Subject: Re: [Geopriv] Security considerationsfordraft-winterbottom-geopriv-held-identity-extensions

From: "Thomson, Martin" <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 1 Feb 2009 17:38:18 -0600

Or, as has been said, there is always policy.  LCP is only special to the extent that there might be a pre-existing policy that is established that says: Target == permitted LR.

Maybe that’s all that needs to be said.  It’s not as though it prevents the process described from occurring under the auspices of policy.  As consensus appears to be converging, I can remove the text that offends Marc so much.  As a general rule, shorter documents are better.

Ta,
Martin

From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] On Behalf Of Dawson, Martin
Sent: Saturday, 31 January 2009 3:53 PM
To: Marc Linsner; [email-masked]
Subject: Re: [Geopriv] Security considerationsfordraft-winterbottom-geopriv-held-identity-extensions

That’s what I said.

Or let me ask this. Are you saying there is any arrangement that provides 100% certainty that the requester is the target? Even return-routability is subject to reasonable judgement .

IRL, all methods of validation are subject to pragmatic certainty. To claim that the special case of a particular arrangement of technology that correlates the identifier with the source IP address is the be all and end all of this judgement is – again – motherhood. It is up to the implementer of the LIS, in the context of their own network, to make that judgement. This includes the quite simple judgement that requester must be deviceX because in my network only deviceX would ask for its location.

Cheers,

Martin

________________________________

From: Marc Linsner [mailto:[email-masked]] 
Sent: Saturday, 31 January 2009 3:41 PM
To: Dawson, Martin; [email-masked]
Subject: Re: [Geopriv] Security considerations fordraft-winterbottom-geopriv-held-identity-extensions

Martin,

No I don’t agree with what you wrote.  There is no rulemaker in the LCP use case.  LCP policy is simple, location is given only to the target.  And it’s up to the LIS to enforce.  If the LIS cannot validate the identifier as belonging to the target, the request is handled as third party and rulemaker policy is applied.

-Marc-

On 1/30/09 11:32 PM, "Dawson, Martin" <[email-masked]> wrote:

Glad you agree.
 
When the request is coming from the target device, the LIS is acting according to LCP – and is providing the location of the requestor to the requestor according to the policy of the rule maker (the enterprise in my example). If the LIS is providing the location to a third party – then it’s acting as an LS according to the definition and still according to its policy.
 
Any attempt to say an enterprise isn’t allowed to do this is simply motherhood.
 
Cheers,
Martin

________________________________

From: Marc Linsner [mailto:[email-masked]] 
Sent: Saturday, 31 January 2009 2:53 PM
To: Dawson, Martin; [email-masked]
Subject: Re: [Geopriv] Security considerations fordraft-winterbottom-geopriv-held-identity-extensions

Martin,

Section 4 of the draft pretty much covers it.

-Marc-

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