Subject: [ietf-dkim] New signature algorithm deployment amidst non-updated verifiers

From: Douglas Otis <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 25 May 2006 14:09:05 -0700

A section may prove useful explaining how a new signature algorithm  
should be rapidly deployed while also avoiding disruption. (Handling  
a worst-case scenario.)

The issues to cover while assuming use of non-updated verifiers are:

1) Expectations of a domain's messages being signed, when new  
algorithms are ignored.

2) Selection of a signature when more than one is available from the  
same domain.

3) Differentiating between unimplemented and spoofed algorithms  
during a transition phase.

-Doug
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From: Paul Hoffman <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 25 May 2006 15:48:19 -0700

>should be rapidly deployed while also avoiding disruption. (Handling 

This would be useful for any protocol in the Security area.

>during a transition phase.

We can't judge the value of the section unless it is fully written out.
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