Subject: [karp] Last Call: <draft-ietf-karp-ops-model-07.txt> (Operations Model for Router Keying) to Informational RFC

From: The IESG <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 28 Jul 2013 23:35:57 -0700

The IESG has received a request from the Keying and Authentication for
Routing Protocols WG (karp) to consider the following document:
- 'Operations Model for Router Keying'
  <draft-ietf-karp-ops-model-07.txt> as Informational RFC

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
[email-masked] mailing lists by 2013-08-18. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to [email-masked] instead. In either case, please retain the
beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract

   Developing an operational and management model for routing protocol
   security that works with all the routing protocols will be critical
   to the success of routing protocol security efforts.  This document
   discusses issues and begins to consider development of these models.

The file can be obtained via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-karp-ops-model/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-karp-ops-model/ballot/

No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.

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From: Sam Hartman <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 29 Jul 2013 04:54:20 -0400

Hi.

Yes I'm making a last call comment on a document I edit:-)

During discussion of another document
)(draft-ietf-karp-crypto-key-table), a routing directorate review
brought up the concern that we don't talk about time synchronization.
Without time synchronization, the wrong keys can be selected in certain
circumstances.
In some cases, time synchronization is required for replay detection,
although that is rare for routing protocols.

Those involved in the discussion of time synchronization and
draft-ietf-karp-crypto-key-table believed that draft-ietf-karp-ops-model
is a better place for a discussion of time synchronization than
draft-ietf-karp-crypto-key-table.

So, I'd like to propose the following text be added to security
considerations:

      <t>Close synchronization of time can impact the security of
      routing protocols in a number of ways.  Time is used to control
      when keys MAY bxegin being used and when they MUST NOT be used any
      longer as described in <xref
      target="i-d.ietf-karp-crypto-key-table"></xref>.  Routers need to
      have tight enough time synchronization that receivers permit a key
      to be used prior to the first use of that key or availability will
      be impacted.  If time synchronization is too loose, then a key can
      be used beyond its intended lifetime.  The Network Time Protocol
      (NTP) can be used to provide time synchronization.  For some
      protocols, time synchronization is also important for replay
      detection.

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From: Danny McPherson <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 29 Jul 2013 05:19:36 -0400

> draft-ietf-karp-crypto-key-table.

I agree with this (not surprisingly :-)

> So, I'd like to propose the following text be added to security

I'm good with this, one nit:

s/bxegin/begin/

Thanks Sam, 

-danny

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From: Sam Hartman <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 29 Jul 2013 05:35:31 -0400

Danny sent me private text that he believes is better than what I
proposed.

I like your text below except that signing is the wrong word.
How about generation of integrity-protected messages?

These messages are almost never digitally signed.

Proposed text:

> Routers need to
>      to be utilized for validation prior to the first use of that key for signing or
>      availability will be impacted.

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From: Danny McPherson <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 29 Jul 2013 12:55:26 -0400

> How about generation of integrity-protected messages?

Yeah, that's what I meant..  New text WFM, thanks [again] Sam for addressing these concerns!

-danny