Subject: RE: More misinformation on IPv6

From: Brian Zill <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 1999 23:41:37 -0700

> From: Richard M. Smith [mailto:[email-masked]]
> 
> I looked over the BBC article and it seems fine to me.

The BBC article states:
"The new proposal is being made by the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF), an international standards body. It would result in the inclusion of
the unique serial number for each computer as part of its expanded new
Internet protocol address."

This statement is incorrect.  RFC 2373, Section 2.5.1 (and also RFC 2374,
Section 3.6) clearly state that the interface identifier portion of an IPv6
address is only required to be unique on the interface's local link.  There
is no requirement that each computer must have a unique serial number that
never changes.

I suspect most people on this list already understand this.

What you're all arguing about is a "may" clause, one way out of many
possible ways to form an interface identifier.  How interface identifiers
end up getting created in common practice is the real issue, I believe.
(And even there the concern is primarily with end user machines, and not
with the addresses of servers or routers.)  There may or may not be a
realistic privacy concern associated with this, opinions tend to vary with
one's predictions of future common practices.  So I'll refrain from
commenting on that issue at this time.

The concern I have that prompted this post is that some people are
misrepresenting this issue as an IPv6 protocol flaw.  It is not.  It is an
issue regarding how the protocol might be used in practice.  The same issue
is relevant (or not) with regards to how IPv4 addresses are used in practice
today.

The casual reader of the BBC article (or Frezza's column) is likely to come
to mistaken conclusion that this is some new problem with IPv6 that is
completely absent in IPv4.  And thus may get the impression that IPv4 is
somehow preferable to IPv6.  I would hate for all the internet users (and
network administrators!) of the world to miss out on all the great advances
of IPv6 due to a misunderstanding propagated by hasty reporting and a small
but vocal group of people with their own agenda.  Especially since Thomas
Narten's proposal has the potential to improve the privacy of IPv6 users
over that of IPv4 users today.

I suspect many other readers of this list share my concerns about IPv6 being
misrepresented, and that this is the cause of much of the contention
surrounding this issue on the list.  It would be appreciated if the privacy
advocates among us would help dispel such misconceptions about IPv6 in their
conversations with reporters, rather than contributing to them.  Cooperation
is generally more productive than sniping from the sidelines (and also helps
to identify those who are truly interested in achieving positive outcomes
from those who merely want to snipe from the sidelines).

Finally, it's worth noting that the BBC article also misrepresents Thomas's
proposal as "manual configuration" (via placement of Thomas' quote
immediately after a paragraph paraphrasing Fred Baker describing such).

--Brian

The opinions expressed in this message are my own and should not be taken as
representative of Microsoft, the IPv6 Forum Tech Directorate, the ipv6.org
web site, or any other company, group, person or inanimate object.
--------------------------------------------------------------------
IETF IPng Working Group Mailing List
IPng Home Page:                      http://playground.sun.com/ipng
FTP archive:                      ftp://playground.sun.com/pub/ipng
Direct all administrative requests to [email-masked]
--------------------------------------------------------------------

---

From: Jeff Williams <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 1999 00:42:51 +0100

Brian and all,

  Over all I agree with your sentiment at least.  Looking for more
positive solutions and insuring that there is absolutely NO
privacy or security holes in IPv6 would be the best and most
productive direction everyone can take.

  Now after stating that, and hoping that there is a renewed
real interest in a positive direction, I do have some legitimate
concerns regarding the TONE or some of you remaining
comments.  (See below your comments for those concerns).

> is no requirement that each computer must have a unique serial number that

  Right, it is not a requirement at the local link interface, but it is
a possible implementation.  That should not be the case as it
opens up Pandora's Box, so to speak.

> commenting on that issue at this time.

  May not be a realistic privacy concern???  There definitely is a
privacy concern and you pointed it out in your paragraph just before this
one above.  And "May not be" is not good enough.

> issue regarding how the protocol might be used in practice.

  Well that is a flaw by definition.  Not a feature.  >;)

>  The same issue

  No this is not really the case at all.  At the client level this problem can
be
dealt with by the user themselves.  Not true with the current spec on IPV6.

> somehow preferable to IPv6.

  Well IPv4 is not preferable to IPv6 just because of a privacy concern,
nor should it be viewed as such.  But it is easy to see how from a business
perspective where that perception could be taken given this "Flaw"
in the IPv6 spec.

> I would hate for all the internet users (and

Regards,

--
Jeffrey A. Williams
Spokesman INEGroup (Over 95k members strong!)
CEO/DIR. Internet Network Eng/SR. Java/CORBA Development Eng.
Information Network Eng. Group. INEG. INC.
E-Mail [email-masked]
Contact Number:  972-447-1894
Address: 5 East Kirkwood Blvd. Grapevine Texas 75208

---

From: Ignatios Souvatzis <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 1999 10:39:26 +0200

> productive direction everyone can take.

Jeff,

_This_ _cant_ _be_ _done_.

As long as people use unicast protocols to access information, be it telephone,
TCP, or an ATM circuit, the return address _has_ _to_ be included, and _is_
somehow trackable.

Even if people use a random source address, routable by their ISP, for each
access, it will be within their ISPs local address block. This is true for
IPv4 as well as IPv6.

There are two problems resulting from this:

a) the ISP can map a (timestamp, sourceaddress) pair to a customer. He _needs_
to be able to do this during the connection (well, actually, he does the 
reverse; he mapps a customer to an address he assings her) for accounting
purpuses.

a1) Furthermore, some governments have (at least tried to) force the 
ISPs to keep this mapping information available in a database and at least
accessible by government agencies (e.g., the former German government.)

a2) Even if they did not, nothing but a rule not to do so and willing not to
break such a rule (self-given or a law) will prevent an ISP from selling 
said database to interested, err, third parties.

b) Even if a1 and a2 do NOT apply, interested WWW services can get statistical
information about a certain ISPs customers.

c) A variant of a2 is to sell the (partial) log of the proxy requests.

Neither Bill Frezza nor you ever addressed a1), a2) or b), as far as I
can tell.  They are not technical. They apply to IPv4 as well as IPv6
as well as telephone connections.

The only way out is to use multicasting protocols (e.g., Radio wave
broadcasting or Usenet. IPv4 multicasting (and I guess, IPv6) comes near,
as multicast routing requests won't propagate to near the source in most
cases, but isn't perfect.

Regards,
	-is

---

From: Jeff Williams <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 1999 06:59:50 +0100

Ignatios and all,

> _This_ _cant_ _be_ _done_.

  I appreciate your frustration, but respectfully I don't agree with your
comment here, and know that it CAN BE DONE.   In fact our
"Interface Facility" provides for this to the user level.

> TCP, or an ATM circuit, the return address _has_ _to_ be included, and _is_

Yes but that access information much like Caller ID Blocking, can be
and is being achieved now, all be it and a different layer, which was
really forced upon us anyway as the IPV6 spec does not provide
for this option presently, yet some sorts of implementations will
in effect allow for some of protection similar to this to occur as has
been pointed out on similar posts on this thread.

> access, it will be within their ISPs local address block. This is true for

  Right, and this is a sort of work around that is only somewhat addressing
the problem.

> reverse; he mapps a customer to an address he assings her) for accounting

  Or the purposes of accounting it depends on what sort of billing method
that ISP is going to do if this needs to be done.  If they are doing flat
rate billing than this is not necessary for billing purposes.

> accessible by government agencies (e.g., the former German government.)

Yes they have, and they have failed.  They have tried to codify this into
law as well, and here too they have failed by in large, even the German
government eventually failed.

> said database to interested, err, third parties.

Your are right here and this is one of the single biggest concerns and
potential harms to the unsuspecting customer or user.  That is why
these security and privacy holes must not be allowed or designed
in the spec, or at the very least provide for an opt out on the
client side.

> information about a certain ISPs customers.

Yes about "Certian" ISP customers, but not about all if a proper implementation
is done on the ISP side or an opt out is provided on the client side.

> c) A variant of a2 is to sell the (partial) log of the proxy requests.

Yep, and a bd thing this certainly is!  Not only that it is in violation
of the privacy act as well.

> as well as telephone connections.

  Yes I did and on more than one occasion.  I have just done so again
in this post as well.

Regards,

---

From: Tim Chown <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 1999 10:50:38 +0100 (BST)

> immediately after a paragraph paraphrasing Fred Baker describing such).

If you look on the bright side, we at least have a BBC story which
raises the profile and awareness of IPv6;  as a result a few more
people will look to find out more about it.

I did some background reading before the Paris IPv6 Forum meeting and
found some 30 or so IPv6 stories in the online press this year (and 
I'm sure there's a lot more).  At least 75% were positive, and many
relatively quite well written, e.g. "The Great Number Crunch" article.

I think the Forum can help by tracking online press stories, and
providing some sanitised commentary on articles (with Technical
Directorate input) on its own web site.  Linking to "bad" press is 
something that I feel should be done, so that any misconceptions can 
be highlighted.  Considered and rational debunking of articles may put
some pressure on the publishers to check facts more tightly.  

Some reporters will always seek sensationalist stories, and not be
interested in reader feedback;  at least this reporter quoted Fred Baker
and stated that the IETF is addressing the issue, even if some assertions
were a bit wobbly.

Tim