Subject: [Eligibility-discuss] Draft meeting minutes

From: "Pete Resnick" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2019 10:20:26 -0500

I think I hit the big issues. Let me know if I should add any other of 
the less discussed issues, or if I failed to capture something fairly.

pr

-------------------

The eligibility-discuss Mailing List Virtual Meeting; October 24, 2019 
17:00 UTC
Pete Resnick chairing, taking narrative notes, and providing issue 
summary.

The meeting consisted of a quick presentation of the two documents under 
discussion (draft-moonesamy-recall-rev and draft-rescorla-istar-recall) 
by each of the authors, followed by commentary from the participants. 
The agenda being basically open, the only "minutes" here are the issue 
summary list and narrative notes below. Also included are the 
transcripts of the webex chat and the jabber chat that were used during 
the meeting.

Issue Summary:
--------------

The two drafts under discussion are primarily addressing two different 
issues:

draft-moonesamy-recall-rev is primarily addressing "equity" (that is, 
the fairness to remote participants to engage in the recall process).

draft-rescorla-istar-recall is primarily addressing "efficacy" (that is, 
the effectiveness and utility of the existing process).

While the question was raised as to whether equity was a problem worth 
solving, it did not appear to garner much support and appeared to be 
squarely in the rough in the meeting.

There was a good deal of discussion as to whether addressing the equity 
problem just for the recall petition was worth it, or whether it would 
be more useful to address equity across nomcom eligibility in general. 
The concern on doing the latter is that work is less likely to complete. 
The issue comes down to whether doing it just for the recall petition 
would be at all useful (or even might do some harm by sending us off in 
the wrong direction) versus whether doing it would be a good first step 
that could then be lead to other useful changes. In the chair's opinion, 
there seemed to be more convincing argument for the latter, but more 
discussion on this is probably warranted.

A major issue with draft-moonesamy-recall-rev was whether opening up the 
recall petition process to remote attendees would expose the IETF to a 
DoS attack (gaming the system) due to unfounded petitions. It was noted 
that the DoS was not on the nomcom-appointed bodies themselves, in that 
the recall committee membership itself cannot be exploited; only the 
petition requesting such a committee can have remote attendees under the 
proposed change. However, it would have an impact on the appointed 
recall committee chair and the volunteers for that committee. It's not 
clear to the chair whether this was sufficient reason was given for this 
impact being a showstopper, or sufficient evidence or reason to believe 
that this is likely to be attempted, but some further discussion to 
conclude is desirable.

Other less discussed issues:

On draft-rescorla-istar-recall, there was concern that this procedure 
could effective make the I* self-selecting, which was what the nomcom 
process was designed to eliminate. No particular response was made to 
this concern.

While there was concern about letting the I* actually remove their own 
members, there was an expressed desire to have the I* initiate a 
petition for their own members. It was pointed out that 
draft-moonesamy-recall-rev, in allowing I* members to sign a petition, 
and in reducing the number of signatures to 10, effectively allows that 
as written.

On draft-moonesamy-recall-rev, it was suggested that if there were 
concern about gaming the system, one possibility is to require at least 
some number of in-person participants to be on the petition. No 
particular resolution.

One concern about making the recall process easier to use is that the 
invocation of the recall procedure could be used to shame leaders who 
are failing to get their work done (as against those engaged in active 
bad behavior).

Narrative Notes:
----------------

Subramanian Moonesamy (SM): "Fairness" is part of the problem addressed 
in this draft
Eric Rescorla (ER): "Process doesn't work well" is part of the problem 
addressed in this draft

John Klensin (JK): Have had situations where a person was a good 
community representative, but unpopular on the body. Could result in 
self-selecting.

Warren Kumari (WK): Changing re-call is an easy first step change.
Given the lack of use now, we should probably do some dry-run 
experiments.

Barry Leiba (BL): I appreciate the "easy thing first" idea, but we may 
lose site of remote participants generally. Don't want to lose "nomcom 
eligibility"

Eliot Lear (EL): A little too loose for submitting petition. Should be 
higher demonstration of connection to community.

Adrian Farrel (AF): Caution against other than bite-size pieces of work. 
We have history of opening doors and everybody bringing issues and 
getting bogged down.

BL: Perhaps gendispatch could handle nomcom eligibility

SM: Perhaps an answer to EL is to have a "vouching person"

ER: Equity in an ineffective process doesn't seem terribly useful.
Not persuaded there is an equity concern; remote people participate 
quite well.

EL: Hard to judge equity issue because we haven't used the process. 
Perhaps it's unmanageable, perhaps bar too high. I would like us to make 
sure that any process should be available to remote participants.

JK: Note: It's really SM's work, just co-author because I did some 
earlier work.
Real problem with recall procedure is that the length of time it takes 
to do it makes it useless. Attacking it on a larger scale goes back to 
Adrian's comment. These seem like a small bite that might help on equity 
and ease.  Overhaul is too big to take on right now. Get these done 
first.

WK: Another small bite is also addressing "fear of recriminations" with 
some sort of anonymous signature.

Michael Richardson (MR): I don't know why this is a small bite. It is a 
zero step. I would split "becoming eligible" from "remaining eligible".

Patrick McManus (PM): Frustrating to deal with fringe process issues. 
With this, there are a lot of fallbacks (nomcom, etc.). This suggestion 
tips things toward people gaming the system. Nomcom eligibility is more 
important.

BL: There are three different kinds of remote participants: Been to many 
meetings but start being remote, come to one or two meetings but 
otherwise are active participants remotely, and folks who simply 
subscribe to lists. It's the third group that is the sticking point.

WK: This isn't a fringe issue. The reason we haven't seen recalls is 
because it's scary and long process. There have been times where it 
would have been used, but it was too hard to use.

BL: We've had times with blocking ADs, and recalls could have been used. 
Those things may have changed.

ER: Two issues: 1) Effective procedure: Then let's open the aperture and 
address the bigger issue.  2) Equity: Should address that more globally.

PM: I don't think having problems with co-leaders should be a reason for 
recall.

BL: EKR, couldn't I* people approach people in the community and start 
the recall rather than giving the power to I* itself.

ER: I've not seen it worth invoking kicking co-leaders out; 2-year is 
enough. Not sure anything needs to be done, but the limited proposal 
wouldn't be effective.

JK: Sometimes the bad performance is not visible to the broader 
community, so it might be useful to have I* sign petitions. (It might 
have been an accident that they were excluded by nomcom rule.) Also 
possible for I* to do the o-team process.

Alissa Cooper (AC): For people who aren't performing well on I*, they 
tend to already have a lot of shame. We should think about whether 
process increases shame. We should also think about people's fear of 
engaging in the process (like Warren said).

ER: For people who are not doing anything (as opposed to doing active 
harm), engaging the recall seems harmful. If that's the more general 
case (that people see invoking recall as harmful and therefore avoiding 
it), then this isn't going to address it.

Russ Housely (RH): Know example where the person had no shame.

SM: Most of the comments are about justification, not about the equity 
issue.

EL: EKR's draft seems orthogonal to SM's. Sympathetic to Alissa's point. 
As for whether docs are ready to go: Need to come up with good criteria 
for "meaningful participant".

ER: If efficacy is the question, then the drafts are competing. If it's 
about equity, then they don't compete, but perhaps there's not an equity 
problem.

JK: Problem is that the process for initiating is discriminatory against 
1) remote participants and 2) I*. The o-team method might make sense for 
I*.

AF: Everybody has a bit of a different problem statement; hard to write 
an all-embracing one.

SM: 2/3 of an I* body effectively is identical to 10, as defined by the 
draft.

PM: I do think actively harmful. We need to talk about what eligibility 
really means. Treating them loosely might harm in the future.

AF: We had concerns about misuse with the o-team. Did we have such 
problems there?

ER: Somewhat worried like Patrick regarding gaming the system. Not 
worried about franchising the I*.

Richard Barnes (RB): On the same page as Patrick. Inclined to have a 
broad discussion of participant eligibility. Don't want DOS attack.
We do see abuse of process elsewhere. This could at least be 
distracting.

Pete Resnick (PR): We haven't seen serious abuse of process on the 
o-team. In this case, the DOS is about initiation, not removal.

RB: Even initiation could be very much a DOS.

WK: We could have a standing "dismiss the nonsense" recall committee.

EL: I don't think we should worry too much about the DOS, but we should 
have a more serious look at what it is to be a participant / member of 
the community.

BL: Should we have a definition of something other than "participant"?

EL: Yeah, "participant" gets used all over the place. We might need 
another term for this.

JK: Slippery slope possible here. Attaching specific privileges to 
specific definitions could impact the very light definition of 
"participant"

RB: Multiple terms here might be good. Document development is different 
than other things.

JK: Most folks who we think of as trolls author documents and get 
mailing lists.

SM: Whether we should tie to BCP 79: Don't think so. Just being a 
participant isn't really enough.

BL: Do we think we can combine the SM and EKR document?

JK: The core of the EKR document is about removing without community 
involvement; that would be bad. We could allow I* to bypass petition in 
SM document, but that might already be solved.

ER: See earlier comments: Mine's not about equity, and I don't think SM 
addresses efficiency.

RB: This doesn't seem like there's enough consensus to do AD-sponsored. 
We need to agree to problem to solve.

BL: Question of "who can initiate recalls?" and the "how do we make the 
process faster?".

ER: Not clear to me what we're trying to do. If it's about equity, then 
they're separate questions.

PR: Summary

EL: We need some more discussion about whether there will be a DOS 
attack.
On question of equity, not sure we must, but we should.

Webex Chat Transcript:
----------------------

from Pete Resnick to Everyone:    12:05  PM
Monitoring here and eligibility-discuss jabber room
from Adrian Farrel (Guest) to Everyone:    12:15  PM
And (joyfully) you have to klick a second time to lower your hand even 
after you have spoken
from Warren Kumari to Everyone:    12:19  PM
Fair.
from Warren Kumari to Everyone:    12:20  PM
Fully agree.
from JcK to Everyone:    12:20  PM
Can we carefully distingish between  "change nomcom eligibility" and 
"decouple recall request eligibility from nomcom eligibility".  Both may 
be worthwhile, but they are different
from Pete Resnick to Everyone:    12:21  PM
Yes, well-noted John.
from EKR to Everyone:    12:22  PM
Hand
from EKR to Everyone:    12:23  PM
(I can't seem to do it from my UI)
from Adrian Farrel (Guest) to Everyone:    12:28  PM
There are 3 (not 2) things in the SM/JCK draft. The third is I* 
eligibility to sign a recall
from Eliot Lear to Everyone:    12:34  PM
Marshall Eubanks
from JcK to Everyone:    12:34  PM
@Warren: yes
from Eliot Lear to Everyone:    12:34  PM
Marshall Rose recalled himself from the IETF some years ago
from JcK to Everyone:    12:36  PM
@Michael: don't understand your proposal.  Are you suggesting that a 
remote participant who had never been to a meeting should not be 
eligib.e to participate in a recall petition?
from Eliot Lear to Everyone:    12:38  PM
Well put, Barry.
from EKR to Everyone:    12:39  PM
Barry, I would like to have my hand up
from ART Area to Everyone:    12:39  PM
EKR: ack.
from Michael Richardson to Everyone:    12:40  PM
@JcK, I sit on the fence about recall petition eligibility itself.  I am 
speaking about nomcom eligibility only.  I want to change the rules for 
remaining eligible to accomodate remote people.
from EKR to Everyone:    12:48  PM
Hand please.
from Eliot Lear to Everyone:    12:50  PM
Good points, Alyssa.
from JcK to Everyone:    12:51  PM
We have no proposals to make the distinction, but it seems that several 
of these comments point to a difference between recalls for 
non-performance (the Marshall case was an extreme example) and recalls 
for abusive behavior.   Maybe that is what ekr is saying now.
from Adrian Farrel (Guest) to Everyone:    12:53  PM
@Barry, erm, you did schedule a 1.5 hour meeting, didn't you?
from ART Area to Everyone:    12:53  PM
Yes, ta.
from Alissa Cooper to Everyone:    12:53  PM
@Russ, fair enough, not every case is the same
from EKR to Everyone:    12:55  PM
Hand at some point
from Pete Resnick to Everyone:    12:57  PM
Chair hand (but no need to interrupt queue).
from Warren Kumari to Everyone:    1:00  PM
Meh, I put my hand down. I agree with John though
from ART Area to Everyone:    1:00  PM
ack
from EKR to Everyone:    1:00  PM
Well, to the extent to which the problem statement is that it's unfair 
to the IESG, then my put is of course a different attempt to solve this
from EKR to Everyone:    1:02  PM
I guess I am back in the queue
from JcK to Everyone:    1:02  PM
@Warren: Yes, and that is why my original proposal that fed into SM's 
draft didn't give the IESG/IAB any special privileges or procedures... 
espeically if the total number of signatures was reduced.
from Richard Barnes to Everyone:    1:02  PM
hand
from JcK to Everyone:    1:03  PM
But I see little harm to letting a sufficient majority of those bodies 
bypass the petition process if people think that would be helpful.  What 
I'm concerned about it their being able to bypass the actually 
evaluation and removal process.
from EKR to Everyone:    1:05  PM
Hand
from JcK to Everyone:    1:10  PM
@Richard: Just remember that we went for several years, at a time when 
we had a number of certifiable trolls actively participating on mailing 
lists and the number of people needed to initiate the process with a 
petition was one, we had zero recall attempts.  Zero.
from JcK to Everyone:    1:12  PM
The fact that it didn't happen doesn't prove that it wouldn't, but it 
seems to me to be a weak argument for disenfranching people who are 
active participants by any measure other than showing up at meetings.
from Richard Barnes to Everyone:    1:15  PM
JcK - If you look at every other platform on the Internet, it happens 
all the time.  Regularly used to silence women and minorities.  To the 
extent we've escaped it, we've been lucky.
from EKR to Everyone:    1:19  PM
Hand
from Richard Barnes to Everyone:    1:20  PM
hand
from Michael Richardson to Everyone:    1:23  PM
Richard, are you saying that the problem statement(s) in the documents 
are not clear enough, or are you saying that this group is not clearly 
onboard with the statement in the document?
from EKR to Everyone:    1:23  PM
Hand
from Pete Resnick to Everyone:    1:24  PM
Chair hand.
from JcK to Everyone:    1:26  PM
@Pete: limiting it to the equity question was certainly my intent.
from Adrian Farrel (Guest) to Everyone:    1:27  PM
Ditto
from Richard Barnes to Everyone:    1:28  PM
i don't think it makes any sense to consider the equity question purely 
in the context of recall
from Michael Richardson to Everyone:    1:29  PM
my last word is that I'd like to do a BOF (Vancouver?) on "Remaining 
Eligible", which has nothing to do with recall.
from JcK to Everyone:    1:31  PM
Re the DoS attack situation, again the historicial evidence is that it 
hasn't been a problem.  If I'm an evil-doer and want to mount such an 
attack, the difference between creating 10 socik puppets or 20 is 
slight, so we aren't talking about preventing (possibly fictional) DoS 
attacks, we are preserving a state in which people who don't show up at 
a lot of meetings are disenfranchised and unable to use the procedures 
to protect themselves against abuse.
from Richard Barnes to Everyone:    1:31  PM
JcK: what i'm saying is don't enfranchise the sock puppets at all
from JcK to Everyone:    1:32  PM
If we can figuree out how to exclude them, I'm in favor of not 
enfranching them.   But the evidence is that there haven't been any of 
those.

Jabber Chat Transcript:
-----------------------

11:48 The topic is:
11:53 glen left the room.
11:53 Barry Leiba [[email-masked]/neptune] entered the 
room.

Pete Resnick
11:56 Greetings. Barry, SM, and I have joined the call. Still a few 
minutes to go.
11:57 Alexey Melnikov [[email-masked]/f2208818e8c5289e] 
entered the room.
11:57 MichaelRichardson [[email-masked]/dooku] entered the room.
MichaelRichardson
11:57 hi.

Adrian Farrel
11:57 What y'all talkin' about, now?

Pete Resnick
11:58 Airline mileage status so far.

Warren "Ace" Kumari
11:58 Reminder: Meeting link:
https://ietf.webex.com/ietf/j.php?MTID=m53f271df6ae5f0a805c2f790d5809e48

Barry Leiba
11:59 Thanks, Ace.
MichaelRichardson
11:59 I really would like it if the webex link could always be in the 
agenda for a virtual interim.
11:59 SM [[email-masked]/Gajim] entered the room.
MichaelRichardson
11:59 Calendar->agenda->webex.. All nice clicks using this new-fangled 
http thing.
12:00 the "next"button on the webex does not work again.

Pete Resnick
12:00 Going in as guest?
MichaelRichardson
12:00 oh, apparently, + is no longer accepted by webex in email 
addresses.
12:00 CAN WE PLEASE HAVE A SLA FOR WEBEX?  OR STOP USING IT?
12:01 apparently, I need a meeting password?

Warren "Ace" Kumari
12:01 @michael: Webex gives us free service. Unless we find something 
else which will match that, it seems unlikely that we can easily moved

Pete Resnick
12:01 Alexey, joining us?
SM
12:01 Michael, use recall

Warren "Ace" Kumari
12:02 The link I posted should have wored without password.

Pete Resnick
12:02 Meeting number: 641 978 746
Password: recall
MichaelRichardson
12:02 I used to have a mic on my BT headset.  I don't anymore. Odd.
12:05 I will plug in old wired headset in a moment.  Apparently, it 
picks up 50Hz noise when in Europe.  I wonder if it will get 60hz now 
that I'm home.
12:05 I've just noticed that the *ART* area has a nice Picasso. HAHA.  
Good on you guys.
12:05 duh. I knew that.
12:05 Van Gough.
12:06 Russ Housley 
[[email-masked]/Russell-Housleys-MacBook-Pro] entered the room.
MichaelRichardson
12:11 so: Updated Recall Procedures for IETF Leadership                  
                                 draft-rescorla-istar-recall-00
12:12 what is SM's draft?

Adrian Farrel
12:12 draft-moonesamy-recall-rev

Barry Leiba
12:17 Adding me to queue
SM
12:18 Warren: changing recall is an easier first step
MichaelRichardson
12:19 so, just to mention that the Kobain (I know that I spelt that 
wrong...) event was like 1992...  That's 25 years ago.  Very few even 
remember that event.
SM
12:19 Kobe
12:20 Barry: concerned that in doing that, we might lose sight of making 
remote participants eligible
12:21 raises hand
MichaelRichardson
12:21 why the focus on who can *initiate*, vs just sign a call?  Am I 
missing something?

Barry Leiba
12:21 SM: ack
SM
12:22 Thanks Barry
MichaelRichardson
12:22 (I don't think that the webrtc WEBEX has a raise hand button)
SM
12:22 Michael, the wording is that there need to be signatories to 
initiate that recall process

Pete Resnick
12:22 MR: My version doesn't have the hand.

Barry Leiba
12:24 MR: do you want to be in the speaking queue?
MichaelRichardson
12:24 SM, thank you, I went back to 3777 to be sure.
12:24 Rich Salz [[email-masked]/bos-mpu8n] entered the room.
SM
12:25 Michael, feel free to ask questions.  I can look up the 
information
MichaelRichardson
12:26 What EKR said.  I didn't realize that this spot was going to be so 
noisy.  I don't understand why we are focused on recall as an 
eligibility concern, vs selection opportunity.  If the recall committee 
has the same eligibility as selecting, then it's not just about who can 
initiate.  It's also about who can serve.
SM
12:27 Michael, you and I had a discussion about the nomcom change about 
five years ago.  I had a draft about that.

Barry Leiba
12:27 MR: The point of doing the "eligible to initiate/sign recall 
petition" first is to make a small start on what would otherwise be a 
large step.
MichaelRichardson
12:29 Yes, I would like to be in the queue.

Barry Leiba
12:29 After Ace.
12:29 Rich Salz has set the topic to: Eligibility-discuss Interim on 
2019-Oct-24

Rich Salz
12:30 gotta go to a work meeting.  good luck folks.  FWIW, I think more 
discussion is needed.

Barry Leiba
12:31 Thanks, Rich.

Rich Salz
12:31 thanks for picking this up!!
MichaelRichardson
12:33 . o O ( that's a really nice document you have.  Wouldn't want 
anyone to DISCUSS it, now would we )

Pete Resnick
12:34 Marshall Eubanks.

Barry Leiba
12:35 I'm in the queue after Patrick.
MichaelRichardson
12:37 What Patrick said.

Barry Leiba
12:39 Ah, I remember.  Back in the queue.
12:41 Barry in queue again, responding to EKR
MichaelRichardson
12:42 I agree with you Barry completely.  That's why we probably need 
three sets of rules here.  Category 1: John or Keith Moore or me in the 
late 2000s, who was eligible, but couldn't attend, but remained 
involved. Category 2: People who are actively involved (criteria are 
subject to large debate...) but have never become eligible.  Category 3: 
people who are peripherally involved.
12:43 I think that we should take a small bite which it to keep category 
1 people eligible.  I think that this could be relatively 
uncontroversial.  Category 2 could be done through a wide variety of 
systems, formulas, even plenary actions...
SM
12:51 raises hand

Barry Leiba
12:51 ack
MichaelRichardson
12:53 (so webex needs a gesture interface)

Adrian Farrel
12:54 No surprise, I agree with Michael about small bites.
MichaelRichardson
12:55 I lost audio.
12:55 it returned.

Adrian Farrel
12:55 I also think that, if (as has been claimed) we are fiddling with 
something that won't matter anyway, then I see no harm to fiddling
MichaelRichardson
12:56 @Adrian, I would agree.  I would "No Objection" on the documents. 
I am not clear which one to go with.  I don't think I care.

Barry Leiba
12:56 Barry in Q
MichaelRichardson
12:57 Agree with Barry. They could go together.
SM
1:01 raises hand
MichaelRichardson
1:06 IESG count is 15 now?  So you can get 10 signatures from just IESG 
members, which I think was SM's point just now.
I just spent three minutes trying to get a list of who is the IESG from 
ietf.org, and I failed...)

Barry Leiba
1:07 Quickest way is Tools -> Quick Links.
SM
1:07 Michael, please see Section 3.1 of draft-recall-rev-02

Barry Leiba
1:08 From there you have IESG: Members
SM
1:14 raises hand
1:29 Rich Salz left the room.
MichaelRichardson
1:29 Barry, I found it finally... because "Groups" spoke "Working 
Groups" to me, I didn't pick it.
SM left the room.
MichaelRichardson
1:33 I think we can find a way to exclude sock puppets.  I worry about 
setting the bar too high, actually.

---

From: John C Klensin <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2019 14:10:08 -0400

--On Tuesday, October 29, 2019 10:20 -0500 Pete Resnick
<[email-masked]> wrote:

>...
> One concern about making the recall process easier to use is
> that the invocation of the recall procedure could be used to
> shame leaders who are failing to get their work done (as
> against those engaged in active bad behavior).
>...

This sort of got lost in the conversation, but I want to suggest
a radical idea and note something else that did not come up
clearly enough to be reflected in the minutes.  In reverse order
and noting that these are general thoughts about the whole
process and its utility, not just about the initiation
(petitioning) process.

>From what I remember of the POISED discussions, when the recall
model was designed, we were thinking a lot more about
malfeasance (engaging in active bad behavior in your words) than
about non-performance (failing to get work done or just
disappearing from the role).  Maybe there is a third category,
which is behavior toward, and positions on, the work of the IETF
that is seriously out of line with apparent community consensus
[1].  In any event, I think it would be very helpful if we tried
to separate the three in our thinking.  For serious
non-performance or disappearance, the recall mechanism may just
be wrong.  In ideal situations, and I would classify the one
case that almost went to a recall committee that way although it
took too long, the optimal answer is probably to more or less
privately reach out to the person involved and convince them to
voluntarily resign and step down.  If nothing else, that should
take less time and be less damaging to both the offending party
and the community.  If they obstinately refuse to do so, the
situation looks more and more like malfeasance.  For cases of
malfeasance, a careful, multi-step, process may be exactly what
we need (even though I worry about its taking too long). It is,
in any event different because non-performance or disappearance
can, in at least most cases, be objectively measured and
evaluated (even if one can imagine debates about whether someone
who is doing half the job should be forced out) while
malfeasance is almost always going to be a matter of judgment
and degree.

Second, what I heard on the call (others may have heard things
differently), I'm a little concerned about what seemed to be a
logic path between "this could be used to shame" and "therefore
we don't want to touch it".  It is oddly possible that the
recall procedure has actually worked rather well, but in a way
that has been largely invisible to the community.  People who
were behaving badly have occasionally been told "stop that or
resign or you will have to live through an unpleasant and
possibly career-damaging recall procedure" and that has brought
about changes in behavior.   I'm even aware of one case in which
someone was shown a petition with most or all of the required
signatures and given that same message.  Now those cases are
threats of shaming and offers of shaming and having the dirty
laundry washing in public would certainly be shaming.  But they
are also part of holding someone accountable and keeping the
IETF working.  If we never want to anyone to feel shames, then
we should eliminate the ability of the Nomcom to not return
people who were publicly willing to serve another term in their
positions.  And maybe we should figure out how to not disclose
the names of people who have indicated their willingness to
serve in particular positions because no being selected might
cause shame.

Let's be a little careful about what we wish for... or wish to
avoid.

best,
   john

[1] It is really a separate issue, at least IMO, but proposals
to let I* bodies remove their own membership are part of that
issue because, if we start removing people for that sort of
reason, we'd better be really sure that it is community
consensus they are out of line with, or "self-selection" by the
bodies is the least of our worries, especially because
dissenting voices and reminding the community about other
perspectives can be very valuable.

---

From: John C Klensin <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2019 14:41:06 -0400

Hi.  I've been thinking about the idea of the I* bodies being
able to remove one of their own members and how to combine that
with adequate safeguards.  Let me make a specific suggestion to
see if it gets enough traction for me to draft some text that
could be dropped into the "equity" I-D.

Suppose we followed the example already set by the ombudsteam
and allowed those bodies, perhaps even by a simply majority
vote, to initiate a recall process, bypassing the petition
process.  The rest of the recall process would run normally
(modulo any changes we might make in the future).

Would that be sufficient and mitigate at least most of the
concerns?

I'm a little fascinated by the possibility of applying Mike's
suggestion to this, requiring each I* member voting "yes" to
initiate the recall process to put down a significant deposit
that would be refunded if the recall committee did not agree
that the person should be removed.  Or, perhaps even more
effectively, requiring each I* member who was going to vote
"yes" to sign a letter of resignation, creating a vacancy
immediately and taking effect as soon as a replacement could be
seated if the recall committee did not remove the person in
question.   "You want to fire an I* member, you put your
position on the line if the recall committee disagrees" has a
certain charm.  But I'm not yet persuaded that either would be a
good idea.

best,
   john

---

From: Melinda Shore <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2019 11:51:18 -0700

[apologies for the irritating phone mail client formatting]

On the first suggestion, I'd be concerned about a body conspiring to remove
someone on the basis of something other than performance. Some productive,
creative people can be irritating.

On the second, I'd worry that the instinct for self-preservation might
overwhelm the desire to do the right thing and effectively make it
impossible to remove someone.

It's an interesting set of incentives.

Melinda

On Tue, Oct 29, 2019, 11:41 John C Klensin <[email-masked]> wrote:

> --
> Eligibility-discuss mailing list
> [email-masked]
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/eligibility-discuss
>

---

From: Samuel Weiler <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2019 14:53:30 -0400 (EDT)

...
> certain charm.  But I'm not yet persuaded that either would be a

This sounds remarkably similar to the idea in:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-klensin-chair-empowerment-00

which empowered the IETF chair to initiate a "him or me" process.  It 
has the advantage that if the recall committee disagrees, it only 
displaces one person (the IETF chair), not half of the I*.  As this 
document observes in section 5: "If different IESG members were able 
to use it on each other, there is too much risk of abuse or repeated 
invocations".

-- Sam

---

From: Warren Kumari <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2019 15:22:36 -0400

On Tue, Oct 29, 2019 at 2:53 PM Samuel Weiler <[email-masked]> wrote:
> ....

My concern with this is that the outcome of the recall committee isn't
guaranteed to be deterministic / always "right".

For the purposes of a thought experiment, let's say that I'm a useless
waste of space on the IESG - as well as not progressing my own
documents, I'm capricious, disruptive, unreasonably argumentative, and
lazy (I certainly hope that this is just a hypothetical).

Of these, the only one that has a verifiable metric is the "not
progressing my own documents" - for the rest of them, it's really hard
to know if a recall committee will be able to have seen the actions,
and neigh impossible to predict if they will agree that I should be
recalled. If the committee *does* agree to remove me, yay, the right
thing happened. If not, we instead lose someone who hasn't done
anything wrong - other than incorrectly predict which way some group
of people will "vote" (and, looking around the world these days, I'm
not certain that anyone can predict how a group of people will vote,
and certainly the "right" outcomes isn't guaranteed). If I were the
chair, the situation would have to be *very* dire before I'd risk my
neck on that...

What's more, the person who we'd be losing is someone with a skillset
that cannot easily be replaced by other members of the IESG -- if a
random IESG person is replaced, they either have a co-AD, or their
work can be reshuffled -- but, the chair has a different set of skills
(it's also a role which, I suspect, most of the IESG wouldn't want to
have to cover!).

What was pointed out on the call (and, after being pointed out is
blindingly obvious!) is that there are 15 people on the IESG - if the
petition limit were dropped to 10 (and IESG members could initiate /
sign petitions) this would be more than enough to start the ball
rolling.

W

-- 
I don't think the execution is relevant when it was obviously a bad
idea in the first place.
This is like putting rabid weasels in your pants, and later expressing
regret at having chosen those particular rabid weasels and that pair
of pants.
   ---maf

---

From: Brian E Carpenter <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2019 08:27:41 +1300

Thanks for the notes. Sorry I wasn't on the call because time zone.

On 30-Oct-19 04:20, Pete Resnick wrote:
...
> squarely in the rough in the meeting.

I had to read that twice to conclude that it means that the consensus
was that equity is a problem worth solving.
 
...> A major issue with draft-moonesamy-recall-rev was whether opening up the 
> DoS attack (gaming the system) due to unfounded petitions.

I've been thinking for some days that perhaps a committee of two, say the
ISOC President and the current NomCom Chair, would be able to declare
that a received recall petition is frivolous and simply dismiss it. As long
as this was a public process, I think it would be reasonable.

   Brian

---

From: Michael StJohns <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2019 16:03:07 -0400

Hi John - sorry for the top post - but my original idea for the 
expulsion process was mainly to provide a few different light-weight 
ways of dealing with the problem where a member goes AWOL.  I.e. the 
only actual semi-worked case for the recall process.

Taxonomy wise the mostly complete ways a member may leave their position 
for a given body (and I'm being more general than the IETF here) are:

1) Upon term expiration  (covered in the current Nomcom documents)
2) Upon resignation (covered in the current documents)
3) Upon recall - a community action (covered - albeit poorly - in the 
current documents)
4) Upon death (not covered explicitly, but covered implicitly as a 
objectively identifiable vacancy)
5) Upon disability (not covered - think US 25th amendment)
6) Upon abandonment (not covered - we have no agreed upon way of 
measuring this)
7) Upon expulsion  - a body initiated action (not covered - EKRs draft).

Ideally, if we're going to open up recall to revision, I'd like to see 
about adding 4-7 above.

More inline.

> (modulo any changes we might make in the future).

I had to think hard about this approach.  Basically, this is mixture of 
both the recall process and the expulsion process and I'm not sure it 
would work.  Here's the problem I see.  Expulsions tend to be for 
egregious failures where the relationship between the member and the 
body is pretty much irretrievably poisoned. Imagine if you will that you 
follow this process, but the recall failed.  I don't know how you put 
everyone back to a point where they can continue to work together.

While your approach does prevent the I* body from being somewhat 
self-selecting, I think the side effects of the result where the I* body 
says "we can't work with this person any more" and where the community 
says "suck it up" may not be the best result for the community.

> that the person should be removed.

"did agree" not "did not agree" I think you mean?

> Or, perhaps even more

Me either.  The deposit idea was more to deal with DOS with possibly 
unknown people rather than a "me or them" type thing.

The "recall or resign" model has two interesting side effects: 1) It 
forces the recall committee to balance the subjective and possibly 
widely differing judgements of the I* body and the recall committee as 
to "egregious behavior" against the possibility of decapitating the 
organization.  2) and the actual possibility of decapitating the 
organization.  If we went through with this model though, I'd suggest a 
slight modification just to keep us from shooting ourselves in both 
feet: one person shall be randomly selected from the set of I* members 
voting for recall and removed if the recall fails.  I think I'd also 
prohibit the chair of any given body from signing on to a petition.

In the draft I wrote a long while back that originally suggested 
expulsion, I had included some form of confirming body for that 
expulsion decision.  When I commented on EKRs draft, I think I provided 
text dealing with the appeal of the expulsion as a possibility.  Now 
that I've considered it further, I would remove the text for the same 
reason I stated above related to the body-originated recall model you 
suggested: once the well is so poisoned as to cause a majority or 2/3s 
to vote for expulsion or recall of a member, forcing them to continue to 
work together seems like a very bad idea.

It may be that any expulsion or body-initiated recall approach is just 
inherently flawed, given how the IETF is constituted, and shouldn't be used.

Mike

---

From: Michael StJohns <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2019 16:16:29 -0400

> as this was a public process, I think it would be reasonable.

I like the idea of a fast-fail, but both of these people are 
problematic.  The Nomcom chair because they were probably on the Nomcom 
that selected the target of the petition, and the ISOC president 
because, under current rules, they would select the Recall committee chair.

How about the last three Nomcom chairs that didn't serve on a Nomcom 
committee or with the petition target on one of the I* bodies or as a 
co-worker?   2/3 vote to void the petition?

The current recall process really needs overhauling.  I once calculated 
it could take 60-90 days from first announcement of the pending petition 
to get to the point where a recall committee could make a decision, and 
a good part of that time is doing all the things we currently do to 
verify and select Nomcom volunteers and somewhat to select the chair.

How about 1) Use the last nomcom volunteer list and seed and select the 
next 10 or so people (pick enough so that some can say no), 2) Have the 
chair be a former Nomcom chair  who gets selected randomly as stand-by 
Recall chair from the pool of past 10-15 chairs (minus the last 3 
chairs)?  All mechanical and *fast* - give people a week to say yes or 
no to be on the committee and you're ready to go.

Later, Mike

---

From: Brian E Carpenter <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2019 10:07:44 +1300

> co-worker?   2/3 vote to void the petition?

Sure, something like that. Just a pragmatic way of dealing with the
(probably unlikely) DOS scenario.

> The current recall process really needs overhauling.

Yes, but possibly out of scope for this list? Maybe gendispatch needs
to start with an issues list.

   Brian

> I once calculated

---

From: "Pete Resnick" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2019 16:53:29 -0500

> was that equity is a problem worth solving.

Joel Halpern had the same problem, which tells me that it was a writing 
problem, not a reading problem. I'll clarify before finalizing.

pr
-- 
Pete Resnick http://www.episteme.net/
All connections to the world are tenuous at best

---

From: S Moonesamy <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2019 01:32:08 -0700

Hi John,
>Would that be sufficient and mitigate at least most of the

I'll use the IETF Trust as an example as the focus has been on the 
IESG instead of all the bodies which has nomcom-appointees.

Let's say that a majority of IETF trustees vote to recall one of the 
trustees.  The  Recall Committee does not get the 3/4 majority to 
recall that trustee.  This is where things can get awkward as you 
already have a majority of the trustees formally agreeing that one of 
them has to be recalled.

I'll comment about the IETF LLC.  Let's say that one of its directors 
does not attend several meetings.  As there aren't any attendance 
rules for that body, should that person be recalled?

An investigation is unnecessary if the starting point is a 
presumption of guilt.  That is what could happen once you (used in 
general) take a formal decision early in the process.

Regards,
S. Moonesamy

---

From: Andrew Sullivan <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2019 07:44:52 -0400

Hi,

Speaking with my ISOC President hat on:

> co-worker?   2/3 vote to void the petition?

I would like to remind people that I already have quite a difficult
job finding a well-qualified, non-disqualified, willing and able
nomcom chair.  And I start with the advantage of knowing some part of
the community (knowledge that inevitably will grow stale over time, of
course); not everyone who will ever be appointed to my job will start
with such an advantage.  If people take a decision that starts to add
more possible time commitments to nomcom chairs, finding good chairs
will get harder.  If serving as nomcom chair signs you up to a
possible responsibility for an undefined number of years (as the above
formula would, because of the interactions with who you didn't appoint
and work with and and so on), you might be reluctant to take on such a
job.  It's already a two year commitment.

Best regards,

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
[email-masked]

---

From: John C Klensin <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2019 08:15:30 -0400

--On Wednesday, October 30, 2019 01:32 -0700 S Moonesamy
<[email-masked]> wrote:

>> able to remove one of their own members and how to combine
>> that with adequate safeguards.  Let me make a specific
>> suggestion to see if it gets enough traction for me to draft
>> some text that could be dropped into the "equity" I-D.
>> 
> I'll use the IETF Trust as an example as the focus has been on
> the IESG instead of all the bodies which has nomcom-appointees.
> 
> Let's say that a majority of IETF trustees vote to recall one
> of the trustees.  The  Recall Committee does not get the 3/4
> majority to recall that trustee.  This is where things can get
> awkward as you already have a majority of the trustees
> formally agreeing that one of them has to be recalled.
> 
> I'll comment about the IETF LLC.  Let's say that one of its
> directors does not attend several meetings.  As there aren't
> any attendance rules for that body, should that person be
> recalled?
> 
> presumption of guilt.  That is what could happen once you
> (used in general) take a formal decision early in the process.

Subramanian,

First of all, I need to continue to make a distinction between
"dropped out" and non-performing on the one hand and malfeasance
on the other.  Maybe we need better remedies for the former,
such as (using your LLC Board example, a rule that sufficient
non-attendance or non-participation constituted an automatic
resignation unless the other members of the body voted to retain
the person.   I can remember times when the IAB might have
benefited from a rule like that. The comments below are about
attempts at removal for malfeasance, including what has been
called "inability to play well with other children" on other
contexts.

What you have said just increases the need and motivation for
members of any of those bodies to act responsibly.  First, I
wouldn't propose anything that would prevent members of those
bodies from initiation of a recall petition (rather than
bypassing it) if they thought it best -- bypass would just be
another, faster, option.   Second, as others have pointed out,
there is an intimidation factor in all of this.  Suppose people
sign a recall petition, their names become public (there
arguments far and against keeping those names secret are
complicated and we have not suggested changing the rule), and
the recall committee then decides to retain the target.  I'd
hope the I* member involved and their supporters would be
professional and mature about the situation, believe the
petitioners had acted out of sincere belief and move on.
However, human nature being what it is, some unpleasantness and
possibly even retaliation against the petitioners is to be
expected.  If the recall committee decided to remove someone but
the nomcom decided to fill the vacancy by returning them, those
bad instincts might be even stronger and might be applied to the
recall committee members as well as the petitioners.  

These things are why it is useful to consider options that
increase the odds that people will take recall initiation
seriously, even if those risks of retaliation and other negative
behavior and probably enough for anyone who cares about the IETF
and their roles in it.

But none of this is goig to go away.  I don't know whether
recall initiation by special votes of members of the I* bodies
is likely to be helpful (the "fifteen people on the IESG so they
can just use the normal process if we cut the number of
signatures down to ten" argument suggests maybe not).  But I'm
fairly confident that, if our conclusion is that we cannot do
anything to improve the equity of the petition process or, down
the line, to make some adjustments in how and how rapidly the
actual evaluation process works, then the possibly-inevitable
conclusion is that, whether we leave the recall process on the
books or not, people are appointed for the Nomcom (or whomever)
for the full duration of their terms and there is no way, short
of assassination or its moral equivalent, to remove them until
they serve out their full terms and hope that the next Nomcom
does the right thing.

best,
   john

---

From: S Moonesamy <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2019 08:34:53 -0700

Hi John,
>called "inability to play well with other children" on other

There are usually procedures in which the expectations are 
documented.  Such procedures become useful in cases where 
non-performance has a negative impact on decision-making.  There can 
also be rules which specify how cases of wrongdoing (you used the 
word "malfeasance") are handled.

I can think of exceptions for the above-mentioned cases.  For 
example, there might be an explanation for what someone out there 
considers to be wrong.

>recall committee members as well as the petitioners.

It is very difficult to justify providing anonymity of signatories 
except in narrow cases.  I agree that, as you mentioned, it is not a 
pleasant situation for all the parties involved.

Returning the person who has been recalled requires the approval of 
both a future Nomcom and the confirming body.  My current thinking is 
that it is not worth figuring that one out.

>they serve out their full terms and hope that the next Nomcom

One of the issues raised is the speed of the process.  My guess is 
that a recall process may be doable in around two to four months.

Regards,
S. Moonesamy

---

From: Michael StJohns <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2019 12:13:36 -0400

Hi Andrew - comments below.

> job.  It's already a two year commitment.

All good points, but missing a few others:

1) The workload for a recall committee is ... maybe one week.

2) The chance of a former chair being called back is ... minimal.  If 
it's not minimal, the Nomcom process is sorely broken.

3) Any given chair can refuse the call when it comes.

4) Unlike the selection of the Nomcom chair, the selection of the recall 
chair, in the worst circumstances, could be perceived as being selected 
to achieve a specific result in the recall. Avoiding that perception by 
making the selection of the recall chair in a manner (e.g. mechanically, 
through a previously agreed approach) that eliminates that possibility 
seems to me to be a good result.

5) And as you noted in a previous message, it's a pain and 
time-consuming to find and recruit the right person.  It also puts the 
ISOC President squarely in the critical path of the current recall 
process.  ISTM that eliminating the time (clock time which causes a 
delay in resolution and the ISOC President's time which impacts their 
other duties) to run that process is a *good thing* (TM).

6) TANSTAAFL - we're either going to pay a little over time (by keeping 
the Nomcom chair's in pocket for a possible recall) or pay a lot all at 
once, perhaps when we can least afford the time or effort.  Personally, 
I'd really do the former.

7) At least a few times over the past 10-15 years  various groups of 
past chairs have gotten together to discuss the Nomcom process.  I 
remain invested in it even after 20 years or so.  If you reach out to 
the group and find more than a few who said "no way in hell" I'd be 
surprised.

Mike

ps -

As you note, the ISOC president isn't guaranteed to have your level of 
knowledge.  Perhaps it's time for the IETF to reconsider who selects the 
Nomcom chair (and how that process might work if it's not the ISOC 
president).  The current scheme has been in place for quite a long while 
- it's probably worth a look.   I mention this as an aside to this 
thread mainly because of your comments above, rather than something to 
add to the current discussion.   Poised/poisson topic I think if we head 
that way. /msj/

---

From: John C Klensin <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2019 00:25:31 -0400

--On Wednesday, October 30, 2019 08:34 -0700 S Moonesamy
<[email-masked]> wrote:

>...
> Returning the person who has been recalled requires the
> approval of both a future Nomcom and the confirming body.  My
> current thinking is that it is not worth figuring that one out.

Actually, unless I have misunderstood the procedures, the
sequence for a removal is 

(1) Petition is submitted to ISOC CEO (or, in the case of the
Ombudsteam, a request goes to the ISOC CEO without a petition).

(2) ISOC CEO appoints recall committee chair, who organizes and
runs the request for volunteers and random selection process for
recall committee members.

(3) Recall committee figures out if the person should be
removed.  If they reach a "yes" decision, the person is out,
creating a vacancy.

(4) The vacancy is filled, as quickly as possible, by the
relevant nomcom.  Depending on when the person recalled was
selected and the timing of the removal action, that might well
be the same nomcom that originally selected the person who was
just removed.  

If it happens to be that same nomcom and their conclusion is
that, independent of the recall committee's conclusions and
whatever the petition has to say, they were right the first
time, nothing prevents them from reappointing the same person to
fill his or her own vacancy.   For many reasons, including my
not being paranoid enough to imagine a nomcom behaving that way,
I think the odds of that occurring are small enough that I can
agree with you that this is probably not worth figuring out.  I
can imagine, but only with difficulty, someone who was recalled
wanting the job back.  But it is not an issue about a "future
nomcom" -- for two year terms, it would be either the nomcom
that seated the person who was recalled or the sitting one after
it.   

It was pointed out to me last night that there is one exception
worth worrying about but probably not in the current context.
At least for the IESG, we've had occasions in which the number
of volunteers/ candidates for a given slot has been very small,
perhaps only one.  If the recalled person was the only plausible
one who volunteered for that slot and no further volunteers are
found with to fill the vacancy, the nomcom might be faced with a
question that has been raised on and off for years but never
answered:  Given a choice between an unsatisfactory candidate
and a decision to not fill the position and, presumably,
strongly advise the IESG to rethink into organizational, area
definition, and AD structure, it has never been clear whether a
nomcom has the option of leaving the position unfilled.   But
that issue is very clearly out of scope for this discussion even
if we expanded to overhaul the whole recall procedure.

best,
   john