Subject: [I18n-discuss] FW: New Version Notification for draft-iab-identifier-comparison-01.txt

From: Dave Thaler <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 12 Mar 2012 20:48:19 +0000

Updates since -00 include:

1) Updated references, including quoted text to be from the most recent relevant 
   RFCs

2) To try to avoid a portion of the (non-technical) process pushback we got 
   at Appsarea  and the plenary, no longer uses the word "recommend".
   Reworded those places to be of the form "to get property X, a design 
   should (or shouldn't) do Y", and oughtn't be controversial I hope.  It
   does not say whether property X is required or whether it's more important
   than other factors in a particular design.  And added text to explicitly say that.
   Weighing among such tradeoffs is for the IETF (and other audiences) to
   do when constructing a design.

3) Removed from section 5 the controversial text about how to deal with 
   security protocols designed to be used by other protocols that may use 
   various comparison algorithms, and replaced it with text basically saying 
   it's an issue requiring further work.

4) Added text in 3.3 about the "ladder" of comparison algorithms for URIs, as
   this approach might be emulated by other identifiers.

5) Fixed various editorial nits.

-Dave

-----Original Message-----
From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] 
Sent: Monday, March 12, 2012 1:37 PM
To: Dave Thaler
Subject: New Version Notification for draft-iab-identifier-comparison-01.txt

A new version of I-D, draft-iab-identifier-comparison-01.txt has been successfully submitted by Dave Thaler and posted to the IETF repository.

Filename:	 draft-iab-identifier-comparison
Revision:	 01
Title:		 Issues in Identifier Comparison for Security Purposes
Creation date:	 2012-03-12
WG ID:		 Individual Submission
Number of pages: 20

Abstract:
   Identifiers such as hostnames, URIs/IRIs, and email addresses are
   often used in security contexts to identify security principals and
   resources.  In such contexts, an identifier supplied via some
   protocol is often compared against some policy to make security
   decisions such as whether the principal may access the resource, what
   level of authentication or encryption is required, etc.  If the
   parties involved in a security decision use different algorithms to
   compare identifiers, then failure scenarios ranging from denial of
   service to elevation of privilege can result.

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