Subject: Re: [IAOC] Re: A couple of questions about the IETF trust outbound licensing.

From: [email-masked]
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2005 14:12:19 +0000

briabn - fyundamentally the Trust is a good idea. The problem is that it is late and the trust is controlled by people who have no interest in taking input from those contributing IP to the trust and that seems to be contraindicated - the idea is that to donate makes ones works part of th trust and so the trust would have obligations to the contributors, and be responsible to them,  but at this point I cant tell what the Trust's responsibilities to those people are and are not.

Todd Glassey
 -------------- Original message ----------------------
From: Brian E Carpenter <[email-masked]>
> Simon Josefsson wrote:
> > Brian E Carpenter <[email-masked]> writes:
> > 
> > 
> >>>The IETF, and the IPR Trust, will, if I understand correctly, have
> >>>the
> >>>legal capability of sub-licensing rights to the IDs/RFCs.  It is
> >>>important that the IETF is able to influence the copying conditions
> >>>used for the IDs/RFCs that will be owned by the IPR Trust.
> >>>Has the IAOC been following the outbound rights copying condition
> >>>discussion in the IPR WG?  Would there be a problem assigning third
> >>>parties rights to IDs/RFCs that will be owned by the IPR Trust?
> >>
> >>It's exactly because of that issue and related concerns that the draft
> >>text in the name of the Settlors that Lucy sent was developed last
> >>week. We intend to make sure that the Trustees can and will do what
> >>the IETF wants in this respect.
> > 
> > 
> > That's good to hear.
> > 
> > Do the CNRI or ISOC have any similar interests?  Can they legally
> > influence the license used in IPR Trust sub-licensing?  Do they want
> > to?
> 
> IANAL. However, the only remaining influence that the Settlors have
> over the Trust is that they can block changes to the Trust Agreement
> for five years, which is intended as a precaution against the
> Trustees going crazy.
> 
>      Brian
> > 
> > 
> >>>What we have been discussing is to permit third parties to use, copy,
> >>>publish and modify IDs/RFCs, under some constraints (e.g., removing
> >>>the boilerplate).  Of course, it would only apply to RFCs which the
> >>>IPR Trust actually have a legal right to sub-license.
> >>
> >>Exactly true.  We (the Trustees) will have to do some work to try to
> >>obtain the missing rights for older documents.
> > 
> > 
> > Oh, that might take a lot of time and work.  But it is worthy mission.
> > 
> > 
> >>Just to be clear once again, the sample license you saw is not in the
> >>least intended to apply to RFCs.
> > 
> > 
> > Ok.
> > 
> > Thanks,
> > Simon
> > 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Ipr-wg mailing list
> [email-masked]
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipr-wg

_______________________________________________
Ipr-wg mailing list
[email-masked]
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipr-wg

---

From: "Lucy E. Lynch" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2005 07:21:55 -0800 (PST)

> briabn - fyundamentally the Trust is a good idea. The problem is
> that it is late and the trust is controlled by people who have no
> interest in taking input from those contributing IP to the trust and
> that seems to be contraindicated - the idea is that to donate makes
> ones works part of th trust and so the trust would have obligations
> to the contributors, and be responsible to them, but at this point I
> cant tell what the Trust's responsibilities to those people are and
> are not.

Todd -

At the point of signing, there are only two Settlors to the Trust -
CNRI and ISOC and they are donating whatever assets they may hold to
the Trust. The issue of future donations to the Trust may best be
addressed by the terms of transfer and an agreed upon form of license
when and if new assets are added to the Trust. I'm not sure that you'd
want to air your issues with all three parties to the founding
document as CNRI and ISOC may have different goals in adding items to
the Trust. Since the Trustees will all be subject to IETF selection
and approval and bound by BCP 101, they are more likely to understand
your issues and answer to the IPR-WG process.

I'll be posting the Draft Trustee guidelines to the IAOC web
site today and I'll let you know when they are up.

---

From: "Lucy E. Lynch" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2005 14:15:04 -0800 (PST)

> site today and I'll let you know when they are up.

The Draft Trust Proceedures are up! See: http://koi.uoregon.edu/~iaoc

- lel

---

From: "todd glassey" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2005 21:03:29 -0800

Lucy - uh, Brian - NO....

Unless you have a complete Business Plan and numbers for the Trust - NO...
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Unless you can tell me on how competent the management of the trust is and
after looking at ISOC and all the pain its given the IETF in resolving
control and responsibility for the IETF's failure to control what its
published to date,  I would vote no to the Trust.  Further any action to
Strong-Arm ANY of the existing IP into the Estate or prevent others from
participating who DONT want to play with the Trust, would also probably
constitute a RICO violation here in the US on Antitrust and other charges.

What is this trust supposed to do - who does it benefit?
---------------------------------------------------------
So lets ask the really dumb question here - What is the purpose of the trust
and why does it need to have 501.3c status if what it does is license
properties created in the Global Internet Protocol IP Forum? Can you explain
that from a business perspective?

And what does it do? per Sections 9.5 through 9.7 it looks like a business
operating under the illegal cover of a 501.3c because its spun out of an
existing 501.3c registrant.

How for instance will licenses be granted and to whom?
--------------------------------------------------------
One of the core failings is the addressing of the business model of the
Trust Operations - where is it? what is the Trust going to do and how will
the licenses it issues work? - How will those licenses be audited and how
will oversight for the Trust itself be accomplished. Further how will
revisions to the trust happen? through RFC to the IPR-WG or what?

What types of revenues does the Trust anticipate?
--------------------------------------------------
Another key question that needs to be answered is "Who gets the write-down
for the value of donated IP???" -  this question has an obvious and critical
legal impact on someone donating a protocol. If for example that the IETF
turns around and licenses for millions of dollars, this act establishes a
valuation for that 'donation'  and thus enables the donating person/entity
to take a tax deduction against.

The contract already exists - do we need  a new org here?
----------------------------------------------------------
Another key issue is whether the existing system constitutes a contractual
relationship and my claim here is that it does and has since RFC2026
perfected the expectations of the party for the publishing rights against
their work.

As to what and why, please tell me what is it (the Trust) supposed to do
that the current IETF cannot or doesn't already have a contractual liability
for to the participants who submitted IP to it for publication, and the
separate agreement it has with those that participated in its vetting?
Because as far as I can tell by what you published there  is NO purpose for
the trust to exist according to section 2.1 of the trust document
whatsoever. Its purpose according to this is to 'do charitable things so it
can maintain a 501.3c status" - So what is that? What exactly is the Trust
going to do and what recourse do those contributors have - none so far as I
can see. Sell access to IP's per 9.5 thru 9.7?

Can IPR-WG change the contract by itself?
-------------------------------------------
Another key question to be answered is whether IPR-WG can by itself change
anything. The previous contract between the parties was essentially
perfected by RFC2026 and changed in a unilateral manner by the IPR-WG
without any ratification by those bound under it.

Even though it is a contract, and was in place no provisions for those that
wanted to participate under the old terms was made and no 'participant' had
anything near a vote on what the IETF is or how it works, only the members
of the IPR-WG and the IESG have been permitted to walk those halls. The
problem is that RFC2026 created a contractual agreement between a submitter
and the IETF and in every document since then, the rights of the submitter
have been whittled away without their permission.

Further the IETF owns No Rights to anything its published to date
------------------------------------------------------------------
This is really important - the IETF has essentially published with no
recourse all of the IP submitted to it. Based on that, I am going to draw
the line in the sand here  - and I am saying that I believe that the IETF
***ONLY*** owns publication-only rights to the RFC's produced through the
genesis of the NG of RFC2026's controls,  and nothing more to anything
previously.

What the IETF may possibly claim as part of the WG Mailing Lists, is the
publication rights to the list, but by law and by any sensible Court's
judgment, the IETF has by its own claim no membership and operates very few
of its own mailing lists so at best the content of the list it might have a
publication claim against and a right therein - but as to the core IP
itself, the IETF has NO RIGHTS to anything developed within it as far as I
can tell and this was done originally by design - something that many want
to change now that there is a possibility to make the entity profitable.

Forcing players to accept the proposed rules
---------------------------------------------
Coercion in my opinion... If the contract already exists to vet and create a
standard, and in doing so the IETF has not owned this material - to force
people to participate under new rules would be adversarial to them. It also
could be yet another claim against the IETF and its previously undocumented
vetting and advancement 'secret handshake'** used to acknowledge the
advancement of a protocol into a beatific state... (sorry - I got a little
obnoxious there, but after years of putting up with this garbage...)

** pertains to being a member of 'the inner circle' - a self evident
commentary.

No rights or claim to the Vetting Workproduct - just to publish and maybe
not even that
-----------------------------------------------
The next step in our QED journey is to the ownership of workproduct produced
in the vetting process of the IETF's working groups and project teams.

That is to say that if the IETF owns no rights to the core IP in the
submissions to it, and doesn't operate or perpetuate the maintenance of the
IP's produced in the WG's then what is it that the IETF can claim ownership
to? The shepparading of the various initiatives underway inside the IETF,
possibly if there was an Initiative tracking System, and some audit done as
part of the IETF's processes, then possibly this claim might have some merit
but in actuality, since the IETF IMHO has no vested interest in anything it
publishes, by the very terms of the publishing, this cannot be.

Coercion...
------------
In summary, if the IETF owns no IP rights beyond publishing... and if this
claim is based on nothing more than the pure intent of those presenting work
for publishing to it, this argument is perfected without breaking a sweat.
That also means that the IETF itself doesn't own the IP vetted inside of it
and unless it has structure and members that the people that operate it
admit to an I suggest that people look very carefully at the agreement and
the INTENT of the parties participating with the IETF - In NO CASES was it
to give away the IP... And if the IETF's officers were to approach those
that had participated to 'coerce their contribution' we would be looking at
a major legal nightmare.

Why add Money to the IAOC?
--------------------------------
But it gets better - why? - what is it that the trust is going to do other
than to bring a financial coefficient into the operations of the IETF and
that would violate any sensible rule for maintaining the argument that the
IETF's processes have no value since they would exactly have demonstrerable
value.

Legal Action and IAOC itself or the process that created it
-----------------------------------------------------------
And by the way - This is the basis for one of the best class action suits in
history... Further if this matter was to be taken into Court the entire
process of the formation and seating of a IAOC itself and the BCP that
created it would likely be struck down as a unilateral act by the
administration of the IETF in deference to its members, something that any
sane court would agree that it has and that it hides the existence of.

I suggest that this whole process and genesis of a Tax Exempt Holding
Company for the IP (or a Trust as the Holding Company has tried to be
structured here) is broken and needs to be rethought.

Todd Glassey

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Lucy E. Lynch" <[email-masked]>
To: <[email-masked]>
Cc: <[email-masked]>; "Thierry Moreau" <[email-masked]>; "Brian
E Carpenter" <[email-masked]>; <[email-masked]>; "Simon Josefsson"
<[email-masked]>
Sent: Monday, November 21, 2005 2:15 PM
Subject: Re: [IAOC] Re: A couple of questions about the IETF trust outbound
licensing.

---

From: "todd glassey" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2005 15:56:29 -0800

Lucy - is there a formal definition of the assets and their state?

Todd
----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Lucy E. Lynch" <[email-masked]>
To: <[email-masked]>
Cc: "Brian E Carpenter" <[email-masked]>; "Simon Josefsson"
<[email-masked]>; <[email-masked]>; "Thierry Moreau"
<[email-masked]>; <[email-masked]>
Sent: Monday, November 21, 2005 2:15 PM
Subject: Re: [IAOC] Re: A couple of questions about the IETF trust outbound
licensing.

---

From: "todd glassey" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2005 08:03:32 -0800

Lucy and Brian dont get me wrong - I think the IETF needs oversight, and
badly - but not this way.

Todd

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "todd glassey" <[email-masked]>
To: "Lucy E. Lynch" <[email-masked]>; <[email-masked]>
Cc: <[email-masked]>; "Thierry Moreau" <[email-masked]>; "Brian
E Carpenter" <[email-masked]>; <[email-masked]>; "Simon Josefsson"
<[email-masked]>
Sent: Monday, November 21, 2005 9:03 PM
Subject: Re: [IAOC] Re: A couple of questions about the IETF trust outbound
licensing.

---

From: "Lucy E. Lynch" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2005 08:08:46 -0800 (PST)

Todd -

I'll add your vote to the no column.

Lucy E. Lynch 				Academic User Services
Computing Center			University of Oregon
llynch  @darkwing.uoregon.edu		(541) 346-1774

---

From: "Joel M. Halpern" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2005 11:34:26 -0500

Over all this trust agreement looks to me like something we (the IETF 
community) can work with and should support.
It does need the side agreement among the contributors to ensure that the 
correct rights are preserved for RFCs / IDs.  You have indicated that you 
intended and expect to get that.
Therefore, I support this agreement and think it works for the IETF community.

Yours,
Joel M. Halpern

---

From: "Lucy E. Lynch" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2005 08:54:05 -0800 (PST)

Joel -

On Tue, 22 Nov 2005, Joel M. Halpern wrote:

> Over all this trust agreement looks to me like something we (the
> IETF community) can work with and should support. It does need the
> side agreement among the contributors to ensure that the correct
> rights are preserved for RFCs / IDs.  You have indicated that you
> intended and expect to get that. Therefore, I support this agreement
> and think it works for the IETF community.

Thanks, the IAOC is committed to making this work for the IETF and
I appreciate both your feedback and your support. We are working with
CNRI to get the side agreement in place and should be able to publish
the text shortly.

---

From: "todd glassey" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2005 13:06:00 -0800

Lucy - If the IETF needs income there are ways it can do that in the form of
"IP Notices" that people would post. There are also ways to fund it as a
501.3c but not the way its set up now.

Rather than just writing my vote off - why not answer the questions I asked.
They are important - what is the Trust to do and what is its charter. The
description there is incomplete and essentially allows the trustee's to
implement virtually anything they wanted to. Also how is the trust to be
managed and what oversight will it have. Also what lengths will it go to to
commoditize and protect IP's entrusted to it?

Todd

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Lucy E. Lynch" <[email-masked]>
To: "todd glassey" <[email-masked]>
Cc: <[email-masked]>; "Thierry Moreau" <[email-masked]>; "Brian
E Carpenter" <[email-masked]>; <[email-masked]>; "Simon Josefsson"
<[email-masked]>
Sent: Tuesday, November 22, 2005 8:08 AM
Subject: Re: [IAOC] Re: A couple of questions about the IETF trust outbound
licensing.

> > > Because as far as I can tell by what you published there  is NO
purpose
> > for
> > > whatsoever. Its purpose according to this is to 'do charitable things
so
> > it
> > > going to do and what recourse do those contributors have - none so far
as
> > I
> > > wanted to participate under the old terms was made and no
'participant'
> > had
> > > judgment, the IETF has by its own claim no membership and operates
very
> > few
> > > of its own mailing lists so at best the content of the list it might
have
> > a
> > > Coercion in my opinion... If the contract already exists to vet and
create
> > a
> > > submissions to it, and doesn't operate or perpetuate the maintenance
of
> > > possibly if there was an Initiative tracking System, and some audit
done
> > as
> > > but in actuality, since the IETF IMHO has no vested interest in
anything
> > it
> > > claim is based on nothing more than the pure intent of those
presenting
> > work
> > > That also means that the IETF itself doesn't own the IP vetted inside
of
> > it
> > > that had participated to 'coerce their contribution' we would be
looking
> > at
> > > And by the way - This is the basis for one of the best class action
suits
> > in

---

From: "todd glassey" <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 26 Nov 2005 08:43:10 -0800

Lucy -
OK so there is no definition of the assets in the estate/trust at this time,
OK -

http://www.alvestrand.no/ietf/adminrest/transteam/notes/1.html

What needs oversight?
-----------------------
Lets then ask a more basic question - what is it about the IETF's processes
that needs oversight? and what is it that oversight is to provide in a
mechanical sense. I as an auditor get to ask these questions professionally
of my client's so lets pretend that the IETF is a client and we are looking
at what inside of its processes that needs oversight and what the oversight
itself is to accomplish or to implement. Because after looking at this
document - I have more questions than ever about responsibility, liability,
and the goals of those intended outside of the financial ones which are
pretty obvious - at least to me as an auditor.

What is it the IAD and IASA actually do?
------------------------------------------
The text at Harald's site says - "The IAOC's role is to provide appropriate
direction to the IAD, to review the IAD's regular reports, and to oversee
the IASA functions to ensure that the administrative needs of the IETF
community are being properly met. The IAOC's mission is not to be engaged in
the day-to-day administrative work of IASA, but rather to provide
appropriate direction, oversight and approval."

But what does this mean? - What is oversight and how are the workprocesses
of this oversight laid out or provided? - see - this is a 300,000 foot
statement without any basis in operations - the same problem most of the
IETF's managerial documents suffer from - vagueness amongst the least of
their flaws.

[Note - Also note the use of the term of art "IETF Community" which clearly
means the IETF's membership base with regards to any initiative being
undertaken or promulgated within the IETF itself.]

http://www.alvestrand.no/ietf/adminrest/transteam/notes/41.html

and I just gotta rub this one in, what happens when the process fails or is
violated? How is any oversight or recovery provided?

History
-------
So then, let me ask, if its about making the playing field level - didn't
Steve have me thrown out of this WG a year or so ago for a month for
bringing exactly this up? Where was the oversight there? Where was the
appeal which the IESG apparently never acted on. Is that where the oversight
would fit in? - to prevent tortuous interference in the operations of the
IETF with individuals trying to participate within it?

My suggestions for change
---------------------------
OK - look - I could go on ad infinitum on the core changes that need to
happen - but in re Oversight and Control's needed to manage this entity, and
its assets, I would suggest that its time to start thinking of changing or
adding a formalized and cafeteria style vetting process and a formal
description (at the very least, a list workflow model) for the vetting of
any project or initiative.

I would also humbly suggest that the concept of "voting" on anything in the
IETF is either formalized or done away with. Without a proper set of
member's the vetting process and voting on its phased completion within the
WG could not happen. This is a key flaw with the whole "we all worked on it
and it was vetted" assertion that today's vetting models address.

What happens today is that pools of people gather in projects or initiatives
that they are collectively committed to working on, and while some of any
effort happens on the WG Lists, a good part of it happens in private
communications between the vetting partners that NEVER is seen by the rest
of the list or is likewise not captured in the List Archive for evidentiary
service.

IMHO - What needs to change is that

    0) The IETF and ISEG need to commit to a new type of Initiative
Management and the new frameworks for making this work. This would include
the IAOC and the Trust Operations as well.

    1) Basic and Extended Vetting needs to be defined (each Initiative is
vetted in the WG's)...
            a) What is vetting - How many people and minimum time frame,
what IP workproduct is produced from the vetting
            b) Can vetting for a specific initiative be free-form, or does
it need to be defined, and if so can a WG 'take on Initiatives' based on
their interest - i.e. are all Initiatives vetted alike?
            b) Initiatives Deliverables - how many implementations and how
many instances of proven interoperability.
            c) Imitative Plan and Status Reports to WG

    2)  WG's needs to become 'Sheppard's of Initiatives' and as such a WG
may have any number of Initiatives
            a) Each Initiative must have a stated goal - something new for
this crowd, but only reasonable.
            b) Each Initiative must be comparable to any other Initiative
being executed or promulgated trough the vetting process
            c) All evidence of any given Initiative must have all evidence
and communications archived for it - this is the true value of the WG
archives and it is something that can have maintenance revenues attached to
as well.

    3)    The IESG needs to lose the power of the vote - its real purpose is
to formally award 'statements of completion' for any Initiative that has
completed its milestones and vetting processes, and to administer the
operations of the IETF and IRTF.

Just some ideas.

Todd
----- Original Message ----- 
From: "todd glassey" <[email-masked]>
To: "Lucy E. Lynch" <[email-masked]>; <[email-masked]>
Cc: <[email-masked]>; "Thierry Moreau" <[email-masked]>; "Brian
E Carpenter" <[email-masked]>; <[email-masked]>; "Simon Josefsson"
<[email-masked]>
Sent: Monday, November 21, 2005 3:56 PM
Subject: Re: [IAOC] Re: A couple of questions about the IETF trust
outbound licensing.

> > > > briabn - fundamentally the Trust is a good idea. The problem is
> > The Draft Trust Procedures are up! See: http://koi.uoregon.edu/~iaoc
> >
> > - lel
>
>