Subject: full integrity? (was: RE: Geopriv WG - meeting 5-6 Jun, other news)

From: "Zmolek, Andrew (Andrew)" <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 18 May 2002 15:07:07 -0600

Aleksandar Gogic wrote:
> In principle, I believe that the location information 
> should always have full integrity, i.e., deceitful 
> information should not be used to protect privacy.

This brings up a few interesting points. First, in practice there will undoubtedly be use of deceitful information for legitimate reasons, for unethical but attractive reasons, or just for convenience (avoid marketers and spam, hide from a threatening ex-husband, carry out an undercover operation, et cetera).  

Second, it seems likely to me that the integrity of the information for use with emergency systems will eventually be "guaranteed" by force of law if it isn't already. But even if that proves to be true, the scope, applicability, and enforcement of such laws is too uneven across political boundaries to affect requirements for the foreseeable future. 

And finally, law enforcement and others with legitimate needs to obscure location already hold certain legal exceptions that may need to be accommodated in the protocol or it won't be widely implementable.

--Andy Zmolek 
    Technology & Standards Engineer 
      CTO Standards 
        Avaya Inc. 

            [email-masked] 
              +1 720 444 4001 
                sip:[email-masked]

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From: Aleksandar Gogic <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 18 May 2002 16:13:43 -0700

At 03:07 PM 5/18/2002 -0600, Zmolek, Andrew (Andrew) wrote:
>This brings up a few interesting points. First, in practice there will 
>undoubtedly be use of deceitful information for legitimate reasons, for 
>unethical but attractive reasons, or just for convenience (avoid marketers 
>and spam, hide from a threatening ex-husband, carry out an undercover 
>operation, et cetera).

Agreed, this is a very interesting area, and I hope the view I expressed 
will ignite a discussion that will lead us toward a good understanding of 
this delicate issue.

Protection of location privacy can be achieved by willingness to disclose 
it to a certain degree of precision, up to the point of barring any 
disclosure.  My point on integrity was that disclosure to a level of 
precision is just as effective in protecting privacy, as provision of 
deceitful information would be.  In fact, a poorly executed deceitful 
disclosure can be less effective.

>Second, it seems likely to me that the integrity of the information for 
>use with emergency systems will eventually be "guaranteed" by force of law 
>if it isn't already. But even if that proves to be true, the scope, 
>applicability, and enforcement of such laws is too uneven across political 
>boundaries to affect requirements for the foreseeable future.
>
>And finally, law enforcement and others with legitimate needs to obscure 
>location already hold certain legal exceptions that may need to be 
>accommodated in the protocol or it won't be widely implementable.
>
>--Andy Zmolek

Aleksandar Gogic
QUALCOMM Incorporated
5775 Morehouse Drive
San Diego, CA 92121-1714
Office:  +1 858 651 5386
Mobile: +1 858 213 7368
[email-masked]

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From: Randall Gellens <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 21 May 2002 16:33:10 -0700

At 4:13 PM -0700 5/18/02, Aleksandar Gogic wrote:

>    Protection of location privacy can be achieved by willingness to 
> disclose it to a certain degree of precision, up to the point of 
> barring any disclosure.  My point on integrity was that disclosure 
> to a level of precision is just as effective in protecting privacy, 
> as provision of deceitful information would be.  In fact, a poorly 
> executed deceitful disclosure can be less effective.

Earlier, wg participants expressed a desire to be able to transmit 
multiple locations, one of which was accurate, the rest bogus.  Is 
this still desired, or are we happy with one location?

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From: "James M. Polk" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 21 May 2002 19:46:44 -0500

>this still desired, or are we happy with one location?

From where to where?

From me (via any associated device or 'inheritance') to my Server who'll be
answering anybody's request of my location, there should be one location
object transmitted. I don't know what interval is appropriate yet....

A 'pull' request to my Server where the Rule Maker controls my policy and
therefore the answers queried of it -- there should be as many locations
given as there are rules made for/by me (and any other target). I think
it'll likely end up being a fairly stable template over time that I move
people or classes of people from one to another category....

*************************************
"People generally demand more respect for their own rights than they are
willing to allow for others"

James M. Polk
Senior Consulting Engineer
Office of the CTO

Cisco Systems
2200 East President George Bush Turnpike 
Richardson, TX  75082 USA
w) 972.813.5208
f)  972.813.5280
www.cisco.com

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From: Dan Greening <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 May 2002 06:50:01 -0700

This stuff about bogus locations sounds like something that won't get
market usage by many people (like less than 1%), and possibly no
carriers.  It seems like "requirements" should be serious market
requirements, otherwise the IETF Geopriv requirements could end up stuck
in the "academically interesting" category and ignored.

Dan Greening, Ph.D.  CEO, BigTribe Corporation 
              330 Townsend Street, Suite 209, San Francisco, CA
94107-1662 
              [email-masked]  +1(415)995-7151  fax 995-7155

-----Original Message-----
From: James M. Polk [mailto:[email-masked]] 
Sent: Tuesday, May 21, 2002 5:47 PM
To: Randall Gellens; Aleksandar Gogic; Zmolek, Andrew (Andrew); Richard
Shockey; [email-masked]
Subject: Re: full integrity? (was: RE: Geopriv WG - meeting 5-6 Jun,
other news)

From where to where?

From me (via any associated device or 'inheritance') to my Server who'll
be
answering anybody's request of my location, there should be one location
object transmitted. I don't know what interval is appropriate yet....

A 'pull' request to my Server where the Rule Maker controls my policy
and

James M. Polk

Cisco Systems

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From: "Zmolek, Andrew (Andrew)" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 May 2002 08:10:43 -0600

Dan Greening wrote:

> requirements, otherwise the IETF Geopriv requirements could 
> end up stuck in the "academically interesting" category and ignored.

This depends on how closed the systems are for passing this information. If we're only talking about carrier systems than I might agree with you. But if enterprises and individuals will have the means to inject presence and location information into these tracking networks (and I believe they will over time) then this is hardly academic.

--Andy Zmolek 

            [email-masked] 
              +1 720 444 4001 
                sip:[email-masked]