Subject: RE: full integrity?

From: Dan Greening <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 May 2002 18:04:46 -0700

I think it's more of a MAY NOT.  The privacy platform MAY NOT allow
users to provide false information, but MUST allow rule-makers to reject
location requests.  If the privacy platform allows users to provide
false information it MUST indicate that capability somehow to external
systems (like through a configuration-query).

So if I'm in Randy, or visa versa, then some platforms will allow me to
say I'm in Sally, while others will allow me to say "location not
available".  However, those platforms that allow me to provide false
information need to identify themselves as such.

(I love privacy examples, they're so *dirty* :)

Dan Greening, Ph.D.  CEO, BigTribe Corporation 
              330 Townsend Street, Suite 209, San Francisco, CA
94107-1662 
              [email-masked]  +1(415)995-7151  fax 995-7155

-----Original Message-----
From: Eric Brunner-Williams in Portland Maine
[mailto:[email-masked]] 
Sent: Wednesday, May 22, 2002 5:30 PM
To: Dan Greening
Cc: Randy Bush; Randall Gellens; [email-masked];
[email-masked]
Subject: Re: full integrity? 

> I like the "telling them to stuff it" idea over providing false
> information.
> 
> You could choose to send a generic error message that doesn't
> distinguish between a policy rejection and a system inability to
provide
> the location.  This way a recipient can't tell if it's the policy or
the
> infrastructure that is causing the problem.  There are some problems
> with providing false information.  If recipients act on that false
> information, it seems to me that lawsuits are highly likely.

Ah, I'm _with_ Randy. In fact, I'm in the same resolution cell. Heck, I
_am_
Randy. What part of this rates a MUST NOT, assuming Randy and I are
consenting
adults (with obscure peering arraingements)? For what technical reason?

Eric

---

From: Randall Gellens <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002 14:37:04 -0700

>  systems (like through a configuration-query).

This is a separate question to what I was trying to ask, but to 
address this one, I don't see how it's any of our business if the 
location is accurate or not.  I also don't see how you can know, 
without out-of-band information.  Our business, as I understand it, 
is to deal with how location information is requested and securely 
disclosed in accordance with the user's policy.  If someone hacks 
their GPS unit to lie, but still wants to use geopriv, so what?  We 
can assume accurate location (or, to get back to my question, at 
least one accurate location), because that's sort of the whole point 
of geopriv.