Subject: [Geopriv] [geopriv] #23: Good Security of DHCP

From: "geopriv issue tracker" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 18 Sep 2009 08:23:21 -0000

#23: Good Security of DHCP
---------------------------------------+------------------------------------
 Reporter:  [email-masked]  |       Owner:                            
     Type:  enhancement                |      Status:  new                       
 Priority:  major                      |   Milestone:  draft-ietf-geopriv-3825bis
Component:  rfc3825bis                 |     Version:                            
 Severity:  -                          |    Keywords:                            
---------------------------------------+------------------------------------
 In recent discussions around the term LCP the good security and privacy
 properties of DHCP were highly praised.

 In a shared medium an adversary is able to see DHCP message (that include
 location information) unless link layer encryption is utilized. Such an
 attack might, for example, compromise the privacy of hotel guests. Hotel
 networks very rarely use link layer security due to their unfriendly
 configuration approaches.

 I believe that this (and maybe other attacks) have to be added to the
 security and privacy considerations section.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://svn.tools.ietf.org/wg/geopriv/trac/ticket/23>
geopriv <http://tools.ietf.org/geopriv/>

---

From: "geopriv issue tracker" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 18 Sep 2009 21:02:25 -0000

Severity:  -                          |   Resolution:                            
 Keywords:                             |  

Comment(by [email-masked]):

 Please substantiate which type of shared networks you believe hotels
 utilize.  RFC3825 already gives guidance to usage for wireless networks,
 of which there is no privacy issue as every target would be given the
 exact same location information.  Are you assuming hotels use Ethernet
 hubs?

-- 
Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/geopriv/trac/ticket/23#comment:1>
geopriv <http://tools.ietf.org/geopriv/>