Subject: Document Action: 'Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Counter Mode with IKEv2' to Informational RFC

From: The IESG <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 12 May 2010 11:38:56 -0700 (PDT)

The IESG has approved the following document:

- 'Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Counter Mode with IKEv2 '
   <draft-ietf-ipsecme-aes-ctr-ikev2-07.txt> as an Informational RFC

This document is the product of the IP Security Maintenance and Extensions Working Group. 

The IESG contact persons are Sean Turner and Tim Polk.

A URL of this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-ipsecme-aes-ctr-ikev2-07.txt

Technical Summary

   This document describes how to use the AES-CTR mode with an
   explicit initialization value to protect IKEv2 messages after
   keys are established.

Working Group Summary

   This is the product of the IPSECME WG.  Nothing worth noting:
   it got a small but adequate amount of review.

Document Quality

   There are already a bunch of implementations based on developers
   guessing how to do this; to the best of our knowledge, those
   implementations match what is described in this document.

Personnel

   Paul Hoffman ([email-masked]) is the document Shepherd.
   Sean Turner ([email-masked]) is the Responsible Area Director.
   The IANA Expert(s) for the registries
   in this document is Tero Kivinen ([email-masked]).

RFC Editor Note

  1) Please remove the following from the 1st page:
       Updates: RFC4307
        (if approved)

  2) Please move the reference to [RFC3686] in Section 7.2 to be the 1st
  reference in 7.1 (i.e., make it a normative reference).

  3) Add the following as a new last paragraph in Section 1:

     Implementers need to carefully consider use of AES-CTR over
     the mandatory to implement algorithms in [RFC4307] because 
     the performance improvements of AES-CTR are minimal in the
     context of IKEv2. Furthermore, these performance improvements
     may be offset by the Counter Mode-specific risk of a minor,
     hard to detect, implementation issue resulting in total
     security failure. 

  4) Please note that this is intended for informational - not
     standards as indicated in the header of the draft.