Subject: Re: [Emu] security paper on tunneled authentication

From: "Hoeper Katrin-QWKN37" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 2010 10:30:06 -0400

I never said the document was broken, just that my paper would be a good
reference to make implementers aware of the potential dangers of MITM
attacks.

I will check the current draft for conflicts and, if necessary, propose
changes.

Katrin

________________________________

From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] On Behalf Of
Glen Zorn
Sent: Tuesday, August 31, 2010 9:31 PM
To: 'Bernard Aboba'; [email-masked]
Subject: Re: [Emu] security paper on tunneled authentication

I agree w/Bernard.  It is never too late to fix a broken document.

Hope this helps.

 ~gwz

From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] On Behalf Of
Bernard Aboba
Sent: Tuesday, August 31, 2010 10:48 PM
To: [email-masked]
Subject: Re: [Emu] security paper on tunneled authentication

Katrina Hoeper said:

"Unfortunately, it seems to be too late to reference the analysis in the
tunnel requirement draft, but I hope that some people still might find
it interesting."

[BA] The paper represents the most comprehensive analysis of tunneled
authentication security to date, and brings into question a number of
assumptions that have been made as to how MITM in the middle attacks can
be mitigated.     In looking over the tunnel requirements document,
there are only a few places where the issue of MITM attacks is
discussed, so if you believe there are changes that need to be made, you
should go ahead and propose them.

---

From: Alan DeKok <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 01 Sep 2010 16:34:05 +0200

> I will check the current draft for conflicts and, if necessary, propose

  I think that the main issue with the draft is that it requires
tunneled methods to allow for password authentication.  Your analysis
paper says that password methods cannot be made resistant to these attacks.

  If that is right, then I don't think there is anything to do in the draft.

  Alan DeKok.

---

From: "Hoeper Katrin-QWKN37" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 2010 10:40:15 -0400

I agree. That's why I was thinking that adding a reference that makes
implementers aware of this problem would be a good idea. Then they can
make an educated decision about whether they want to implement
additional mitigation techniques (i.e. enforce policies) or to not use
password-based inner methods.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Alan DeKok [mailto:[email-masked]]
> Sent: Wednesday, September 01, 2010 9:34 AM
> To: Hoeper Katrin-QWKN37
> Cc: Glen Zorn; Bernard Aboba; [email-masked]

---

From: Joe Salowey <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 01 Sep 2010 08:51:59 -0700

I'd be glad to add a reference.

On 9/1/10 7:40 AM, "Hoeper Katrin-QWKN37" <[email-masked]> wrote:

> _______________________________________________
> Emu mailing list
> [email-masked]
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu

---

From: Sam Hartman <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 01 Sep 2010 12:57:43 -0400

>>>>> "Hoeper" == Hoeper Katrin-QWKN37 <[email-masked]> writes:

    Hoeper> I agree. That's why I was thinking that adding a reference
    Hoeper> that makes implementers aware of this problem would be a
    Hoeper> good idea. Then they can make an educated decision about
    Hoeper> whether they want to implement additional mitigation
    Hoeper> techniques (i.e. enforce policies) or to not use
    Hoeper> password-based inner methods.

Well, we also want to make sure that if you're using a non-password
inner method, then we are not vulnerable to MITM issues.