Subject: [karp] draft-ietf-karp-threats-reqs-00

From: "Bhatia, Manav (Manav)" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 2010 06:09:57 +0530

Hi Gregory,

Most of the requirements that I had sent have been included.  I could not find a few though.

(1) Following text on replay mechanisms should go in 3.17 (Section 3, point 17):

Replay mechanisms provided by the routing protocols should work even if certain protocol packets are offered prioritized treatment.

(2) Routing protocols MUST only send minimal information regarding the authentication mechanisms and the parameters in its protocol packets to avoid exposing the information to parties on the path.

(3) In most routing protocols (OSPF, ISIS, BFD, RIP, etc), all speakers share the same key on a broadcast segment. Possession of the key itself is used for identity validation and no other identity check is used. This opens a window for an attack where the sender can masquerade as some other neighbor. Routing protocols should thus use some other information besides the key to validate a neighbor. One could look at draft-ietf-opsec-routing-protocols-crypto-issues-03.txt for details on such attacks.

(4) Routing protocols that rely on the IP header (or information beyond the routing protocol payload) to identify the neighbor which originated the packet must either protect the IP header or provide some other means to identify the neighbor. draft-ietf-opsec-routing-protocols-crypto-issues-03.txt describes some attacks that are based on this.

Editorial comments:

(1) 3.21 is not a separate requirement - it's a part of 3.20

(2) Similarly, 3.23 is a part of 3.22

Cheers, Manav

P.S.

For those of you who missed it, the latest KARP requirements and threats has been announced and is available at:
http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-karp-threats-reqs-00.txt

--
Manav Bhatia,
IP Division, Alcatel-Lucent,
Bangalore - India