Subject: cardio step Clip

From: Kim Kardashian's Body Sculpt Routine <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2014 13:06:59 -0700

Celeb Interviews: Kim K on post-baby body
posted - June 10, 2014
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Getting to a point where fitness becomes part of your life isnt as hard as it seems, 
and the results are amazing.
I was on a mission to lose 55-lbs before my wedding in May... And I did it. 

Fit In Your Jeans By Friday is an all access pass to my personal training sessions. 

Check-Out My Video Here: / http://www.alealt.com/kim/kardashian/fitness.video

-KimK

To stop further updates from KimK write Member Update Systems 9167 ROAD 177-Oakwood, OH 45873
or visit http://www.alealt.com/4otj/sgm4.4kgfr

I'd replace "completely useless" with "just a minor security improvement". For example you could get access to a memory dump if you happen to have read access to a tmp directory, a badly configured machine and a crash in your application. In that case you wouldn't be able to install a keylogger, but you could analyze the core dump.   Joachim Sauer Jan 16 '12 at 16:23
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Wiping unencrypted data from memory as soon as you're done with it is considered a best practice not because it's foolproof (it's not); but because it reduces your threat exposure level. Real time attacks aren't prevented by doing this; but because it serves a a damage mitigation tool by significantly reduces the amount of data that is exposed in a retroactive attack on a memory snapshot (eg a copy of your apps memory that was written to a swap file, or that was read out of memory yanked from a running server and moved to a different one before its state failed).   Dan Neely Jan 16 '12 at 16:26
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I tend to agree with the attitude of this response. I'd venture to propose most security breaches of consequence occur at a much higher level of abstraction than the bits in memory. Sure, there are probably scenarios in hyper-secure defense systems where this may be of considerable concern but seriously thinking at this level is overkill for 99% of the applications where .NET or Java are being leveraged (as it related to garbage collection).   kingdango Jan 17 '12 at 18:18
  	  	
maybe localhost isn't what you want to protect. Maybe you have created a program running on an unsecure client and you need the password for accessing a database. If you don't trust the client and are trying to protect the database, wiping passwords from memory is good advice.   Rolf Rander Jan 20 '12 at 17:19
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@RolfRander that is even worse, you should not enter passwords on an untrusted client - use a one time key (not sure this is the right term, a password that only works once and gets locked out after that use).   josefx Jan 20 '12 at 19:08 @RolfRander there is nothing about websites that requires an untrusted client, if the user chooses to use a compromised system then there is nothing that you can do to protect him from the consequences.  I want you to know that I am absolutely in agreement with CWE-257 and would love to just quote that verbatim each and every time I am asked to make passwords recoverable as plaintext. However, in reality, clients and users are rarely interested in NIST regulations and just want me to do it anyway. 90% of the time I can convince them otherwise but in that 10% of time when I can't I am trying to determine the best course of action--in those cases CWE-257 is ashes in my hand (unfortunately).  
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@AviD: The "low value" of the system has absolutely no bearing on this issue because people reuse their passwords. Why can't people understand this simple fact? If you crack the passwords on some "low value" system, you will likely have several valid passwords for other "high value" systems.   Aaronaught Feb 24 '10 at 14:19
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Another point has also been glossed over, which I just mentioned in the comment stream to my answer: How do you know that the person asking for these requirements is trustworthy? What if the "usability" excuse is just a faade masking a real intent to steal the passwords at some point in the future? Your naivet may have just cost customers and shareholders millions. How many times must security experts repeat this before it finally sinks i
  	  	
as I said, the point might be protecting the server, not the client. My point with the website-example is that there are lots of services using passwords (for different reasons, although other mechanisms obviously would be more secure. Bottom line being that a scenario where you want to protect the server, won't trust the client and are using passwords, storing passwords in a char[] is a wise choice and this isn't really a far-fetched scenario.   Rolf Rander Jan 20 '12 at 22:02
  	  	
@RolfRander somehow I get the feeling that you use a single login for all your clients and don't have any security/validation serverside. Its your duty to make sure that a user can't compromise the database (access restrictions and validation serverside) and the users duty to make sure that his account can't be compromised (his password).   josefx Jan 21 '12 at 10:06
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Absolutely. But for the user to make sure his password isn't compromised, the software handling the password has to take care to reduce the chance that malware (on the client) can pick up passwords from the client application memory. To achieve that, I believe storing the password in a char[] and overwriting this afterwards is good Developers are always trying to say how our jobs are so much harder than others because we get garbage requirements that change all the time. Well, this is a perfect example of why; our profession desperately needs a backbone. Our profession desperately needs to be able to say "no, this is not an acceptable requirement, this is not something that I can develop in good faith, you may be my client/employer but I have professional responsibilities toward your customers and the public, and if you want this done then you'll have to look elsewhere