Subject: RE: [ietf-dkim] agenda item on upgrading hash algorithms?

From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2006 18:16:45 -0800

> [mailto:[email-masked]] On Behalf Of Mark Delany

> Me three. As a long-time implementor I suck at getting 
> un-exercised code right. I'd much prefer agility to be 
> essential to a day one deployment, as it'll otherwise never work.

The only downside is that this does render the legacy base obsolete. But
this is probably not such a great hardship. It might even be a benefit
as people are more likely to upgrade for higher security.

The only concern I have here is if moving to SHA 256 might create
problems with crypto acceleration hardware. I don't think it should, the
hash is usually done on thehost processor rather than the cryptobox, but
I would be happier if folk could confirm that this is the case.

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From: Michael Thomas <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2006 18:27:07 -0800

> I would be happier if folk could confirm that this is the case.

I'm not a hardware geek, but I really don't think that DKIM
is likely to be destined for hardware accelaration any time
soon. And if it is, it's very likely to be last in line with
all of the other protocols who are likely to be stampeding
toward SHA-256. Like, oh say, TLS and IPsec.

		Mike

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From: Mark Delany <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 23 Feb 2006 02:44:28 +0000

On Wed, Feb 22, 2006 at 06:27:07PM -0800, Michael Thomas allegedly wrote:

> soon.

Actually, h/w accelerators are looking much more attractive these days
and one possibility for us is to default deploy such cards in all our
external facing infrastructure. That they seemlessly integrate with a
dynamic openssl library makes it a no-brainer as far as taking
advantage in s/w. Trusting a 3rd party is another matter, but that's
hardly an issue for this forum.

Mark.

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From: Tony Hansen <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2006 21:57:25 -0500

> as people are more likely to upgrade for higher security.

The legacy base of verification code would need to be upgraded ASAP. The
legacy base of signing code could take more time.

Besides, there are already other minor changes in the draft, and certain
to be more in the future, that will require the legacy base to be upgraded.

	Tony Hansen
	[email-masked]