Subject: [Last-Call] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-capport-rfc7710bis-04

From: Rifaat Shekh-Yusef via Datatracker <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 01 May 2020 05:10:19 -0700

Reviewer: Rifaat Shekh-Yusef
Review result: Has Issues

Since the use of IP address literal is not forbidden by this document, what if 
an attacker with the ability to inject DHCP messages or RAs uses this option 
to force the user to contact an IP address of his choosing? In this case, the use 
of TLS and presenting the identity in the certificate might not be of much help.

I think this case should be discussed in the security consideration section.

---

From: Erik Kline <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 3 May 2020 14:58:29 -0700

Rifaat,

Thanks for your reading of the document.

The security section has a paragraph that begins:

"""
   An attacker with the ability to inject DHCP messages or RAs could
   include an option from this document to force users to contact an
   address of his choosing.  As an attacker with this capability could
   simply list himself as the default gateway (and so intercept all the
   victim's traffic); this does not provide them with significantly more
   capabilities, but because this document removes the need for
   interception, the attacker may have an easier time performing the
   attack...
"""

Do you have any specific ideas for what text might be added to clarify vis.
your concern?  Would a sentence that captures your "the use of TLS and
presenting the identity in the certificate might not be of much help"
observation suffice?

Thanks,
-Erik