Subject: draft-ietf-isis-hmac-00.txt

From: Tony Li <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1998 00:56:28 -0800 (PST)

Attached is a draft of an ID for HMAC-MD5 authentication.  The semantics
are identical to the previous proposal.  The document syntax now should
conform to ID standards.  Some of the text has changed in an effort to
improve readability.  No semantic changes were intended in this edit.

Editorial comments to me, please.  General comments to the list.

Thanks,
Tony

ps. As this did not make the cutoff deadline, it may not be published until
after IETF.

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Network Working Group                                                 Tony Li
INTERNET DRAFT                                               Juniper Networks
                                                                November 1998

                     IS-IS HMAC-MD5 Authentication

                     <draft-ietf-isis-hmac-00.txt>

Status

   This document is an Internet-Draft.  Internet-Drafts are working
   documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
   and its working groups.  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   To view the entire list of current Internet-Drafts, please check the
   "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow
   Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), ftp.nordu.net (Northern
   Europe), ftp.nic.it (Southern Europe), munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim),
   ftp.ietf.org (US East Coast), or ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast).

1.0 Abstract

   This document describes the authentication of IS-IS PDUs using the
   HMAC-MD5 algorithm [1].  IS-IS is specified in [2], with extensions
   to support IPv4 described in [3].  The base specification includes an
   authentication mechanism that allows for multiple authentication
   algorithms.  The base specification only specifies the algorithm for
   cleartext passwords.

   This document proposes an extension to that specification that allows
   the use of the HMAC-MD5 authentication algorithm to be used in
   conjunction with the existing authentication mechanisms.

2.0 Introduction

   The IS-IS protocol, as specified in ISO 10589, provides for the
   authentication of Link State PDUs (LSPs) through the inclusion of
   authentication information as part of the LSP.  This authentication
   information is encoded as a Type-Length-Value (TLV) tuple.  The type

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INTERNET DRAFT                                             November 1998

   of the TLV is specified as 10.  The length of the TLV is variable.
   The value of the TLV depends on the authentication algorithm and
   related secrets being used.  The first octet of the value is used to
   specify the authentication type.  Type 0 is reserved, type 1
   indicates a cleartext password, and type 255 is used for routing
   domain private authentication methods.  The remainder of the TLV
   value is known as the Authentication Value.

   This document extends the above situation by allocating a new
   authentication type for HMAC-MD5 and specifying the algorithms for
   the computation of the Authentication Value.  This document also
   describes modifications to the base protocol to insure that the
   authentication mechanisms described in this document are effective.

   This document is a publication of the IS-IS Working Group within the
   IETF, and is a contribution to ISO IEC JTC1/SC6, for eventual
   inclusion with ISO 10589.

3.0 Authentication Procedures

   The authentication type used for HMAC-MD5 is 54 (0x36).  The length
   of the Authentication Value for HMAC-MD5 is 16, and the length field
   in the TLV is 17.

   The HMAC-MD5 algorithm requires a key K and text T as input.  The key
   K is the password for the PDU type, as specified in ISO 10589.  The
   text T is the PDU to be authenticated with the Authentication Value
   field inside of the Authentication Information TLV set to zero.  Note
   that the Authentication Type is set to 54 and the length of the TLV
   is set to 17 before authentication is computed.  When LSPs are
   authenticated, the Checksum and Remaining Lifetime fields are set to
   zero (0) before authentication is computed.  The result of the
   algorithm is placed in the Authentication Value field.

   An implementations that implements HMAC-MD5 authentication and
   receives HMAC-MD5 Authentication Information MUST discard the PDU if
   the Authentication Value is incorrect.

   An implementation MAY include HMAC-MD5 Authentication Information in
   PDUs even if it does not fully implement HMAC-MD5 authentication.
   This allows an implementation to generate authentication information
   without verifying the authentication information.  This is a
   transition aid for networks in the process of deploying
   authentication.

   An implementation MAY check a set of passwords when verifying the

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INTERNET DRAFT                                             November 1998

   Authentication Value.  This provides a mechanism for incrementally
   changing passwords in a network.

   An implementation that does not implement HMAC-MD5 authentication MAY
   accept a PDU that contains the HMAC-MD5 Authentication Type.

   ISes (routers) that implement HMAC-MD5 authentication and initiating
   LSP purges MUST remove the body of the LSP and add the authentication
   TLV.  ISes MUST NOT accept unauthenticated purges.  ISes MUST NOT
   accept purges that contain TLVs other than the authentication TLV.
   These restrictions are necessary to prevent a hostile system from
   receiving an LSP, setting the Remaining Lifetime field to zero, and
   flooding it, thereby initiating a purge without knowing the
   authentication password.

4.0 Security Considerations

   This document enhances the security of the IS-IS routing protocol.
   Because a routing protocol contains information that is not of
   significant value, privacy is not a requirement.  However,
   authentication of the messages within the protocol is of interest.

   The technology in this document provides an authentication mechanism
   for IS-IS.  This mechanism does not prevent replay attacks, however
   such attacks would trigger mechanisms in the protocol that would
   effectively reject old information.  This document does not address
   denial-of-service attacks.

5.0 Acknowledgments

   The author would like to thank Henk Smit, Dave Katz and Tony
   Przygienda for their comments on this work.

6.0 References

   [1] RFC 2104, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", H.
   Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti, February 1997

   [2] ISO 10589, "Intermediate System to Intermediate System Intra-
   Domain Routeing Exchange Protocol for use in Conjunction with the
   Protocol for Providing the Connectionless-mode Network Service (ISO
   8473)" [Also republished as RFC 1142]

   [3] RFC 1195, "Use of OSI IS-IS for routing in TCP/IP and dual
   environments", R.W. Callon, Dec. 1990

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INTERNET DRAFT                                             November 1998

10.0 Author's Address

   Tony Li
   Juniper Networks, Inc.
   385 Ravendale Dr.
   Mountain View, CA 94043
   Email: [email-masked]
   Fax: +1 650 526 8001
   Voice: +1 650 526 8006

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