even agreement of what a "secure" implementation
>> should be, or is it all a question of trade-offs?
>>
>> Thanks in advance for any help.
>>
>> Graham
>>     
>
>
> Hi Graham,
>
> I'm not sure what you're expecting when you refer to a "secure"
> reference implementation. Do you mean one with the security protocols,
> or one that had been hardened, or one that has been certified by some
> organization or other?
>
> If you can give a little more context we can help fill in what you need.
>
> Cheers.....Peter
>
>
>   

-- 
Technical Director
Leonix Solutions (Pte) Ltd
18 Boon Lay Way
#09-95 TradeHub 21
Singapore 609966
Telephone:+65 6316 9968
Fax: +65 6316 9208

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hi, Peter, <br>
<br>
&nbsp; there is an agreed upon standard "reference implementation" of DTN
2.6 and Oasys 1.3, but&nbsp; it lacks security features.<br>
<br>
Now, let us say that someone wants a "secure" implementation - but
doesn't care about the details of "secure", just that it is generally
agreed to be "secure" (or (much) more so than the standard
implementation. Is there a reference build for that which can be
downloaded?<br>
<br>
My guess is that everyone's perception of "secure" differs and that
even for one person it is a matter of trade-offs, but I just though
that I would&nbsp; ask if there is some consensus on what it means for DTN
to be "secure".<br>
<br>
Thanks very much for taking the time to reply.<br>
<br>
With best wishes,<br>
<br>
Graham<br>
<br>
<br>
Peter Lovell wrote:
<blockquote cite="mid:[email-masked]"
 type="cite">
  <pre wrap="">On Sun, Jun 28, 2009, Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:[email-masked]">&lt;[email-masked]&gt;</a> wrote:

  </pre>
  <blockquote type="cite">
    <pre wrap="">Is there a "secure" reference implementation of the DTN stack available
for download? Is there even agreement of what a "secure" implementation
should be, or is it all a question of trade-offs?

Thanks in advance for any help.

Graham
    </pre>
  </blockquote>
  <pre wrap=""><!---->

Hi Graham,

I'm not sure what you're expecting when you refer to a "secure"
reference implementation. Do you mean one with the security protocols,
or one that had been hardened, or one that has been certified by some
organization or other?

If you can give a little more context we can help fill in what you need.

Cheers.....Peter

  </pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
<pre class="moz-signature" cols="80">-- 
Technical Director
Leonix Solutions (Pte) Ltd
18 Boon Lay Way
#09-95 TradeHub 21
Singapore 609966
Telephone:+65 6316 9968
Fax: +65 6316 9208
</pre>
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From: Peter Lovell <[email-masked]>
To: "Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)" <[email-masked]>, [email-masked]
Date: Sun, 28 Jun 2009 01:02:43 -0400
Subject: Re: [dtn-security] Is there a "secure" reference implementation of the DTN stack?

On Sun, Jun 28, 2009, Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
<[email-masked]> wrote:

>Is there a "secure" reference implementation of the DTN stack available
>for download? Is there even agreement of what a "secure" implementation
>should be, or is it all a question of trade-offs?
>
>Thanks in advance for any help.
>
>Graham

Hi Graham,

I'm not sure what you're expecting when you refer to a "secure"
reference implementation. Do you mean one with the security protocols,
or one that had been hardened, or one that has been certified by some
organization or other?

If you can give a little more context we can help fill in what you need.

Cheers.....Peter

Date: Sun, 28 Jun 2009 09:07:35 +0800
From: "Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)" <[email-masked]>
Organization: Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd
To: "[email-masked]" <[email-masked]>
Subject: [dtn-security] Is there a "secure" reference implementation of the DTN stack?

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Is there a "secure" reference implementation of the DTN stack available 
for download? Is there even agreement of what a "secure" implementation 
should be, or is it all a question of trade-offs?

Thanks in advance for any help.

Graham

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From: Peter Lovell <[email-masked]>
To: [email-masked], "'Ivancic, William D. (GRC-RHN0)'" <[email-masked]>, "'Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)'" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 09 Jun 2009 17:42:04 -0400
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: [dtn-security] Re(2): Newbie seeking some security related advice

On Tue, Jun 9, 2009, Jason Redi <[email-masked]> wrote:

>Strange - I think this email already came around about a month ago.
>Armando responded then, but the original reappeared.   Maybe there's some
>delay in the relayer?
>
>
>
>Jason

An example of delay-tolerance, perhaps ??

From: "Jason Redi" <[email-masked]>
To: "'Ivancic, William D. \(GRC-RHN0\)'" <[email-masked]>, "'Graham Keellings \(Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd\)'" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2009 13:09:53 -0400
Organization: BBN Technologies
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: Re: [dtn-security] Newbie seeking some security related advice
Reply-To: [email-masked]

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Strange - I think this email already came around about a month ago.
Armando responded then, but the original reappeared.   Maybe there's some
delay in the relayer?

Jason

 

From: Ivancic, William D. (GRC-RHN0) [mailto:[email-masked]] 
Sent: Tuesday, June 09, 2009 12:49 PM
To: Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd); [email-masked]
Cc: 'Armando Caro'; [email-masked]
Subject: RE: [dtn-security] Newbie seeking some security related advice
Importance: High

Graham,

Some applications simply are not delay tolerant.  If I need to say
"Incoming, take cover!"  10 seconds delay is unacceptable.

I hear some talk about DTN for  air traffic control.  Safety of flight,
safety of life, ... I don't think so.  I'll walk!

Now, for some air traffic application such a perhaps passenger lists of fuel
and weight, a few seconds or a minute may not be an issue, but at that point
you have good links and don't need DTN.

Beware of the Buzz Words and Marketing.  DTN is great for some things, bad
for others and there are situations were one could not communicate at all
without DTN.

You have to educate the customer.   Do so in your proposal and point out the
folly of DTN in a primarily voice network and you will take the contract
from those proposing otherwise.

 

/Will

From: Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
[mailto:[email-masked]] 
Sent: Tuesday, June 09, 2009 1:50 AM
To: [email-masked]
Cc: 'Armando Caro'; Ivancic, William D. (GRC-RHN0);
[email-masked]
Subject: Re: [dtn-security] Newbie seeking some security related advice

....
As Armando describes, we are currently using streaming voice over BP.
Individual packets contain 20-100ms of voice, so sending those individual
buffers in an individual disrupted fashion would not make a whole lot of
sense.  

Note that we are also working on providing voice-snippets of 1-10s

Wow! That surely *is* delay tolerant (if not disruption tolerant). You have
to wait until you have collected 10 seconds of voice at the sender before
transmitting. That guarantees a lag of over 9 seconds at the receiver, or
18+ seconds to get a reply to a question.

I think that I need to rethink :-)   Or,  at least, we can say that such
delay might be acceptable in some scenarios, but not in others. Nasa might
have no choice, given the lag inherent in very long range transmissions, but
I doubt that DARPA can accept multi-seconds delays in combat scenarios.

I am looking at a "real time" voice network, where it has been strongly
"suggested" that I use DTN, but I am thinking that all that it will bring to
my particular use case is that I don't have to worry about "link lost" for a
short time bringing down the call.  My personal feel is that DTN is not the
right tool for the job for a mainly voice based short range system where
speed of reply is of the essence. I don't see that the benefits justify it,
but then I don't get to make the decision (and if I recommend against it, I
probably don't get the contract. Sigh)

Thank you very much for taking he time to reply and for helping me to
clarify my thoughts.

With best wishes,

Graham 

 

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<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Strange &#8211; I think this email already came around =
about a
month ago.&nbsp;&nbsp; Armando responded then, but the original
reappeared.&nbsp;&nbsp; Maybe there&#8217;s some delay in the =
relayer?<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Jason<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in =
0in 4.0pt'>

<div>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt =
0in 0in 0in'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";
color:windowtext'>From:</span></b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:windowtext'> Ivancic, William D. (GRC-RHN0)
[mailto:[email-masked]] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, June 09, 2009 12:49 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd); [email-masked]<br>
<b>Cc:</b> 'Armando Caro'; [email-masked]<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: [dtn-security] Newbie seeking some security related =
advice<br>
<b>Importance:</b> High<o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Graham,<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Some applications simply are not delay tolerant.&nbsp; If =
I need
to say &#8220;Incoming, take cover!&#8221;&nbsp; 10 seconds delay is
unacceptable.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>I hear some talk about DTN for&nbsp; air traffic =
control.&nbsp;
Safety of flight, safety of life, ... I don&#8217;t think so.&nbsp; =
I&#8217;ll
walk!<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Now, for some air traffic application such a perhaps =
passenger
lists of fuel and weight, a few seconds or a minute may not be an issue, =
but at
that point you have good links and don&#8217;t need =
DTN.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Beware of the Buzz Words and Marketing.&nbsp; DTN is =
great for
some things, bad for others and there are situations were one could not
communicate at all without DTN.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>You have to educate the customer.&nbsp; &nbsp;Do so in =
your
proposal and point out the folly of DTN in a primarily voice network and =
you
will take the contract from those proposing =
otherwise.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>/Will<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in =
0in 4.0pt'>

<div>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt =
0in 0in 0in'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";
color:windowtext'>From:</span></b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:
"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:windowtext'> Graham Keellings (Leonix =
Solutions Pte
Ltd) [mailto:[email-masked]] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, June 09, 2009 1:50 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> [email-masked]<br>
<b>Cc:</b> 'Armando Caro'; Ivancic, William D. (GRC-RHN0);
[email-masked]<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [dtn-security] Newbie seeking some security related =
advice<o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<pre><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>....</span><o:p></o:p></pre><pre>As =
Armando describes, we are currently using streaming voice over =
BP.<o:p></o:p></pre><pre>Individual packets contain 20-100ms of voice, =
so sending those individual<o:p></o:p></pre><pre>buffers in an =
individual disrupted fashion would not make a whole lot =
of<o:p></o:p></pre><pre>sense.&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></pre>

<blockquote style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><pre>Note =
that we are also working on providing voice-snippets of =
1-10s<o:p></o:p></pre><pre>&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></pre></blockquote>

<p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:
12.0pt;margin-left:5.25pt'>Wow! That surely *is* delay tolerant (if not
disruption tolerant). You have to wait until you have collected 10 =
seconds of
voice at the sender before transmitting. That guarantees a lag of over 9
seconds at the receiver, or 18+ seconds to get a reply to a =
question.<br>
<br>
I think that I need to rethink :-)&nbsp;&nbsp; Or,&nbsp; at least, we =
can say
that such delay might be acceptable in some scenarios, but not in =
others. Nasa
might have no choice, given the lag inherent in very long range =
transmissions,
but I doubt that DARPA can accept multi-seconds delays in combat =
scenarios.<br>
<br>
I am looking at a &quot;real time&quot; voice network, where it has been
strongly &quot;suggested&quot; that I use DTN, but I am thinking that =
all that
it will bring to my particular use case is that I don't have to worry =
about
&quot;link lost&quot; for a short time bringing down the call.&nbsp; My
personal feel is that DTN is not the right tool for the job for a mainly =
voice
based short range system where speed of reply is of the essence. I don't =
see
that the benefits justify it, but then I don't get to make the decision =
(and if
I recommend against it, I probably don't get the contract. Sigh)<br>
<br>
Thank you very much for taking he time to reply and for helping me to =
clarify
my thoughts.<br>
<br>
With best wishes,<br>
<br>
Graham <br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></p>

<pre><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></pre></div>

</div>

</div>

</body>

</html>

------=_NextPart_000_029E_01C9E903.9723A880--

Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2009 17:58:51 +0100
From: Stephen Farrell <[email-masked]>
To: "Ivancic, William D. (GRC-RHN0)" <[email-masked]>
Cc: "[email-masked]" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: [dtn-security] Newbie seeking some security related advice

I agree about being wary of marketing-speak.

However, if you have an environment where you are sometimes disrupted
then looking at a DTN option is quite reasonable. I can well imagine
someone doing a good job with voice over the BP esp. with that
superseding bundle stuff (2nd mention today:-), but of course doing
it well would be non-trivial.

Who's talking about DTN for air traffic control?

S.

Ivancic, William D. (GRC-RHN0) wrote:
> Graham,
> 
>  
> 
> Some applications simply are not delay tolerant.  If I need to say
> â€œIncoming, take cover!â€  10 seconds delay is unacceptable.
> 
>  
> 
> I hear some talk about DTN for  air traffic control.  Safety of flight,
> safety of life, ... I donâ€™t think so.  Iâ€™ll walk!
> 
>  
> 
> Now, for some air traffic application such a perhaps passenger lists of
> fuel and weight, a few seconds or a minute may not be an issue, but at
> that point you have good links and donâ€™t need DTN.
> 
>  
> 
> Beware of the Buzz Words and Marketing.  DTN is great for some things,
> bad for others and there are situations were one could not communicate
> at all without DTN.
> 
>  
> 
> You have to educate the customer.   Do so in your proposal and point out
> the folly of DTN in a primarily voice network and you will take the
> contract from those proposing otherwise.
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> /Will
> 
>  
> 
> *From:* Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
> [mailto:[email-masked]]
> *Sent:* Tuesday, June 09, 2009 1:50 AM
> *To:* [email-masked]
> *Cc:* 'Armando Caro'; Ivancic, William D. (GRC-RHN0);
> [email-masked]
> *Subject:* Re: [dtn-security] Newbie seeking some security related advice
> 
>  
> 
> ....
> 
> As Armando describes, we are currently using streaming voice over BP.
> 
> Individual packets contain 20-100ms of voice, so sending those individual
> 
> buffers in an individual disrupted fashion would not make a whole lot of
> 
> sense.  
> 
>     Note that we are also working on providing voice-snippets of 1-10s
> 
>       
> 
> Wow! That surely *is* delay tolerant (if not disruption tolerant). You
> have to wait until you have collected 10 seconds of voice at the sender
> before transmitting. That guarantees a lag of over 9 seconds at the
> receiver, or 18+ seconds to get a reply to a question.
> 
> I think that I need to rethink :-)   Or,  at least, we can say that such
> delay might be acceptable in some scenarios, but not in others. Nasa
> might have no choice, given the lag inherent in very long range
> transmissions, but I doubt that DARPA can accept multi-seconds delays in
> combat scenarios.
> 
> I am looking at a "real time" voice network, where it has been strongly
> "suggested" that I use DTN, but I am thinking that all that it will
> bring to my particular use case is that I don't have to worry about
> "link lost" for a short time bringing down the call.  My personal feel
> is that DTN is not the right tool for the job for a mainly voice based
> short range system where speed of reply is of the essence. I don't see
> that the benefits justify it, but then I don't get to make the decision
> (and if I recommend against it, I probably don't get the contract. Sigh)
> 
> Thank you very much for taking he time to reply and for helping me to
> clarify my thoughts.
> 
> With best wishes,
> 
> Graham
> 
> 
>  
> 
> 
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> _______________________________________________
> dtn-security mailing list
> [email-masked]
> http://maillists.intel-research.net/mailman/listinfo/dtn-security

From: "Ivancic, William D. (GRC-RHN0)" <[email-masked]>
To: "Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)" <[email-masked]>, "[email-masked]" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2009 11:49:04 -0500
Accept-Language: en-US
acceptlanguage: en-US
Cc: "[email-masked]" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: [dtn-security] Newbie seeking some security related advice

--_000_3A5AA67A8B120B48825BFFCF5443856137E3553C4BNDJSSCC03ndcn_
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Graham,

Some applications simply are not delay tolerant.  If I need to say "Incomin=
g, take cover!"  10 seconds delay is unacceptable.

I hear some talk about DTN for  air traffic control.  Safety of flight, saf=
ety of life, ... I don't think so.  I'll walk!

Now, for some air traffic application such a perhaps passenger lists of fue=
l and weight, a few seconds or a minute may not be an issue, but at that po=
int you have good links and don't need DTN.

Beware of the Buzz Words and Marketing.  DTN is great for some things, bad =
for others and there are situations were one could not communicate at all w=
ithout DTN.

You have to educate the customer.   Do so in your proposal and point out th=
e folly of DTN in a primarily voice network and you will take the contract =
from those proposing otherwise.

/Will

From: Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd) [mailto:Graham@LeonixSolu=
tions.com]
Sent: Tuesday, June 09, 2009 1:50 AM
To: [email-masked]
Cc: 'Armando Caro'; Ivancic, William D. (GRC-RHN0); dtn-security@maillists.=
intel-research.net
Subject: Re: [dtn-security] Newbie seeking some security related advice

....

As Armando describes, we are currently using streaming voice over BP.

Individual packets contain 20-100ms of voice, so sending those individual

buffers in an individual disrupted fashion would not make a whole lot of

sense.

Note that we are also working on providing voice-snippets of 1-10s

Wow! That surely *is* delay tolerant (if not disruption tolerant). You have=
 to wait until you have collected 10 seconds of voice at the sender before =
transmitting. That guarantees a lag of over 9 seconds at the receiver, or 1=
8+ seconds to get a reply to a question.

I think that I need to rethink :-)   Or,  at least, we can say that such de=
lay might be acceptable in some scenarios, but not in others. Nasa might ha=
ve no choice, given the lag inherent in very long range transmissions, but =
I doubt that DARPA can accept multi-seconds delays in combat scenarios.

I am looking at a "real time" voice network, where it has been strongly "su=
ggested" that I use DTN, but I am thinking that all that it will bring to m=
y particular use case is that I don't have to worry about "link lost" for a=
 short time bringing down the call.  My personal feel is that DTN is not th=
e right tool for the job for a mainly voice based short range system where =
speed of reply is of the essence. I don't see that the benefits justify it,=
 but then I don't get to make the decision (and if I recommend against it, =
I probably don't get the contract. Sigh)

Thank you very much for taking he time to reply and for helping me to clari=
fy my thoughts.

With best wishes,

Graham

--_000_3A5AA67A8B120B48825BFFCF5443856137E3553C4BNDJSSCC03ndcn_
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
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<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Graham,<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Some applications simply are not delay tolerant.&nbsp; If I =
need
to say &#8220;Incoming, take cover!&#8221;&nbsp; 10 seconds delay is
unacceptable.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>I hear some talk about DTN for&nbsp; air traffic control.&nb=
sp;
Safety of flight, safety of life, ... I don&#8217;t think so.&nbsp; I&#8217=
;ll
walk!<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Now, for some air traffic application such a perhaps passeng=
er
lists of fuel and weight, a few seconds or a minute may not be an issue, bu=
t at
that point you have good links and don&#8217;t need DTN.<o:p></o:p></span><=
/p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Beware of the Buzz Words and Marketing.&nbsp; DTN is great f=
or
some things, bad for others and there are situations were one could not
communicate at all without DTN.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>You have to educate the customer.&nbsp; &nbsp;Do so in your
proposal and point out the folly of DTN in a primarily voice network and yo=
u
will take the contract from those proposing otherwise.<o:p></o:p></span></p=
>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>/Will<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",=
"sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in =
4.0pt'>

<div>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma=
","sans-serif";
color:windowtext'>From:</span></b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-fami=
ly:
"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:windowtext'> Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions=
 Pte
Ltd) [mailto:[email-masked]] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, June 09, 2009 1:50 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> [email-masked]<br>
<b>Cc:</b> 'Armando Caro'; Ivancic, William D. (GRC-RHN0);
[email-masked]<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [dtn-security] Newbie seeking some security related adv=
ice<o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<pre><span style=3D'color:#1F497D'>....</span><o:p></o:p></pre><pre>As Arma=
ndo describes, we are currently using streaming voice over BP.<o:p></o:p></=
pre><pre>Individual packets contain 20-100ms of voice, so sending those ind=
ividual<o:p></o:p></pre><pre>buffers in an individual disrupted fashion wou=
ld not make a whole lot of<o:p></o:p></pre><pre>sense.&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></p=
re>

<blockquote style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><pre>Note that w=
e are also working on providing voice-snippets of 1-10s<o:p></o:p></pre><pr=
e>&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></pre></blockquote>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:5.25pt'>Wow! That surely *is* del=
ay tolerant
(if not disruption tolerant). You have to wait until you have collected 10
seconds of voice at the sender before transmitting. That guarantees a lag o=
f
over 9 seconds at the receiver, or 18+ seconds to get a reply to a question=
.<br>
<br>
I think that I need to rethink :-)&nbsp;&nbsp; Or,&nbsp; at least, we can s=
ay
that such delay might be acceptable in some scenarios, but not in others. N=
asa
might have no choice, given the lag inherent in very long range transmissio=
ns,
but I doubt that DARPA can accept multi-seconds delays in combat scenarios.=
<br>
<br>
I am looking at a &quot;real time&quot; voice network, where it has been
strongly &quot;suggested&quot; that I use DTN, but I am thinking that all t=
hat
it will bring to my particular use case is that I don't have to worry about
&quot;link lost&quot; for a short time bringing down the call.&nbsp; My
personal feel is that DTN is not the right tool for the job for a mainly vo=
ice
based short range system where speed of reply is of the essence. I don't se=
e
that the benefits justify it, but then I don't get to make the decision (an=
d if
I recommend against it, I probably don't get the contract. Sigh)<br>
<br>
Thank you very much for taking he time to reply and for helping me to clari=
fy
my thoughts.<br>
<br>
With best wishes,<br>
<br>
Graham <br>
<br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></p>

<pre><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></pre></div>

</div>

</body>

</html>

--_000_3A5AA67A8B120B48825BFFCF5443856137E3553C4BNDJSSCC03ndcn_--

Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2009 11:02:09 +0100
From: Stephen Farrell <[email-masked]>
To: [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: Re: [dtn-security] Key Management hop-by-hop ciphersuite

Hi Nasir,

[email-masked] wrote:
> Hi,
> 
>>From internet-draft "Key Management Requirements", it is a requirement
> that key management should support all mandatory ciphersuites.

First I wouldn't take that (expired) draft as being something that's
gotten broad consensus - at this stage I think its really just a set
of opinions of mine, but I'm really happy to get others' input, so
thanks for bringing it up.

The point I was trying to make with that requirement is that if someone
does go and define a (generic) key management scheme for DTNs, then they
had better consider the existing ciphersuites. I've seen some papers
both in DTN and more generally related to PKI where the authors
define a key management scheme that won't do that (e.g. I guess some
of the IBE things). The problem with that would be that we'd end up with
a way to establish keys, but no (interoperable) way to use 'em. Were
the authors of such key management schemes to also fully specify
accompanying ciphersuites then I think that'd be fine. (I'm not saying
I'd agree with 'em, but at that point at least we could have a good
argument:-)

>       For Hop-by-Hop integrity and authentication, the ciphersuite
> BAB-HMAC only supports symmetric cryptography..
> 
>      1.  Does this means, when we are looking for key establishment
> while assuming pre-installed public keys, then we also have to take
> assumption that symmetric keys also exist between two nodes for
> hop-by-hop authentication and integrity..

Not necessarily. If you assume pre-installed public keys, then you
could define a new bundle payload protocol (or set of extension
blocks, not sure) that'd allow you to do key transport or key
agreement in order to manage those shared secrets. I'd really like
to see someone write that I-D. The core of that is pretty easy,
it probably just needs to adopt some CMS structures for key
transport/agreement.

I think the main issue though would be how to gracefully
handle lost or badly delayed bundles.

For example, if a key manager tries to distribute new keys to nodes
1 & 2 but the relevant bundles only arrive at node 1, then how do we
ensure that we don't break BAB verification between nodes 1 & 2?
Probably by allowing some kind of window but there's work to be
done to get that right. Actually that might usefully use the
stuff about superseding bundles [1] now that I think of it.
And/or maybe node 1 could pass along the key mgmt extension
to node 2 similar to how kerberos does things.

Getting that right requires a bit of thought and consideration
of various use cases and failure modes so its non-trivial. (But
again, I'd love to see someone take it on.)

> 
>      2. Are we not making Key Management dependent on distribution of
> symmetric keys between forwarder and intermediate receiver while using
> public key  only..

No. See #1 above:-)

S.

[1]
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-parikh-bundle-superseding-extension-block-00.txt

> 
> Please comment...
> 
> thanks
> 
> regards,
> Nasir
> 
> 
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> _______________________________________________
> dtn-security mailing list
> [email-masked]
> http://maillists.intel-research.net/mailman/listinfo/dtn-security

Date: Tue, 09 Jun 2009 13:49:49 +0800
From: "Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)" <[email-masked]>
Organization: Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd
To: [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: Re: [dtn-security] Newbie seeking some security related advice

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
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	boundary="------------030302050908050209090405"

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Jason Redi wrote:
> Minor comment to Armando's email:
>
>   
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: [email-masked] [mailto:dtn-
>> [email-masked]] On Behalf Of Armando
>> Caro
>> Sent: Wednesday, May 27, 2009 8:14 PM
>> To: Ivancic, William D. (GRC-RHN0)
>> Cc: [email-masked]
>> Subject: Re: [dtn-security] Newbie seeking some security related advice
>>
>> Ivancic, William D. (GRC-RHN0) wrote:
>>     
>>> I believe DARPA is using DTN for voice networks but I believe the
>>>       
>> disruption is expected to be very quick fades and the like or perhaps
>> that voice simply will not make sense at certain times.
>>
>> I believe you are referring to the work that BBN is doing for the DARPA
>> WNaN program. For this program, we run IP over DTN and use VoIP without
>> modifications to the VoIP application. We are using the BPA as a
>> forwarding engine that works in both connected and disconnected
>> scenarios. VoIP traffic (and other delay sensitive traffic) are only
>> routed/forwarded to destinations that are currently connected, since
>> VoIP doesn't make sense for disconnected destinations. If a node
>> receives VoIP traffic for a disconnected destination, the traffic is
>> dropped.
>>     
>
> As Armando describes, we are currently using streaming voice over BP.
> Individual packets contain 20-100ms of voice, so sending those individual
> buffers in an individual disrupted fashion would not make a whole lot of
> sense.  
> Note that we are also working on providing voice-snippets of 1-10s
>   
Wow! That surely *is* delay tolerant (if not disruption tolerant). You 
have to wait until you have collected 10 seconds of voice at the sender 
before transmitting. That guarantees a lag of over 9 seconds at the 
receiver, or 18+ seconds to get a reply to a question.

I think that I need to rethink :-)   Or,  at least, we can say that such 
delay might be acceptable in some scenarios, but not in others. Nasa 
might have no choice, given the lag inherent in very long range 
transmissions, but I doubt that DARPA can accept multi-seconds delays in 
combat scenarios.

I am looking at a "real time" voice network, where it has been strongly 
"suggested" that I use DTN, but I am thinking that all that it will 
bring to my particular use case is that I don't have to worry about 
"link lost" for a short time bringing down the call.  My personal feel 
is that DTN is not the right tool for the job for a mainly voice based 
short range system where speed of reply is of the essence. I don't see 
that the benefits justify it, but then I don't get to make the decision 
(and if I recommend against it, I probably don't get the contract. Sigh)

Thank you very much for taking he time to reply and for helping me to 
clarify my thoughts.

With best wishes,

Graham

> that could be sent in a disrupted fashion over the network.  But ultimately
> that's just data like any other bundle.  The only real "work" there is in
> the application, not the BP.   
>
> The key point is that voice can either be streaming as little snippets or
> buffered as a big blob.  If it is a big blob, it's just another bundle.  If
> it is streaming, then one needs to make sure you have a BPA/router that adds
> only a minimal amount of additional overhead to the forwarding process.  (as
> Armando says below)
>  
>   
>> One important take-away from this work... the motivation of DTN is to
>> support delay/disrupted scenarios and apps that can operate in that
>> regime, but it is possible to implement a DTN stack that can also deal
>> with time-sensitive traffic.
>>
>> Armando
>> _______________________________________________
>> dtn-security mailing list
>> [email-masked]
>> http://maillists.intel-research.net/mailman/listinfo/dtn-security
>>     
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> dtn-security mailing list
> [email-masked]
> http://maillists.intel-research.net/mailman/listinfo/dtn-security
>
>   

-- 
Technical Director
Leonix Solutions (Pte) Ltd
18 Boon Lay Way
#09-95 TradeHub 21
Singapore 609966
Telephone:+65 6316 9968
Fax: +65 6316 9208

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  <meta content="text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1" http-equiv="Content-Type">
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</head>
<body bgcolor="#ffffff" text="#000000">
Jason Redi wrote:
<blockquote cite="mid:023601c9df2a$694fd5b0$3bef8110$@com" type="cite">
  <pre wrap="">Minor comment to Armando's email:

  </pre>
  <blockquote type="cite">
    <pre wrap="">-----Original Message-----
From: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:[email-masked]">[email-masked]</a> [<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="mailto:dtn">mailto:dtn</a>-
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:[email-masked]">[email-masked]</a>] On Behalf Of Armando
Caro
Sent: Wednesday, May 27, 2009 8:14 PM
To: Ivancic, William D. (GRC-RHN0)
Cc: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:[email-masked]">[email-masked]</a>
Subject: Re: [dtn-security] Newbie seeking some security related advice

Ivancic, William D. (GRC-RHN0) wrote:
    </pre>
    <blockquote type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">I believe DARPA is using DTN for voice networks but I believe the
      </pre>
    </blockquote>
    <pre wrap="">disruption is expected to be very quick fades and the like or perhaps
that voice simply will not make sense at certain times.

I believe you are referring to the work that BBN is doing for the DARPA
WNaN program. For this program, we run IP over DTN and use VoIP without
modifications to the VoIP application. We are using the BPA as a
forwarding engine that works in both connected and disconnected
scenarios. VoIP traffic (and other delay sensitive traffic) are only
routed/forwarded to destinations that are currently connected, since
VoIP doesn't make sense for disconnected destinations. If a node
receives VoIP traffic for a disconnected destination, the traffic is
dropped.
    </pre>
  </blockquote>
  <pre wrap=""><!---->
As Armando describes, we are currently using streaming voice over BP.
Individual packets contain 20-100ms of voice, so sending those individual
buffers in an individual disrupted fashion would not make a whole lot of
sense.  </pre>
</blockquote>
<blockquote cite="mid:023601c9df2a$694fd5b0$3bef8110$@com" type="cite">
  <pre wrap="">Note that we are also working on providing voice-snippets of 1-10s
  </pre>
</blockquote>
Wow! That surely *is* delay tolerant (if not disruption tolerant). You
have to wait until you have collected 10 seconds of voice at the sender
before transmitting. That guarantees a lag of over 9 seconds at the
receiver, or 18+ seconds to get a reply to a question.<br>
<br>
I think that I need to rethink :-)&nbsp;&nbsp; Or,&nbsp; at least, we can say that
such delay might be acceptable in some scenarios, but not in others.
Nasa might have no choice, given the lag inherent in very long range
transmissions, but I doubt that DARPA can accept multi-seconds delays
in combat scenarios.<br>
<br>
I am looking at a "real time" voice network, where it has been strongly
"suggested" that I use DTN, but I am thinking that all that it will
bring to my particular use case is that I don't have to worry about
"link lost" for a short time bringing down the call.&nbsp; My personal feel
is that DTN is not the right tool for the job for a mainly voice based
short range system where speed of reply is of the essence. I don't see
that the benefits justify it, but then I don't get to make the decision
(and if I recommend against it, I probably don't get the contract. Sigh)<br>
<br>
Thank you very much for taking he time to reply and for helping me to
clarify my thoughts.<br>
<br>
With best wishes,<br>
<br>
Graham <br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid:023601c9df2a$694fd5b0$3bef8110$@com" type="cite">
  <pre wrap="">that could be sent in a disrupted fashion over the network.  But ultimately
that's just data like any other bundle.  The only real "work" there is in
the application, not the BP.   

The key point is that voice can either be streaming as little snippets or
buffered as a big blob.  If it is a big blob, it's just another bundle.  If
it is streaming, then one needs to make sure you have a BPA/router that adds
only a minimal amount of additional overhead to the forwarding process.  (as
Armando says below)
 
  </pre>
  <blockquote type="cite">
    <pre wrap="">One important take-away from this work... the motivation of DTN is to
support delay/disrupted scenarios and apps that can operate in that
regime, but it is possible to implement a DTN stack that can also deal
with time-sensitive traffic.

Armando
_______________________________________________
dtn-security mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:[email-masked]">[email-masked]</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://maillists.intel-research.net/mailman/listinfo/dtn-security">http://maillists.intel-research.net/mailman/listinfo/dtn-security</a>
    </pre>
  </blockquote>
  <pre wrap=""><!---->

_______________________________________________
dtn-security mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:[email-masked]">[email-masked]</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://maillists.intel-research.net/mailman/listinfo/dtn-security">http://maillists.intel-research.net/mailman/listinfo/dtn-security</a>

  </pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
<pre class="moz-signature" cols="80">-- 
Technical Director
Leonix Solutions (Pte) Ltd
18 Boon Lay Way
#09-95 TradeHub 21
Singapore 609966
Telephone:+65 6316 9968
Fax: +65 6316 9208
</pre>
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Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2009 20:06:28 +0100
From: <[email-masked]>
To: <[email-masked]>
Subject: [dtn-security] Key Management hop-by-hop ciphersuite

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Hi,=20

>From internet-draft "Key Management Requirements", it is a requirement =
that key management should support all mandatory ciphersuites.=20
      For Hop-by-Hop integrity and authentication, the ciphersuite =
BAB-HMAC only supports symmetric cryptography..=20

     1.  Does this means, when we are looking for key establishment =
while assuming pre-installed public keys, then we also have to take =
assumption that symmetric keys also exist between two nodes for =
hop-by-hop authentication and integrity..=20

     2. Are we not making Key Management dependent on distribution of =
symmetric keys between forwarder and intermediate receiver while using =
public key  only..=20

Please comment...=20

thanks=20

regards,
Nasir

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<P><FONT SIZE=3D2>Hi,<BR>
<BR>
>From internet-draft &quot;Key Management Requirements&quot;, it is a =
requirement that key management should support all mandatory =
ciphersuites.<BR>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; For Hop-by-Hop integrity and =
authentication, the ciphersuite BAB-HMAC only supports symmetric =
cryptography..<BR>
<BR>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 1.&nbsp; Does this means, when we are looking =
for key establishment while assuming pre-installed public keys, then we =
also have to take assumption that symmetric keys also exist between two =
nodes for hop-by-hop authentication and integrity..<BR>
<BR>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 2. Are we not making Key Management dependent =
on distribution of symmetric keys between forwarder and intermediate =
receiver while using public key&nbsp; only..<BR>
<BR>
Please comment...<BR>
<BR>
thanks<BR>
<BR>
regards,<BR>
Nasir<BR>
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