Subject: [Gen-art] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-perc-dtls-tunnel-08

From: Russ Housley via Datatracker <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 28 May 2021 08:16:06 -0700

Reviewer: Russ Housley
Review result: Almost Ready

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Document: draft-ietf-perc-dtls-tunnel-08
Reviewer: Russ Housley
Review Date: 2021-05-28
IETF LC End Date: unknown
IESG Telechat date: unknown

Summary: Almost Ready

Major Concerns:

Section 9:  The document has two different types of keying material:
   (1) keys for hop-by-hop encryption and authentication; and
   (2) keys for end-to-end encryption and authentication.
The first two paragraphs of Section 9 talks about these two types of
keying material.  I think that the discussion should be expanded by a
sentence or two to explain the security consequences of disclosure of
each of theses keying material types.

In addition, a pointer to the very extensive Security Consideration in
RFC 8871 would he helpful.

Minor Concerns:

Section 5.4 says: "Each TLS tunnel established between the media
distributor and the key distributor MUST be mutually authenticated."
Is this a requirement to use DTLS client authentication?  If so,
please be explicit.  If not, what other mechanisms for authentication
are expected?

Nits:

Section 5.1, paragraph 2:   s/[!@RFC4566]/[RFC4566]/

Section 5.5, paragraph 1:
  s/MUST utilize the same version/MUST contain the same version/

Section 8, last paragraph:
   s/section 4.8 if [!@RFC8126]/Section 4.8 of [RFC8126]/

Section 9, paragraph 1:
  s/keying material This does/keying material. This does/