Subject: [lp-wan] Ticket #3: Zip bomb

From: Ana Minaburo <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 3 Apr 2018 11:20:56 +0200

Description  <https://trac.ietf.org/trac/lpwan/ticket/3#comment:description>

An attack that could be tried based on the fragmentation scheme, possible
in some lower layer-specific manner.
Include a security clause: "Never re-construct a packet bigger than some
configured size (with 1500 bytes as a good generic default)"

Some discussion during the Interim meeting on January 16th was that this
does not seem to be possible. because in the context we describe what is
received. We Agree to put the suggested comment into the document.

Laurent Toutain said that there could be a risk of saturating the link with
variable length fields, but it is limited.
comment:1 <https://trac.ietf.org/trac/lpwan/ticket/3#comment:1>Changed 5
weeks ago
<https://trac.ietf.org/trac/lpwan/timeline?from=2018-02-26T13%3A25%3A33-08%3A00&precision=second>
 by ana@…

   - *Resolution* set to *fixed*
   - *Status* changed from *new* to *closed*

Ana: In section 8 the comment has been added
comment:2 <https://trac.ietf.org/trac/lpwan/ticket/3#comment:2>Changed 0
seconds ago
<https://trac.ietf.org/trac/lpwan/timeline?from=2018-04-03T02%3A18%3A28-07%3A00&precision=second>
 by ana@…

This ticket has been closed with the following text added in the Security
section:

10.1. Security considerations for header compression

A malicious header compression could cause the reconstruction of a
wrong packet that does not match with the original one. Such a
corruption MAY be detected with end-to-end authentication and integrity
mechanisms. Header Compression does not add more security problem than what
is already needed in a transmission. For instance,
to avoid an attack, never re-construct a packet bigger than some configured
size (with 1500 bytes as generic default).