Subject: [Iasa20] Bias vs. Capture

From: Ted Hardie <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 15 Jun 2018 12:58:40 -0700

In some of the discussion about the board selecting a subset of its own
directors, the word "capture" has come up a number of times.  That term in
this context tends to mean that a group of individuals has come to control
the process or the entity to the extent that the actions of that group can
advance a goal different from that intended.  Regulatory capture
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regulatory_capture> is a form of this
problem.

I think, though, the reason to avoid this practice or to minimize it is
more subtle and related to Leslie's point on "like selecting like".  Even
in a case where the set of individuals has no intent to subvert the
process, self-selection can produce a very strong bias just through the
"like selecting like" influence.  That bias may be derived a valid opinion
that is held by a subset of the IETF and would normally be balanced by
other opinions in open debate; lacking that balance, it could produce
unintended or even harmful effects.

Imagine for a moment that the first board has several members who strongly
believe that the IETF should always have a balanced budget and should
minimize and eventually eliminate the flow of money coming from ISOC.  If
it can't be paid for by meeting fees or other fundraising specific to the
IETF, in that view, it should not happen.  That's a valid opinion, but at
one place along a very broad spectrum within the community.  If it became a
selection criteria for a majority of later board members, though, simply
from the "like selecting like" effect, the shape of the IETF's activities
would change because of that budgetary constraint.  Avoiding that sort of
bias is why I oppose board members appointed solely by the board itself.
My preference is for there to be none, but I would accept a small number
who are confirmed by a body that will almost certainly have no or unrelated
biases.

I mention this because I've heard several folks dismiss the risk of
capture.   They may be right to do so, as the interest in creating such
capture seems to be much lower here than it would be for regulatory
capture.  The prize is just to small.  But I don't think we should dismiss
the risk of slow drift to a biased position; that seems all too likely from
all too human effects.

regards,

Ted

---

From: Donald Eastlake <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 15 Jun 2018 17:41:09 -0400

I agree with Ted. There is a bias danger is board selected board
members, particularly with such a small board.

Thanks,
Donald
===============================
 Donald E. Eastlake 3rd   +1-508-333-2270 (cell)
 155 Beaver Street, Milford, MA 01757 USA
 [email-masked]

On Fri, Jun 15, 2018 at 3:58 PM, Ted Hardie <[email-masked]> wrote:
> advance a goal different from that intended.  Regulatory capture is a form
> of this problem.
>
> I think, though, the reason to avoid this practice or to minimize it is more
> subtle and related to Leslie's point on "like selecting like".  Even in a
> case where the set of individuals has no intent to subvert the process,
> self-selection can produce a very strong bias just through the "like
> selecting like" influence.  That bias may be derived a valid opinion that is
> held by a subset of the IETF and would normally be balanced by other
> opinions in open debate; lacking that balance, it could produce unintended
> or even harmful effects.
>
> minimize and eventually eliminate the flow of money coming from ISOC.  If it
> can't be paid for by meeting fees or other fundraising specific to the IETF,
> in that view, it should not happen.  That's a valid opinion, but at one
> place along a very broad spectrum within the community.  If it became a
> bias is why I oppose board members appointed solely by the board itself.  My
> preference is for there to be none, but I would accept a small number who
> are confirmed by a body that will almost certainly have no or unrelated
> biases.
>
> I mention this because I've heard several folks dismiss the risk of capture.
> They may be right to do so, as the interest in creating such capture seems
> to be much lower here than it would be for regulatory capture.  The prize is
> just to small.  But I don't think we should dismiss the risk of slow drift
> to a biased position; that seems all too likely from all too human effects.
>
> regards,
>
> Ted
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> iasa20 mailing list
> [email-masked]
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/iasa20
>

---

From: Andrew Sullivan <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 15 Jun 2018 18:07:04 -0400

Hi,

On Fri, Jun 15, 2018 at 12:58:40PM -0700, Ted Hardie wrote:

> subtle and related to Leslie's point on "like selecting like".  Even in a case
> where the set of individuals has no intent to subvert the process,
> self-selection can produce a very strong bias just through the "like selecting
> like" influence.

This is true.  Also, of course, our nomcom process has a similar
tendency, because it draws exclusively from the nomcom eligibility
pool, and nomcom appointees are also likely to come from environments
where the technical work of the IETF is supported (i.e. it has a bias
toward self-selection because of people volunteering, and people who
can't afford the time because they have no support or extra time won't
volunteer).  Which is yet another reason to like the diverse-source
appointment process.

Best regards,

A
-- 
Andrew Sullivan
[email-masked]

---

From: "Salz, Rich" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 15 Jun 2018 23:02:42 +0000

*   I mention this because I've heard several folks dismiss the risk of capture.   They may be right to do so, as the interest in creating such capture seems to be much lower here than it would be for regulatory capture.  The prize is just to small.  But I don't think we should dismiss the risk of slow drift to a biased position; that seems all too likely from all too human effects.

Thanks for this; you said it better than I have.

---

From: "Deen, Glenn" <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 16 Jun 2018 00:03:30 +0000

On 6/15/18, 12:59 PM, "iasa20 on behalf of Ted Hardie" <[email-masked]<mailto:[email-masked]> on behalf of [email-masked]<mailto:[email-masked]>> wrote:

I mention this because I've heard several folks dismiss the risk of capture.   They may be right to do so, as the interest in creating such capture seems to be much lower here than it would be for regulatory capture.  The prize is just to small.  But I don't think we should dismiss the risk of slow drift to a biased position; that seems all too likely from all too human effects.

I don’t dismiss the risk as never could happen, but I do believe that there are sufficient and effective means by which the situation could be responded to if capture did happen.   Ultimately the IETF is a community and the LCC is a disregarded entity of ISOC.  If the IETF community or ISOC found that the board was not properly doing the job as defined by either ISOC or the IETF community the board can be replaced.

-glenn

---

From: "John Levine" <[email-masked]>
Date: 15 Jun 2018 21:50:34 -0400

In article <[email-masked]> you write:
>I don’t dismiss the risk as never could happen, but I do believe that there are sufficient and effective
>means by which the situation could be responded to if capture did happen.   Ultimately the IETF is a
>community and the LCC is a disregarded entity of ISOC.  If the IETF community or ISOC found that the board
>was not properly doing the job as defined by either ISOC or the IETF community the board can be replaced.

It seems to me that adequate reporting should help prevent capture.
Is there anything in the draft about reports, e.g., the board shall
publish a written summary of its actions at least N times a year, and
shall present a report at an IETF meeting at least annually.

Re another note that nomcom interviews can't invite outside people, I
realize that is the rule for the slots the nomcom fills now, but why
would the candidate interviews for this board have to follow the
identical process as IESG and IAB candidate interviews?

R's,
John

---

From: Michael Richardson <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 16 Jun 2018 09:46:56 -0400

> volunteer).  Which is yet another reason to like the diverse-source

I am strongly in favour of a diverse LLC board, and we need help external to
the IETF to make this happen. (From ISOC and/or from other civil society
entities)

I accept that the nomcom is a non-diverse selection body (compared to the
world) for the reasons you cite.  I do believe that given a diversity of
candidates, the nomcom process works well.

The need for diversity is what makes me reject IAB and IESG appointed LLC
members: the IAB and IESG are selected *precisely* because by way of the
self-selection process you mention.  They are not diverse today, and it is
really really hard to make them more diverse.
They are never as diverse as the nomcom.

If someone suggested that we have some other entities like the Ford
Foundation or BillGates/Melinda foundation appoint an LLC member, I might
support such a thing.  It would depend upon a lot of things.

The point has been made that many corporate boards form their own nominations
committee, and then send the resulting list of directors out for *approval*
by the shareholders.  (Not selecting: there are never more candidates then
seats).  I don't consider this to be a good thing, but rather a very very bad
thing which has had a very very seriously negative contribution to our society.
The corporate boards have been captured by an oligarchy.
I recognize that the IETF can't boil this particular ocean, but I don't see
why should immitate it.

--
]               Never tell me the odds!                 | ipv6 mesh networks [
]   Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works        | network architect  [
]     [email-masked]  http://www.sandelman.ca/        |   ruby on rails    [

--
Michael Richardson <[email-masked]>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-

---

From: Michael Richardson <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 16 Jun 2018 09:51:15 -0400

> identical process as IESG and IAB candidate interviews?

In fact the nomcom can invite anyone they like to join the nomcom as
non-voting members, provided that person agrees to the confidentiality
agreements.

A number of past chairs have tried to get the appointment of NomCOM
chair to move from March/April to October, such that the future-Chair
could participate in the November interviews.  This has not as yet occured.
There has also been discussion about always alternating genders of chairs,
and I think that ISOC President Kathryn has been trying, but there is no
hard and fast rule at present.

---

From: Alissa Cooper <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2018 09:57:06 -0400

Hi Ted,

Thanks for this. One question below:

> On Jun 15, 2018, at 3:58 PM, Ted Hardie <[email-masked]> wrote:
> 
> 
> Imagine for a moment that the first board has several members who strongly believe that the IETF should always have a balanced budget and should minimize and eventually eliminate the flow of money coming from ISOC.  If it can't be paid for by meeting fees or other fundraising specific to the IETF, in that view, it should not happen.  That's a valid opinion, but at one place along a very broad spectrum within the community.  If it became a selection criteria for a majority of later board members,

It’s not clear to me how a criterion could be established that would apply to the selection of the majority of the board members under any of the three options Jason spelled out. Assuming 3-year terms, it seems to me that Option 2 or Option 3 are the options under which a single group a people — any given year’s nomcom — has the power to appoint the most directors, which would be 3 (2 nomcom appointed plus the IETF Chair). But that still is not a majority. Can you clarify?

Thanks,
Alissa

---

From: Ted Hardie <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2018 09:31:42 -0700

Howdy,

On Fri, Jun 15, 2018 at 3:07 PM, Andrew Sullivan <[email-masked]>
wrote:

> more
> selecting
> There are two points here:  first, given a NomCom process that "selected
like" followed by that pool of people then selecting a second set of
people, it's not clear what internal process would make that (putatively
homogeneous) group select a diverse group for their second set.  To put it
another way, it's not clear that a secondary set of choices by the board
actually does much to increase diversity if the NomCom-selected set is a
majority.

The second point is that self-selection bias for people volunteering is
part of the reason given for folks not simply putting their CFOs or
favorite outside board members up as candidates.  We have a presumption
that the NomCom will prefer candidates whom they personally know.  Fixing
that requires three things:  adjusting the nomcom instructions to make
clear that familiarity isn't a bonus; improving the volunteer pool provided
by the community by making it clear to them what's wanted; getting that new
clarity translated into names.  That list is a bit daunting of a Monday
morning, but not impossible.

Ted

---

From: Ted Hardie <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2018 09:41:07 -0700

On Mon, Jun 18, 2018 at 6:57 AM, Alissa Cooper <[email-masked]> wrote:

> > Imagine for a moment that the first board has several members who
> strongly believe that the IETF should always have a balanced budget and
> should minimize and eventually eliminate the flow of money coming from
> ISOC.  If it can't be paid for by meeting fees or other fundraising
> specific to the IETF, in that view, it should not happen.  That's a valid
> opinion, but at one place along a very broad spectrum within the
> community.  If it became a selection criteria for a majority of later board
> members,
>
> It’s not clear to me how a criterion could be established that would apply
> to the selection of the majority of the board members under any of the
> three options Jason spelled out. Assuming 3-year terms, it seems to me that
> Option 2 or Option 3 are the options under which a single group a people —
> any given year’s nomcom — has the power to appoint the most directors,
> which would be 3 (2 nomcom appointed plus the IETF Chair). But that still
> is not a majority. Can you clarify?
>

I'm pointing out that if the majority has this bias in the first set of
appointments, it will likely be retained in any set of people later brought
into the board on their own authority.  I didn't really speculate how the
majority emerged, but if all of the NomCom folks of a year shared it (2
nomcom appointees, plus the IETF chair) with either a previous year's
appointee or the appointee of the ISOC board, you'd have the problem.  The
biggest danger is, obviously, in the first year, when a single NomCom might
be making a larger number of appointments to staggered terms, but it can
happen later whenever a majority can be re-enforced by external
appointments.

I want to reiterate, though, that the risk here is primarily bias toward
one opinion in a spectrum of opinions that the community already holds, not
capture of the board to cause it to act toward unforeseen ends.  Rejecting
a candidate (or failing to confirm a candidate) because they hold that
valid opinion might seem inappropriate, which makes this much harder to
avoid than capture.

Ted

---

From: Andrew Sullivan <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2018 13:38:24 -0400

On Mon, Jun 18, 2018 at 09:31:42AM -0700, Ted Hardie wrote:
> There are two points here:  first, given a NomCom process that "selected like"
> followed by that pool of people then selecting a second set of people, it's not
> clear what internal process would make that (putatively homogeneous) group
> select a diverse group for their second set.  To put it another way, it's not
> clear that a secondary set of choices by the board actually does much to
> increase diversity if the NomCom-selected set is a majority. 

Those appointed to the board by the nomcom (at least at the opening
round) are not previously-seated members, and so they will not have
had the benefit of sitting in the board before being seated.  Their
perspective might shift, and then they might select people for skills
that they grasp they did not originally themselves have, without even
necessarily being able to state with any precision what those skills
are.  
 
> prefer candidates whom they personally know.  Fixing that requires
> three things:  adjusting the nomcom instructions to make clear that
> familiarity isn't a bonus

I think this sort of instruction is unlikely to be successful.  We
have selected our nomcom from IETF participants.  It's a population of
different interests than those of mangement oversight, so the nomcom
will be poorly qualified to put the instructions into practice, and
will naturally tend to fall back toward familiarity.

> ; improving the volunteer pool provided by the community by making it
> clear to them what's wanted; getting that new clarity translated into names. 
> That list is a bit daunting of a Monday morning, but not impossible.

I think the above two also appear to suppose that it's a
quickly-solved problem to describe what is wanted in a way compelling
to people who quite likely prefer protocol engineering to people
management.  My experience leads me to a different conclusion, but I
recognise that my experience is only mine.

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
[email-masked]

---

From: Ted Hardie <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2018 11:16:59 -0700

On Mon, Jun 18, 2018 at 10:38 AM, Andrew Sullivan <[email-masked]>
wrote:

> like"

I'm reluctant to privilege a requirement for skills which can't be
articulated, as you seem likely to me to end up with someone known to the
board rather than someone with the best available key skills.

> recognise that my experience is only mine.

No, I agree that it is daunting, and I expect to continue to agree even
after it ceases to be Monday morning.

Ted

---

From: Andrew Sullivan <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2018 14:37:07 -0400

On Mon, Jun 18, 2018 at 11:16:59AM -0700, Ted Hardie wrote:
> 
> I'm reluctant to privilege a requirement for skills which can't be articulated,
> as you seem likely to me to end up with someone known to the board rather than
> someone with the best available key skills.

That could well be, too, which is why I am entirely in favour of
having multiple ways people get appointed.  Sometimes, "someone known
to the board" is a poor proxy for "someone who understands this"; but
often people select for people they hang around with because they
already understand each other.  This is a possible source of
groupthink, of course, which is another good reason to prefer to have
multiple sources of candidates.

Best regards,

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
[email-masked]

---

From: Joseph Lorenzo Hall <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2018 13:13:19 +0200

Given all of this, I'm not seeing anything emerge from this discussion
that we can build into the process. Ted, are there things from your
list of three that we can discuss that might help counteract capture?

-- 
Joseph Lorenzo Hall
Chief Technologist, Center for Democracy & Technology [https://www.cdt.org]
1401 K ST NW STE 200, Washington DC 20005-3497
e: [email-masked], p: 202.407.8825, pgp: https://josephhall.org/gpg-key
Fingerprint: 3CA2 8D7B 9F6D DBD3 4B10  1607 5F86 6987 40A9 A871

---

From: Alissa Cooper <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2018 06:55:04 -0700

> On Jun 18, 2018, at 9:41 AM, Ted Hardie <[email-masked]> wrote:
> 
> On Mon, Jun 18, 2018 at 6:57 AM, Alissa Cooper <[email-masked] <mailto:[email-masked]>> wrote:
> Hi Ted,
> 
> > On Jun 15, 2018, at 3:58 PM, Ted Hardie <[email-masked] <mailto:[email-masked]>> wrote:
> > 
> > 
> I'm pointing out that if the majority has this bias in the first set of appointments, it will likely be retained in any set of people later brought into the board on their own authority.  I didn't really speculate how the majority emerged, but if all of the NomCom folks of a year shared it (2 nomcom appointees, plus the IETF chair) with either a previous year's appointee or the appointee of the ISOC board, you'd have the problem.  The biggest danger is, obviously, in the first year, when a single NomCom might be making a larger number of appointments to staggered terms, but it can happen later whenever a majority can be re-enforced by external appointments.

I think Jon proposed a requirement that the rest of the board vote unanimously to bring on a new board-selected member. There has been a bunch of list discussion about the voting threshold for director removal (which settled on unanimous minus two, I think). It might be worth discussing the voting threshold for addition of a board member.

Alissa 

> 
> I want to reiterate, though, that the risk here is primarily bias toward one opinion in a spectrum of opinions that the community already holds, not capture of the board to cause it to act toward unforeseen ends.  Rejecting a candidate (or failing to confirm a candidate) because they hold that valid opinion might seem inappropriate, which makes this much harder to avoid than capture.
> 
> Ted
> 
>  
> 
> Thanks,
> Alissa
>

---

From: "Salz, Rich" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2018 15:15:31 +0000

Of course, we don't have to fix *everything* before the WG adopts the doc.  And perhaps tabling this one item until Montreal will be useful.

---

From: "Livingood, Jason" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 22 Jun 2018 14:39:39 +0000

Alissa

[JL] Good suggestion – may be a good idea to have that better aligned with removal, which is just below unanimous.