Subject: Re: [Ianaplan] [ianatransition] Call for Observers to join CWG on Naming

From: Jefsey <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 02 Oct 2014 11:41:03 +0200

Additions are interspead.

At 20:34 01/10/2014, Avri Doria wrote:
>Hi,
>On 01-Oct-14 08:26, Jefsey wrote:
> > RFC 7282 makes clear that without appeals there is no possible rough
> > consensus.
>
>Personally, I could not agree more.
>
>That does define one of the issue the ICANN Accountability track will
>need to deal with.  Some contend that ICANN does have these mechanisms
>while others contend that those that ICANN has are so flawed as to not
>really exist.  I hope this gets fixed in the Accountabilty track.
>
>The CWG does, however, define as in-scope the issue of accountability in
>regard to IANA Stewardship Transition.  So Appeals could well be a
>missing or flawed mechansims that gets discussed.

Until 1977 accountability was everywhere the reason for state
monopolies. They permitted regulations making everyone equal IRT the
universal communication (telephone) service. Two bandwidth related
private developments challenged that vision: the radio/satellite
bandwidth increase and the packet switch bandwidth optimization. This
has led to the datacommunications Telenet and Tymnet VAN temporary
licenses and  the mutual "regulation by competition" it implied. By 1978
Congress hearings where sold to the idea of competition in telephone;
and foreign monopolies had to accept to interface (through Tymnet and
the US IRCs - international record carriers) the US datacommunication
Tymnet/Telenet competition, and further on the  AT&T deregulation.

In 1998, the creation of ICANN restored the monopoly situation (called
"market monopoly" by NSI) under the NTIA. The NTIA removal can only
lead to its replacement by competition. Otherwise we would have a
"self-controlled-monopoly", the BUG, an entitity pretending to Be
Uniliterally Global - not to call it a "tyranny".

However, if the CWG finds a third possibility which is neither state
monopoly nor competition, it will certainly be most interesting to investigate.

>"Accountability for the administration of the IANA functions (i.e.,
>implementation and operational accountability), however, is properly
>within the scope of this working group"
>
> > 1. RFC 6852 has identified cooperating SDOs,
>
>Not an ICANN issue as it is not a signatory. In fact is not an SDO
>(Standards Development Organization).

It is an ICANN issue because it wants to be a monopoly and RFC 6852
identifies that standards should compete toward innovation. Which
standard is ICANN to follow in such a case, and who will say it is
correct, since technical priorities result from differente economic interests.

Who decides ICANN is right?

>As for the IETF, itself, not really in scope here, but that is an
>Informational RFC - does not set a practice.

RFC 6852 is not standard track. However, it has been signed by the IAB
Chair and the IETF Chair.

>Not sure what there is to appeal in the RFC as it reports a document
>having been signed signed.

What is to appeal is to publish a document that contradicts with several
RFCs and describes a technically fragmented internet but does document
an IAB and/or IETF explaining how to cope with the consequences. These
consequences we are confronted to.

>The issue of what the IAB & IETF chairs can sign without an explicit
>IETF process is yet another issue for the IETF.

IMHO, the point is not the IETF legality. The point is the pertinence
of the acknowldgement signed by the chairs of the fine leading
internet organizations concerning the reasons why the Internet process
has resulted in an "huge bounty"

It is to know if the RFC 6852 statement true or not? If it is we have
to consider the implications. It it is not we have to ask the chairs
of ISOC, IAB and IETF to resign.

>One for which I believe they have a response - though it is out of
>scope for this discussion, I think.

>At 21:53 01/10/2014, Andrew Sullivan wrote:
>I expect Avri knows this, but so that everyone else is clear, there is
>an important difference between the IAB Chair and the IETF Chair here.
>In particular, the IAB does not rely on IETF consensus for what it can
>say or do.  The IETF Chair, of course, does.

At 20:34 01/10/2014, Avri Doria wrote:
>One possible connection to this process is whether the IETF plans to
>treat the work of the ianaplan WG  in the BCP (Best Current Practice)
>track that needs the review process or as input to the IAB IANA
>Evolution Program or to the chairs of IETF and IAB.  I don't know the
>answer to that one, but will find out.

At 21:53 01/10/2014, Andrew Sullivan wrote:
>The first part of the IANAPLAN charter "tasks" section says
>
>   The IANAPLAN working group is chartered to produce an IETF consensus
>   document
>
>That doesn't mean it'll be a BCP, but it does mean that whatever the
>WG produces is supposed to go through the usual IETF consensus
>process.

This seems perfectly clear. This is why I asked a review of the
Charter. The Chair has said she is satisfied with the Charter and that
this WG would endorse a pre-decided "status quo" strategy. Since I
consider that such a strategy would put the IETF and subsequently its
technology in jeopardy - what is the matter for an appeal - and after
having asked the NTIA, the IAB, the IETF, the ICANN and the GAC Chairs
if they had an alternative suggestion to propose, I suppose that the only
solution, once again, is to appeal the IESG against the uncompleteness
of our Charter.

Would someone have a better solution?

Or could someone demonstrate that what RFC 6852 states is wrong?
I wish it could be the case, so I would not have to appeal !

jfc