Subject: [Gen-art] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-09

From: Christer Holmberg via Datatracker <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 13 Dec 2019 12:17:58 -0800

Reviewer: Christer Holmberg
Review result: Almost Ready

I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area
Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed
by the IESG for the IETF Chair.  Please treat these comments just
like any other last call comments.

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Document: draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-09
Reviewer: Christer Holmberg
Review Date: 2019-12-13
IETF LC End Date: 2019-12-25
IESG Telechat date: Not scheduled for a telechat

Summary: The document is well-written, and almost ready for publication.
However, I have a couple of minor comments that I would like the authors to
address.

Major issues: None

Minor issues:

Q1:

The Security Considerations lists IKEv2/IPSec algorithms that are not
considered quantum-resistant. However, that is not mentioned anywhere else. I
think it would be good to mention that in the Abstract and/or Introduction.

Q2:

Section 3 says:

   "If the responder does not support this specification or does not have
   any PPK configured, then it ignores the received notification and
   continues with the IKEv2 protocol as normal."

I assume the ignoring of a non-supported notification and continuing with
normal IKEv2 is part of the IKEv2 specification. If so, I suggest to say add
something like:

", as described in RFCXXXX."

Nits/editorial comments:

Q3:

The Security Considerations talk about the Grover's algorithm. Please add a
reference.

---

From: "Valery Smyslov" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2019 15:38:30 +0300

Hi Christer,

thank you for your review. Please, see inline.

> think it would be good to mention that in the Abstract and/or Introduction.

Introduction already contains the following text:

   If the preshared key has
   sufficient entropy and the PRF, encryption and authentication
   transforms are quantum-secure, then the resulting system is believed
   to be quantum resistant, that is, invulnerable to an attacker with a
   quantum computer.

We think that it is out of scope of this document to classify existing
algorithms on the ground of whether they are quantum secure or not,
the Security Considerations section lists only most obvious cases.

> ", as described in RFCXXXX."

OK.

> The Security Considerations talk about the Grover's algorithm. Please add a

Added.

Thank you,
Valery Smyslov.

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> IPsec mailing list
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> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec

---

From: Christer Holmberg <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2019 12:59:04 +0000

Hi Valery,

    > the Security Considerations section lists only most obvious cases.

I was thinking of just adding (to the text you referenced above) something like:

"The Security Considerations gives some examples of algorithms that are not considered quantum-resistant."

But, if you don't think it is needed, I am fine with that. It was only a minor issue, so :)

Regards,

Christer