Subject: [Idr] Stephen Farrell's No Objection on draft-ietf-idr-as-migration-03: (with COMMENT)

From: "Stephen Farrell" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2015 17:36:55 -0800

Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-idr-as-migration-03: No Objection

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COMMENT:
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In the security considerations, isn't there a threat of
hijacking traffic (for whatever purpose) if an
unauthorised party can migrate?

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From: joel jaeggli <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2015 20:44:33 -0800

> http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-idr-as-migration/

I wouldn't  expect the threat of hijack, either due to mis-origination
or as-path manipulation to be greater during the merger of two ASNs then
operating them seperately. the opportunity for grievous error exists but
that's not extrinsic to the common administrative domain encompassing
both ASNs.

With respect to a changing the backing asn on a router with changing the
asn on the bgp session with the customer,  the goal is to
leave-pre-eastablished relationships unchanged until they can later be
migrated. that can include the ip addresses in use on both ends, arp
entries, shared secrets if employed and potentially even the tcp session
itself, if supported by the platform.

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From: joel jaeggli <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2015 20:44:33 -0800