Subject: [Int-area] BoF and Non-WG Mailing List: madinas -- MAC Address Device Identification for Network and Application Services

From: Juan Carlos Zuniga <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2020 16:56:20 -0500

Hello all,

At IETF109 there will be a BoF to discuss MAC address randomization and
implications on network and application services.

If you are interested in the topic please join the mailing list.

A draft agenda of the BoF can be found here:
https://github.com/jlivingood/IETF109BoF/blob/master/109-Agenda.md

Best,

Juan-Carlos

---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: IETF Secretariat <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, Oct 30, 2020 at 12:19 PM
Subject: New Non-WG Mailing List: madinas -- MAC Address Device
Identification for Network and Application Services
To: IETF Announcement List <[email-masked]>
Cc: <[email-masked]>, <[email-masked]>, <[email-masked]>

A new IETF non-working group email list has been created.

List address: [email-masked]
Archive: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/madinas/
To subscribe: https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/madinas

Purpose:
This list is for discussion of the MAC Address Device Identification for
Network and Application Services (MADINAS) BOF at IETF 109.

Major operating systems have implemented and deployed MAC Address
randomization features to enhance device and user privacy, as randomization
can help avoid device identification. Device identification by MAC address
is often used in ways that do not invade privacy, but that provides useful
services to the device user. These services include network optimization,
access control, usage counting, and security and user protection services.
Some examples are LAN forwarding policy, sticky DHCP IP assignments, static
NAT policy and MAC address ACL for blocking malicious or unwanted devices.
In those situations, the deployment of MAC address randomization results in
unintended and likely unforeseen impacts to the network, systems and
applications external to the device implementing randomization.

This illustrates a potential need for the networking community (OS vendors,
device manufacturers, application developers and network operators) to work
more closely together to solve the needs of the end users. In some cases, a
greater awareness by Network and Application Services to current MAC
address usage may be enough. For other cases, a new solution may need to be
developed and standardized to reach the desired outcome. The proponents of
this BoF are interested in determining if there is sufficient support in
the IETF community to define best practices, update any existing documents
if needed, or potentially develop new protocols or mechanisms for service
continuity in the presence of MAC Address randomization.
This list belongs to IETF area: INT

For additional information, please contact the list administrators.

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From: Carsten Bormann <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 2 Nov 2020 08:20:51 +0100

> https://github.com/jlivingood/IETF109BoF/blob/master/109-Agenda.md

I don’t understand the slides about home device MAC addresses, https://github.com/boucadair/IETF109BoF/blob/master/madinas-ddos%20mitigation-use%20case-rev%2027102020.pdf

If mitigations are widely deployed that are based on MAC address filtering, attackers will implement countermeasures (such as varying the MAC address quickly enough to defeat the mitigation signaling).  MAC address randomization as implemented by a device vendor would probably be too slow as a countermeasure (if it were, it would save the attacker a little work, but not that much).

(Please reply to [email-masked].)

Grüße, Carsten