Subject: KINK issue list rev.6

From: "KAMADA Ken'ichi" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 05 Apr 2005 13:37:14 +0900

Hi.  I think that there were rough consensuses on solutions which have
been proposed on the list, and remaining issues have been discussed and
have directions of the fixes at the IETF-62 meeting.
Please let me know if I've missed any issues which have no consensus
at all or whose solutions are not summed up well.  I'm pleased to
provide any work I can do to make it go forward.
I feel a few issues (on U2U/cross-realm) need to be rechecked when a
revised draft is submitted.

in discussion:          0
solution proposed:      0
waiting a revision:    41
closed:                 2
---------------------------
total:                 43

[**] Indicates an issue considered substantive.
[-] Indicates an editorial issue.
(2401bis) Indicates it depends on 2401 vs 2401bis.

Category: Clarifications related to kcrypto
===========================================

#8 CksumLen (section 5)
(waiting a revision)

	Diagram indicates one octet for cksumlen, but the text (and 
	kcrypto specifications) say it should be two.

	Proposed solutions:
	- Clarify that you mean the padding discussed in 5.1 (KINK Padding
	  rules), not crypto-system padding.  (Sam Hartman)

	- Use 2 octets for CksumLen field in accordance with kcrypto.

	See also: #9

#9 [**] etype does not directly indicate checksum type (section 5)
(waiting a revision)

	a key's encryption type does not directly indicate 
	a checksum type, it indicates an encryption(-with-integrity-protection) 
	scheme, which does include a required-to-implement checksum type
	(Ken Raeburn)

	Proposed solutions are:
	- Use "required checksum mechanism" checksum type determined by
	  the etype.
	- Use get_mic or verify_mic function to generate or verify the checksum.
	- Omit the checksum field before calculation.
	- The Length field is filled with the packet length without checksum and
	  the CksumLen field is zeroed out before the calculation.
	- Move the Cksum field to the end of the message.
	  (maybe without padding between the last payload and checksum?)
	(Message-ID: <[email-masked]>)

#10 [**] Kerberos allows variable length checksum (section 5)
(waiting a revision)

	I'd have to go back and check, but I don't think we require that 
	a given checksum type have a fixed output size, so "leave X amount of 
	space and fill it with zero for computing the checksum" is questionable 
	too.  (Ken Raeburn)

	Proposed solution: look at #9

#11 Kerberos checksum is not deterministic (section 5)
(waiting a revision)

	The Kink description of how to verify a checksum assumes that
	Kerberos checksums are deterministic; this is not strictly required.
	(Sam Hartman)

	let kcrypto specify how 
	to verify a checksum, as they're not required to be deterministic, so 
	the "compute it again and compare" approach specified in section 5 is 
	wrong  (Ken Raeburn)

	Proposed solution: look at #9

#20 [**] KINK_ENCRYPT format (section 5.1.8)
(waiting a revision)

	The format of the encrypted part of KINK_ENCRYPT (section 5.1.8) is
	vague.  I think of using the output of raw encryption algorithms
	(i.e. E(confounder | plaintext | pad)) or using EncryptedData.

	treat "encryption with 
	integrity protection" output as a whole, don't peek under the covers to 
	find a "checksum" part you can throw away  (Ken Raeburn)

	drop references to the initialization vector  (Ken Raeburn)

	Please use the output of the kcrypto encrypt
	operation directly.  Of most importance is to make sure that all
	kcrypto enctypes will work even if it is not possible to decompose the
	kcrypto checksum from the encrypted data.  This probably means that in
	some cases you will have double checksums.
	You also need to deal with making sure you can determine the length of
	the plaintext.  (Sam Hartman)

	Related thread: Message-Id: <[email-masked]>

	Proposed solution:
	Use the output of the kcrypto encryption.

#25 [**] prf (section 8)
(waiting a revision)

	Section 8 says "prf is the same hash algorithm found in the session
	ticket's etype", but krb-wg-crypto-07 defines hash as unkeyed.
	Fortunately krb-wg-crypto-07 defines a PRF for each etype, so KINK
	should use this PRF.

	Use a prf 
	from kcrypto, don't assume the checksum operations are deterministic 
	hash functions  (Ken Raeburn)

	Section 6.1 (the description of hash algorithm):
	This checksum may not be deterministic and is probably not
	appropriate for use in setting up a key.  A PRF is provided, although
	depending on how the hash is used the PRF may or may not be a suitable
	replacement.  There has been significant discussion within krb-wg on
	when the PRF is appropriate and when it is not.  This discussion
	centered around key determination in pkinit.  (Sam Hartman)

	Related thread: <[email-masked]>

	Proposed solution:
	- use RFC 3961 PRF (instead of "hash") to generate KEYMAT.
	  (PRF is suitable for key generation for KINK.)

#26 Key derivation (section 8)
(waiting a revision)

	The key derivation seems inconsistent with the crypto framework
	document.  (Sam Hartman)

	I don't understand what this section says well enough to determine
	whether it works with kcrypto.  (Sam Hartman)

	Proposal: <[email-masked]>

#28 Key usage
(waiting a revision)

	Usage of  kink should specify the key usage numbers for kerberos
	encryption.  (Sam Hartman)

	You can assign the numbers out of the space reserved for applications
	if principals used for kink will not be used for other purposes.  If
	principals used for kink will be used for other purposes it is
	probably desirable to talk to Tom Yu and get a key usage number added
	to 1510ter.  You'll also want to add the same key usage number to Kink
	to avoid a normative reference to 1510ter.
	(Sam Hartman, Message-ID: <[email-masked]>)

	Related thread: <[email-masked]>

	Proposal:
	- Get 2 key usage numbers (for KINK_ENCRYPT and KINK Cksum) from
	  1510ter.
	  (and defined them in the KINK draft to avoid waiting 1510ter as
	  a normative reference.)

Category: U2U (and cross-realm) issues
======================================

#3 [**] Choosing the right principal when U2U
(waiting a revision)

	It seems like the
	server tells the client what principal to authenticate to, but this
	principal is not properly authorized.  (Sam Hartman)

	Section 5.1.2:
	How do I authorize which service I'm talking to in the u2u case.
	I.E. how do I know what principals are authorized for a particular SPD
	entry?  (Sam Hartman)

	Proposal:
	- The initiator should know the responder's principal name
	  in the same way with non-U2U case.
	  <[email-masked]>

#19 [**] Cross-realm and U2U (section 4.2 and 5.1.5)
(waiting a revision)

	Please Consider how this works in the cross-realm case.
	I.E. make sure you end up with the right ticket on the right side.  I
	believe this text assumes that you need a ticket in a realm close to
	the client; I think that for things to work you actually need a realm
	close to the server.  Work through the message flows and make sure the
	KDC doing the decryption actually has the necessary keys and then
	adjust the document if necessary so the right KDC is used.

	The document needs to clearly indicate what error code is used in the
	case when the responder cannot get a ticket because some cross-realm
	key is missing.  In general we want it to be possible for an initiator
	to try several identities until the initiator finds the right one that
	has a shared key.
	(Sam Hartman, <[email-masked]>)

	Proposal:
	- Change GETTGT.
	  (The initiator specified the responder's principal name.  The
	  responder returns a TGT for its own realm.)
	  <[email-masked]>

#7 [**] DPD: rebooting peers when U2U (section 4.4.2 and 4.5)
(waiting a revision)

	[**] Discuss status message, rebooting peers and u2u.  This looks a
	lot like the IKE case where you lose all cryptographic context to me.
	(Sam Hartman)

	I don't understand what you want here. Are you saying
	that this doesn't work in the u-u case? I don't
	understand what u-u has to do with anything here.  (Michael Thomas)

	OK.  I was unclear .  When sending a status message, what happens if
	the peer has gotten a new TGT?  How do I realize I need to use this
	TGT rather than the one I have?  (Sam Hartman)

	Proposal: <[email-masked]>
	- When the responder can't decrypt a U2U KINK_AP_REQ,
	  it returns KINK_TGT_REP with a new TGT.
	- Then the initiator retry the command with a new service ticket
	  retrieved using the new TGT.
	- This sequence doesn't directly define how to detect a dead
	  U2U peer, but just define how to recover from the situation
	  that the responder has changed its TGT.
	- After recovery, the initiator can see whether the responder
	  has been dead or not using the usual DPD method.

#2 U2U (section 3, 4.2, and 5.1.2)
(waiting a revision)

	See also: #3, #19, #44, and #7

	I think we need to look at how u2u works at various parts of
	the protocol.  In particular I'm concerned about choosing the right
	u2u principal, dealing with cross-realm u2u and dealing with
	recovering from reboots.  We should confirm all these work out.
	(Sam Hartman)

	# choosing the right u2u is discuessed in #3.
	# cross-realm u2u is discussed in #19.
	# how to know and get new TGT when peer reboots is discussed in #7

	More examination of user-to-user case, especially situations where 
	it might *not* be two PKINIT clients, which section 3 says is possible. 
	(Ken Raeburn)

	In the user-to-user case with TGTs, I think the KINK draft may be 
	over-specifying things that should be dealt with at the Kerberos level. 
	If things are underspecified in Kerberos Clarifications, let's deal 
	with that.  (Ken Raeburn)

	Related thread: <[email-masked]>
		and <[email-masked]>

	(1) what principal to use -- needs to be in PAD
	(2) whether to use U2U -- PAD, or learning from remote side.
	    you can use KDC errors for optimization, but can't depend on them.
	(3) in cross-realm U2U, in what realm do you rendesvous?
		-- target (responder's) realm

	Review U2U after the next version of the document is published.
	(@IETF62)

#44 [**] How to determine whether the initiator can get a TGT
(waiting a revision)

	Section 4.2:
	How will the initiator determine whether it will be able to get a
	TGT?  I think policy considerations of when to use u2u and
	authorization considerations of what u2u principals are authorized are
	underspecified in the draft.
	(Sam Hartman)

	Proposal:
	- when to use u2u is the Kerberos matter.
	- what u2u principal to use: initiator knows the responder's
	  principal name in advance and specify it in the GETTGT.
	See <[email-masked]> for more detailed
	proposal.

Category: Other Kerberos matters
================================

#17 [**] Checksum when KRB-ERROR occured (section 5.1.4 and 7.1)
(waiting a revision)

	Section 7.1 says the checksum in the KRB-ERROR message is not used,
	but section 5.1.4 says that KINK implementation MUST make use of
	keyed Kerberos errors.  But KRB-ERROR does not have checksum in it (at
	least with RFC 1510 or kerberos-clarifications).

	Proposals:
	Use KINK checksum instead of signed KRB-ERROR of 1510ter.

	Replace following paragraph of section 5.1.4
	  KINK implementations MUST make use of keyed Kerberos errors when  the
	  appropriate  service  key  is available as specified in [KRBREVS]. In
	  particular, clock  skew  errors  MUST  be  integrity  protected.  For
	  unauthenticated  Kerberos  errors,  the receiver MAY choose to act on
	  them, but SHOULD take precautions against make-work kinds of attacks.
	with
	  KINK implementations MUST make use of
	  a KINK Cksum field when returning KINK_KRB_ERROR and the appropriate
	  service key is available.

	Drop reference to krb-error checksum from section 7.1.  (Sam Hartman)
	  defined in the following sections.  The checksum in the KRB-ERROR
	  message is not used, since the KINK header already contains a check-
	  sum field.

#18 [**] Kerberos error type limitations (section 5.1.4)
(waiting a revision)

	Why should a sender send only those errors?  I'm mostly asking
	for an explanation to be given to me or to be added to the document
	rather than liberalization of the requirement.  (Sam Hartman)

	Related thread: Message-Id: <[email-masked]>

	Proposed solution:
	- Remove the limitation.

#12 [**] Subsession keys (section 5 and 8)
(waiting a revision)

	Are subsession keys ignored?  (Ken Raeburn)

	The description of the checksum says that the session key of the
	ticket is used.  That's a way to do it, but the working group should
	explain why it has chosen to ignore the subsession key.
	(Sam Hartman)

	Related thread: Message-ID: <[email-masked]>

	Michael> more entropy from subsession keys buy us almost nothing
		 (ISAKMP NONCE is enough).
		 There are people who have been writing to *this* spec
		 for several years now.
		 And old mail: <[email-masked]>
	Bill> The session key is long-lived.
	      (but it's not really all that different from a
	      per-exchange nonce.)
	Sam> Being the same as everyone else is preferred if we have
	     no reason.

	No need to change the behavior.
	The nonce is sufficient to make it not necessary to use subkeys.
	"MUST not send.  SHOULD ignore on receive." ?
	(@IETF62)

Category: Handshake clarifications
==================================

#5 When 3-way, is responder's nonce MUST or SHOULD? (section 4.3 and 7.3)
(waiting a revision)

	Sec 4.3 and 7.3 use SHOULD and MUST respectively regarding when the 
	nonce should be used.  If the circumstances they're describing are 
	different, that's okay, but if so, I missed it on first reading.
	(Ken Raeburn)

	They are talking the same situation and the requirement levels should
	be aligned.  I think SHOULD is appropriate because non-returning
	responder's nonce does not break interoperabilities.
	(Message-ID: <[email-masked]>)

	If the initiator receives a responder's nonce, she MUST use
	it in the KEYMAT calculation.

	I think it is also editorial issue.  anyway, the behavior depends on
	condition.  if a responder does not agree with the initiator's proposal,
	AND if the responder wants to continue the transaction, then the responder
	MUST send back a message with ACK request bit, and MAY contain a nonce.
	There is a case when the responder wants to use same KEYMAT of the
	initiator, but just doesn't want to use the initiator's proposal.
	It is not always required to add a nonce.
	(Message-Id: <[email-masked]>)

	Proposal:
	- The responer's nonce in 3-way handshake is SHOULD.
	- When the responder request ACK (sakane-san's comment) is
	  discussed in #45.

#45 When to add SAs and which SAs to add in 3-way handshake
(waiting a revision)

	derived from #5 and #37, and related to #23.

	When does the responder require ACK?
	- disagreeing on the proposal
	- doing KE (dispite accepting or rejecting?)
	- agreeing with the parameters but want to add NONCE
	  (Is this allowed in KINK?)

	When to add (and remove if necessary) SAs?
	- usual optimistic approach
	- (non-KE) 3-way
		These two are already described in the current draft.
	- KE 3-way

	Proposal:
	- describe that the KE payload requires ACK.
	- describe that the initiator defer the installation of the
	  inbound SA until it receives REPLY message, when using KE
	  payloads.  (because the initiator can't calculate KEYMAT
	  before that.)

#37 [**] Difference between IKE and KINK on CREATE command (section 4.3)
(waiting a revision)

	IN addition, any differences
	between how this works and how IKE would set up the same SA need to be
	called out.  It is fine for there to be differences, but I want to
	make sure the working group explicitly decided the differences are a
	good thing.

	I'm somewhat concerned that 4.3 is not specific enough to describe
	exactly what key gets set up.  I.E. I'm concerned it may not be
	detailed enough for interoperable implementations.
	(Sam Hartman)

	- What keys are used for the resulting SA on the each side?
	  (Sam Hartman, Message-ID: <[email-masked]>)

		Related thread: <[email-masked]>
			and <[email-masked]>.
		To be revisted after rewriting section 8.
		(#26 is the same issue?)

		hartmans: I think we can close #37 if there is consensus
			on the new text for section 8
		derek: Assume 37 is closed.  Note that sam will have to
			read/review ike.
		(@IETF62)

	- (closed) Doesn't the timing when to add in/out SAs conflict with IKE?
	  (Sam Hartman, Message-ID: <[email-masked]>)

		Related thread: Message-ID: <[email-masked]>
		There is no objection.

	- (closed) How about when to add SAs and which SAs to add when 3-way.
	  (Message-ID: <[email-masked]>)
	  --> moved to #45

#4 [**](2401bis) CREATE command from the aspect of 2401bis (section 4.3)
(closed)

	I need explicit review from the IPsec reviewer of this section to
	make sure it is compatible with 2401bis.

	Closed: being discussed with #37

Category: Error handling
========================

#1 [**] Versioning
(waiting a revision)

	what happens when a receiver receives a major or
	minor version of the kink or qm that is inconsistent with this
	document?  What about unknown payload types?  (Sam Hartman)

	QM version is discussed in section 12 (Forward Compatibility
	Considerations).

	Related thread: Message-Id: <[email-masked]>

	Proposed solution:
	- KINK version
		remove the minor version and KINK_INVMIN error code.
	- QM versoin
		already specified in section 12.
	- KINK payload type
		return error (KINK_PROTOERR)
	- ISAKMP payload type
		return error (ISAKMP INVALID-PAYLOAD-TYPE)
		(describe each Notify type usage like ikev2 spec.)

	Specify the behavior when the error is not authenticated
	in the Security Consideration section.
	(<[email-masked]>)

#23 KE interoperability (section 6.8)
(waiting a revision)

	What happens if a peer that implements the KE payloads communicates
	with a peer that does not.  Specify the behavior in sufficient detail
	to guarantee interoperability.  (Sam Hartman)

	Releated thread: Message-Id: <[email-masked]>

	Proposal:
	- When the responder does not like the KE handling, the responder
	  just reply an ISAKMP error (NO-PROPOSAL-CHOSEN or
	  INVALID-KEY-INFORMATION.)
	  The initiator must proceed the next step properly.
	  <[email-masked]>

#31 behavior on KINK_ERROR
(waiting a revision)

	In implementor's point of view, I'd like to see initiator's
	behavior in receiving KINK_ERROR to be defined.
	For example:
	- When KINK_OK is received, initiator MAY act as if the KINK_ERROR
	  payload was not included in the messaged.
	- When KINK_BADQMVERS is received and the Cksum is verified,
	  initiator MAY retry in other Quick Mode version.
	- When one of other error codes is received and the Cksum is verified,
	  initiator SHOULD abort the negotiation.

	when does the responder generate these errors?

	Proposal: <[email-masked]>
	- Add simple description of each error codes.
	  + when these errors are generated by responders.
	  + how to act on these errors.

Category: IANA considerations
=============================

#33 [-] IANA considerations (section 11)
(waiting a revision)

	I think the correct terminology is "port 
	number", not "port", and they're "assigned", not "created".  This 
	section says no new registries are required in the first paragraph, and 
	the third one specifies that IANA must create one (but without the 
	associated procedural data that is required nowadays).  Are the KINK 
	payload types and ISAKMP payload types actually ever used in the same 
	field?  If not, I don't think they need to come out of the same 
	registry.  (Ken Raeburn)

	Needs work.  You may want to stop by tthe IANA office hours and ask
	them for advice.  They are generally quite good at working with
	authors to figure out how things need to be specified.
	(Sam Hartman)

	See BCP 26 (RFC 2434).

	Related thread: <[email-masked]>

	Proposal: <[email-masked]>
	1) from the current docuemnt, the folloing codes are IANA matter.
		- KINK message type
		- KINK payload type
		- KINK error code
		- KINK port number
	2) We have to register
		- KINK message type
		- KINK payload type
		- KINK error code

Category: Other clarifications
==============================

#16 EPOCH (section 5.1.2)
(waiting a revision)

	Perhaps you need a description of the time stamp?  I recall there
	being such a description in draft-housley-binarytime-xx.
	(Sam Hartman)

	Related thread: Message-ID: <[email-masked]>

	Proposal:
	- Just says EPOCH MUST NOT reused in a short period, and
	  leave the format to the implementations.
	  If the draft uses POSIX time, we'll need to describe the
	  semantics of the value like draft-housley-binarytime-xx
	  or refer to POSIX.

#22 Kerberos PFS (section 6.8)
(waiting a revision)

	Sec 6.8: "Kerberos in general does not provide PFS so it is somewhat 
	questionable whether a system which is heavily relying on Kerberos 
	benefits from PFS."  First, that sounds like it might be Security 
	Considerations material.  Second, I don't follow; explain please?
	(Ken Raeburn)

	Related thread: Message-Id: <[email-masked]>

	- (Current) Kerberos doesn't provide PFS.
	- KINK optionally provides PFS.
	- KINK PFS has benefits but is not mandatory because of the
	  computational cost.
	so editorial fix (or even removing this sentence) would be
	enough.

	Proposal:
	- Rewrite the section 6.8 according to the above points.
	  (The AD is ok not to mandate PFS if the WG wants to go
	  that route.)

#27 (2401bis) SPD Considerations (section 10.1)
(waiting a revision)

	This should not go in the security considartions section.  It is
	really more about IPsec architectural considerations than security
	considerations.

	This text needs to take into account 2401bis.  In particular it needs
	to be properly split between SPD considerations and PAD
	considerations.  (Sam Hartman)

	Related thread: Message-ID: <[email-masked]>

	Proposal:
	- This section does not describe security issues, so move it
	  to the outside of the security considerations section.
	- If KINK refers to 2401bis, almost of this section is related to
	  PAD rather than SPD, so need to clarify SPD/PAD issues.

#29 (2401bis) Rekeying (section 4.4.1)
(waiting a revision)

	section 4.4.1:
	Please make sure this discussion is aligned with 2401bis.  I think it
	may change small details but they seem to have adopted much of the
	same strategy kink uses.  The area wher I believe they speak to this
	issue is when you should rekey (timers etc).  (Sam Hartman)

	Related thread: <[email-masked]>

	Proposed solution:
	- clarify with the 2410bis words
	  + "hard lifetime minus rekey margin" --> soft lifetime.
	  + randomize soft lifetime.

#13 [**] Replay protection (section 5)
(closed)

	The document claims that the transaction id is not used for
	replay detection because Kerberos provides that.  How is that true?
	The authenticator is protected against replays but how is the rest of
	the message bound to that specific authenticator instead of to a
	session key of a ticket?
	(Sam Hartman)

	Closed: not a issue.
	(Message-ID: <[email-masked]>)

#30 (2401bis) IKEv2
(waiting a revision)

	Should we adopt IKEv2?

	If we should...
	- IKEv2 does not have DOI, so how to handle the DOI field in the KINK
	  packet header should be described.
	- Use TS (Traffic Selector) instead of ID (Identification).
	- KEYMAT calculation is changed.
	- How to handle REKEY_SA Notify type.
	- IKEv2 doesn't negotiate the SA lifetime.  Rekeying in KINK is
	  up to the initiator.  Therefore, the lifetime of the responder
	  can happen to be shorter, and the responder has no way to rekey.

	Related threads:
		Message-ID: <[email-masked]>
		Message-ID: <[email-masked]>

	Proposal:
	- We will describe things in 2401bis way, but
	  conforming to IKEv2 is not important.
	  <[email-masked]>

Category: Editorial
===================

#6 Half open (section 4.4)
(waiting a revision)

	IPsec does not allow half-open security associations any more as far
	as I can tell in 2401bis.  So it's not just for simplicity, but for
	model conformance.  (Sam Hartman)

	Proposed solution:
	- remove the phrase "for simplicity".
	  (Message-ID: <[email-masked]>)

#14 [-] Reserved (15 bits) --  Reserved and must be zero (section 5)
(waiting a revision)

	must be zero on send, must be ignored by receiver.

#15 [**] How to get the principal name of KINK service (section 5.1.2)
(waiting a revision)

	How do I discover the FQDN of my remote peer?   SPD
	entries are configured in terms of  IP addresses.  If you  want to
	store an identity in the PAD, why not store a principal instead of a
	hostname.

	I interpreted the text as a naming convention, not how a implementation
	get a peer's principal name.  So I think it is an implementation issue
	whether a principal name is generated from a FQDN or got directly from
	the PAD.
	(KAMADA Ken'ichi, <[email-masked]>)

	Proposal:
	- Clarify the descriptions so as to avoid misunderstandings that
	  the principal names must be generated from FQDNs.

#21 Next Payload in KINK_ENCRYPT (section 5.1.8)
(waiting a revision)

	Text should probably indacte that next payload must be none.

	Proposed solution:
	The section 5.1 describes it,
	however it would be better to describe explicitly so.
	reader does not has trouble even if the text is described repeatedly.
	(Message-Id: <[email-masked]>)

#24 MUST or SHOULD in clock skew processing (section 7.1)
(waiting a revision)

	The time difference MUST be computed and SHOULD be stored 
	and used?  Why the different requirement levels?  (And is this sort of 
	thing in the domain of KINK or Kerberos?)  (Ken Raeburn)

	Related thread: Message-ID: <[email-masked]>

	Proposal:
	- Just an editorial fix.
	  + Use SHOULD in the descriptoin of the initiator processing.
	  + The description itself should remain untouched.

#32 [-] I-D nits
(waiting a revision)

	Review the I-D nits and RFC authors docs.  I spotted a lot of 
	mechanical things (number of lines per page; avoid hyphenation; use 
	ragged right margin; need two spaces after sentence-ending period; fix 
	page numbers in table of contents; add section numbers to TOC) most of 
	which I think are specified in one of those documents.
	(Ken Raeburn)

	the document needs to meet all the ID nits when it is
	submitted.  (Sam Hartman)

#35 [-] References
(waiting a revision)

	The reference to [PKCROSS] is unnecessary, and only happens once, in 
	the introduction.  I'd suggest dropping it.  That's one less 
	unpublished I-D in the references section.  (Ken Raeburn)

	[KRBREVS] is referenced but not listed in the references section.
	(Ken Raeburn)

	Sec 5.1.7, next to last paragraph on page 21, is "IKE" (the 
	protocol) fuzzy about use of different SAs, or is it "[IKE]" (the 
	document)?  (Ken Raeburn)

	Section 1:
	Remove the reference to pkcross or cite something outside the IETF.
	It's an expired ID without and active editor.  (Sam Hartman)

	Section 1:
	Add an informative reference to IKE.  (Sam Hartman)

	Section 2:
	Cite a reference for DER.  (Sam Hartman)

	Section 5: DOI
	Cite a specific registry please.  IANA registries are typically
	named, and a URL reference would probably be appropriate.

#36 [-] Typos
(waiting a revision)

	4.4.2. Dead Peer Detection
	In the fourth paragraph, "loose" is to be "lose".

	5.1 KINK Payloads
	In the first item, the length of the Next Payload should be
	one octet instead of two.

	5.1.1. KINK Padding Rules
	In the second item, "other other" is to be "other".

	5.1.1. KINK Padding Rules
	The first item in the list should end with a period like 
	the others.  (Ken Raeburn)

	5.1.5. KINK_TGT_REQ Payload
	In the third item, "krbtgt/REALM/@REALM" is to be "krbtgt/REALM@REALM".

	5.1.6. KINK_TGT_REP Payload
	In the caption of Figure 13, "KINK_TGT_REQ" is to be "KINK_TGT_REP".

	7.3. CREATE
	"IPspec" is to be "IPsec".

	7.5. STATUS
	In the last paragraph, "REPLY KINK Header" should be in one line.
	In the last paragraph, "[KRB_ERROR]" is to be "[KINK_ERROR]".

	overall:
	"'s" is used in some places where I'd use "s" for a plural form.

#38 [-] Terminology
(waiting a revision)

	Section 2 and 10.1.
	Kerberos is now using the term user-user rather than user-to-user.
	(Sam Hartman)

	Section 2.
	Principals are not either client or service principals;
	they can and often do fill both roles.  (Sam Hartman)

#40 [-] Wording
(waiting a revision)

	Section 2, last paragraph.  "Between" is generally non-directional, 
	but in this case, a direction seems to be intended to be inferred; try 
	"from...to" instead.  (Ken Raeburn)

#41 [-] Wording in section 3, Protocol Overview
(waiting a revision)

	Section 3, English usage/grammar problems with the first two paragraphs.
	(Sam Hartman)

	Section 3.
	   which allows a final acknowledgment message when the respondent needs
	   a full three-way handshake. This is only needed when the optimistic
	   keying route is not taken, though it is expected that that will not
	   be the norm. KINK also provides rekeying and dead peer detection as
	What is expected not to be the norm?  Please reword.
	(Sam Hartman)

#42 [-] Wording
(waiting a revision)

	Section 4.3, discussing attributes, mixes singular and plural 
	indications.  The word "lone" appears to be popular with the author, 
	too. :-)  (Ken Raeburn)

#43 [-] Wording
(waiting a revision)

	Sec 8: "By optional, it is meant..." is badly worded.  (Ken Raeburn)

-- 
KAMADA Ken'ichi <[email-masked]>