Subject: WG Action: Handover Keying (hokey)

From: IESG Secretary <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2006 18:50:01 -0500

A new IETF working group has been formed in the Security Area.  
For additional information, please contact the Area Directors 
or the WG Chairs.

+++

Handover Keying (hokey)
==========================

Current Status: Active Working Group

Chair(s):  
Glen Zorn <[email-masked]>
Charles Clancy <[email-masked]>
 
Security Area Director(s):
            Russ Housley <[email-masked]>
            Sam Hartman <[email-masked]>
 
Security Area Advisor:
            Russ Housley <[email-masked]>
 
Mailing List:     
[email-masked]

Description:
 
Most deployments of EAP in wireless networks employ an authenticator in
pass-through mode, usually located at the edge, coupled with a backend
AAA/EAP server.  Many EAP methods generate an MSK and an EMSK.  The MSK is
used by several EAP lower layers.  The EMSK remains at the peer and
server, but it is not presently used in any specifications.  Different EAP
lower layers make use of the MSK differently; the most common usage is to
derive Transient Session Keys (TSKs) to provide access link security in
networks (e.g., IEEE 802.11i, IEEE 802.16e), although some lower layers
(e.g., IKEv2) use the MSK for other purposes.
 
Extensions to current EAP key framework will be needed to facilitate
inter-authenticator handover and roaming.  Some problems that need to be
addressed with extensions to EAP keying include: 
 
1) Inter-authenticator handovers require re-execution of EAP
authentication even though the same EAP authentication server is used. 
Handover scenarios vary considerably in their fundamental assumptions.  In
scenarios where hosts remain connected during the handover period, EAP
authentication need not be in the critical path for handover.  However,
there are scenarios where necessary connectivity is not available to
support "make before break" communications.
In these scenarios, significant handover latency can result.  To avoid
this latency, SDOs have employed methods such as context transfer and
anchoring that are inefficient or insecure or both.
 
2) EAP peers with unexpired keying material from a full EAP exchange must
take part in a full EAP exchange with the same AAA server to extend a
session. While some EAP methods provide fast re-authentication mechanisms,
a consistent, EAP-method-independent, low-latency re-authentication
mechanism is needed.
 
3) EAP generates keys (MSK and EMSK).  When the EAP WG updated the
protocol and specified the keying framework, many details regarding the
use of the EMSK were not specified.  The EMSK can be used as the root of a
cryptographic key hierarchy, and then the keys in the hierarchy are used
in various ways to provide the needed security services.  In order to
ensure that different keys derived from the EMSK are cryptographically
separate and that the key derivations are coordinated in an acceptable
manner, it is important to clearly specify the top of the topology for the
key hierarchy and some guidelines for child key derivations.
 
4) When wireless networks employ AAA infrastructures, the cross-domain
roaming is handled by inter-domain authentication via the "home" AAA/EAP
server.  Any authentication must pass through the home server, which
increases latency. Latency can be reduced by establishing a trust
relationship between the EAP peer and the visited domain's AAA/EAP server.
  This trust relationship would be brokered by the home EAP/AAA server. 
Efficient re-authentication for the EAP peer can be supported locally
within the visited domain.
 
Some of the inconsistency in current handoff and roaming solutions can be
attributed to different trade-offs between computational cost, mobility
performance, and security.  Specifications are not consistent in the way
that the key derivation function (KDF) and KDF parameters are used.  Clear
direction by the IETF on the topology and construction of a key hierarchy
could reduce some of the inconsistencies.  However, the HOKEY WG will not
attempt to standardize TSK derivation from the MSK, as this would
interference with work of other SDOs.
 
The solutions specified by the HOKEY WG fall into several categories,
based on timing and mechanism.  The authentication and key management may
occur before handoff, when latency is much less critical.  Alternatively,
authentication and key management can occur as part of the handoff, where
latency is critical.  Solutions should reduce or eliminate the number of
referrals to AAA servers, and solutions should avoid re-executing lengthy
EAP method exchanges. This may be accomplished by providing new mechanisms
for cryptographic keying
material in combination with a protocol for the timely delivery of
appropriate keys to the appropriate entities.  Solutions are expected to
include "handover keying," "low-latency re-authentication," and
"pre-authentication."
 
All solution categories are useful, each supporting different scenarios. 
The HOKEY WG may provide multiple solutions, each addressing a different
scenario.
 
Solutions specified by the HOKEY WG must:
 
1) Be responsive to handover and re-authentication latency performance
objectives within a mobile wireless access network.
 
2) Fulfill the requirements in draft-housley-aaa-key-mgmt and 
draft-ietf-eap-keying.
 
3) Be independent of the access-technology.  Any key hierarchy topology or
protocol defined must be independent of EAP lower layers.  The protocols
may require additional support from the EAP lower layers that use it.
 
4) Accommodate inter-technology heterogeneous handover and roaming.
 
5) No changes to EAP methods.  Any extensions defined to EAP must not
cause changes to existing EAP methods.
 
In specifying an access-technology-independent solution, media independent
guidelines for SDOs may also be needed to explain how the keying material
and signaling can be employed in a specific access technology.

HOKEY WG Deliverables
=====================
 
All the specifications will be EAP-method-independent manner and
access-technology-agnostic.  EAP re-authentication and EAP
pre-authentication authenticator are expected to use the same layer and
the same protocol as the original EAP authentication used for the
authenticator.   They will provide enough semantics and guidance so that
all SDOs can employ them and preserve cryptographic separation.
 
1) A Problem Statement that defines the problem of re-authentication and
key management.  The discussion will include security and performance
goals for the solutions.  Too often, mobility optimization discussions do
not clearly identify the scenarios that are being addressed; this lack of
clarity often makes it difficult to agree on whether the proposed
optimizations offer real value.  To avoid this situation, the Problem
Statement must clearly describe the scenarios that are being addressed,
and the assumptions about the handover environment associated with that
scenario.
 
2) A specification of an EMSK-based key hierarchy topology.  The
specification will include a requirements, one or more KDF, and
parameters.  This is follow-on work EAP (RFC 3748) and EAP keying
framework that was developed in the EAP WG.
 
3) A specification for the derivation of root keys, such as the handover
root key (HRK), as well as any other media-independent keys (e.g.,
authenticator level keys) that need to be derived from such a root key, to
support re-authentication and handover key management.  The HOKEY WG can
base these keys on either the MSK or the EMSK produced by EAP (pick one).
If the consensus is to use the EMSK, then the HRK forms one branch in the
EMSK-based key hierarchy.  This specification will describe the properties
of each key that is specified, and the topics must include caching,
naming, scope, binding, storage, and key lifetime.  

4) A protocol specification for media-independent, low-latency
re-authentication.  The protocol specification must support handovers
between EAP authenticators.  This protocol specification is expected to
employ a re-authentication branch in the key hierarchy.
 
5) A protocol specification for secure and timely distribution of
cryptographic keys to support roaming and handover.  Use of AAA protocols
is preferred, and if used, should leverage existing work if possible (such
as RADEXT WG work on RFC 3576bis and RADIUS cryptographic algorithm
agility). However, if AAA protocols cannot meet the objectives, other
protocols for reactive or proactive distribution or retrieval of keys by
the proper entities is permitted.
 
6) A specification for inter-EAP-authenticator roaming and
re-authentication in visited domains that is brokered using inter-domain
trust relationships to support efficient inter-domain roaming.
 
7) A specification for EAP pre-authentication to support low-latency
inter-authenticator handoffs.

MILESTONES
==========
 
Jan 07   First draft with a problem statement on EAP re-authentication and

         key management
 
Jan 07   First draft on EMSK-based Keying Hierarchy
 
Feb 07   First draft on EAP Re-authentication and Handover Keying
         Hierarchy
 
Mar 07   First draft on EAP Re-authentication Protocol
 
Mar 07   First draft on Protocol and Keying Hierarchy for Visited Domain
         Handovers and Re-authentication
 
Mar 07   Submit the problem statement draft to IESG
 
Apr 07   Submit EMSK-based Keying Hierarchy draft to IESG
 
Jun 07   First draft on Handover Key Distribution Protocol
 
Aug 07   Submit EAP Re-authentication and Handover Keying Hierarchy draft
         to IESG
 
Aug 07   Submit EAP Re-authentication Protocol draft to IESG
 
Sep 07   Submit Protocol and Keying Hierarchy for Visited Domain Handovers

         and Re-authentication draft to IESG
 
Sep 07   First draft on EAP Pre-authentication Specification for
         inter-technology and inter-domain handoffs
 
Mar 08   Submit EAP Pre-authentication Specification to IESG
 
Mar 08   Re-charter or shut down WG

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