Subject: [Mip6] discussion about MIP6 RR test

From: "Fan Zhao" <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 6 Mar 2005 10:21:52 -0800 (PST)

Hello all,

We have submitted a draft, Extensions on Return Routability Test in MIP6,
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-zhao-mip6-rr-ext-01.txt.
What we are considering in this draft is the following:

Questions/problems:
1) Location Privacy in the MIP6 RR test procedure
The eavesdropper can learn the location related information 
of MN through observing the messages in the CN-BU procedure.
To prevent the location privacy related information in the 
CN-BU procedure from leaking to an eavesdropper is  
necessary for a privacy-enhanced MIP6 protocol.

2) Detection of attack on the MIP6 RR test
MIP6 RO security is based on the assumptions that it is difficult
for the attacker to achieve the information on both MN-CN and HA-CN
path. However, even a fixed CN might be in a hostile network 
environment where the malicious node is eavesdropping; also depending 
on the Internet routing, the MN-CN path might overlap with the HA-CN 
path; an attacker may eavesdrop the path that is part of both MN1-CN 
path and HA2-CN path where HA2 is the home agent of another mobile 
node, MN2; it is also possible that there is another conspirator on 
the other path. Although it is hard to accurately assess these threats 
but the probability is non-zero.
MIP6 network is a little bit less than the normal IPv6 network because
an eavesdropper can eventually intercept the messages given the above 
threats.
If these threats are present, so far there is no detection mechanism for
MN to promtply detect the attack that could compromise the security
of MIP6 RO mechanism.

3) Performance improvement
In MIP6, every time when the BUC entry is about to expire,
the complete RR procedure should be completed even though 
MN does not change the location.
We want to explore the various ways to improve the performance by 
reducing the signaling message overhead.
 
Solutions:
1) Location Privacy in the MIP6 RR test procedure:
The solution described in the draft is to use the hash function
and encryption to protect the privacy of HoA. 

2) Detection of attack on the MIP6 RR test
We use the hash chain to detect this kind of attack.

3) Performance improvement
We use the hash chain in order to make CN believe the new BU message
is indeed from the same MN before.

Your comments are welcome.

Sincerely,
fan

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