Subject: [MIPSHOP-MIH-DT] security thread

From: Sam Xia <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 13 Jun 2007 11:19:51 +0800

hi, all
  I create the security thread for all of us.

  I am considering to use IPsec to protect the MIH transportation because
IPSec can support TCP/UDP at the same time and it has coarse granularity for
SAs decreasing the numbers of SA. For TLS/DTLS, SA should be established for
every transportation sesstion. I have some comments as follows:

1: What's the best authentication method for each other?  (sharing secret,
public/private key, DSA).   How about the unilateral authentication? (I mean
that mn authenticate itself to the MIH service server).

2: Should it be end to end security model? if not (such as the proxy model),
what about the authentication?  Who will be authenticated, between mn and
proxy?

3: Because there are multiple MIHF entities in the network, there should be
multiple SAs between MN and network entities.  What is the relationship
between them?

views?

 Best Regards, Sam Xia

_______________________________________________
MIPSHOP-MIH-DT mailing list
[email-masked]
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/mipshop-mih-dt

---

From: <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 13 Jun 2007 11:36:16 -0500

Sam,

Let's not put the horse before the cart.  Before chosing IPSec (or TLS,
DTLS, SMIME, etc.)
what are the things we need?

I guess we need
1) Authentication
2) Replay protection

I am unsure if we need 
1) Authorization (will mobile nodes need an explicit authorization to
use MIH services?)
2) Confidentiality (I don't know if we need pure end-to-end
confidentiality).

My guess is that the security model might be different for some of the
different
.21 services.

This is the kind of text we would need in the security considerations
section, IMO.

John 

>-----Original Message-----
>From: ext Sam Xia [mailto:[email-masked]] 
>Sent: 12 June, 2007 20:20
>To: [email-masked]
>Subject: [MIPSHOP-MIH-DT] security thread
>
>hi, all
>  I am considering to use IPsec to protect the MIH 
>transportation because IPSec can support TCP/UDP at the same 
>time and it has coarse granularity for SAs decreasing the 
>numbers of SA. For TLS/DTLS, SA should be established for 
>2: Should it be end to end security model? if not (such as the 
>proxy model), what about the authentication?  Who will be 
>authenticated, between mn and proxy?
>
>3: Because there are multiple MIHF entities in the network, 
>there should be multiple SAs between MN and network entities.  
>What is the relationship between them?
>
>views?
>
>
>
> Best Regards, Sam Xia
>
>
>

---

From: "sam xia" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2007 23:42:28 +0800

Hi, John,

from the requriements of .21 to security,   i agree that authentication and
replay protection as well integrity are neccessary.   

Do you think that authorization is inside the scope of our designing?
My feeling is that the authorization may not be in the scope of .21 because
.21 does not discuss this issue. And authorization is performed at the
precodure of messages between AAA server and MIHF servers. But our focus is
to design security mechanism between mobile node and MIHF servers.
views?

As for confidentiality, i am not sure a lot of issues.
I don't know why we should keep the confidentiality  of MIHF messages worthy
of nothing.

BestRegards;
Sam(Zhongqi)Xia;
-----Original Message-----
From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] 
Sent: Thursday, June 14, 2007 12:36 AM
To: [email-masked]; [email-masked]
Subject: RE: [MIPSHOP-MIH-DT] security thread

Sam,

Let's not put the horse before the cart.  Before chosing IPSec (or TLS,
DTLS, SMIME, etc.) what are the things we need?

I guess we need
1) Authentication
2) Replay protection

I am unsure if we need
1) Authorization (will mobile nodes need an explicit authorization to use
MIH services?)
2) Confidentiality (I don't know if we need pure end-to-end
confidentiality).

John 

>  I am considering to use IPsec to protect the MIH transportation 
>because IPSec can support TCP/UDP at the same time and it has coarse 
>granularity for SAs decreasing the numbers of SA. For TLS/DTLS, SA 
>should be established for every transportation sesstion. I have some 
>comments as follows:
>
>2: Should it be end to end security model? if not (such as the proxy 
>model), what about the authentication?  Who will be authenticated, 
>between mn and proxy?
>
>3: Because there are multiple MIHF entities in the network, there 
>should be multiple SAs between MN and network entities.

---

From: "Stefano Faccin" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2007 09:54:22 -0700

Hi guys, 
thanks for progressing the discussion. I have noticed that some of the
long-term 802.21ers have been pretty quite. Come on guys, I know you
have good material and input to contribute. After all, we're designing
the transport for 802.21, so I'm expecting you to bring in scenarios and
material from 802.21. If not, I'm not sure what we're trying to do here.
We're all very busy.

Stefano

---

From: Subir Das <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 20 Jun 2007 12:14:28 -0400

Stefano,
My bad... no question asked... I will try to contribute...

-Subir

---

From: Subir Das <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 20 Jun 2007 15:53:11 -0400

John,
I agree with you that "Authentication" and "Replay Protection" are 
important. However. I would like
to add "Mutual Authentication" instead of just "Authentication" and also 
"Integrity Protection". I
do not think that we need to provide any "Authorization" at the 
transport level. If at all, this is required,
it should done at the registration/subscription level (e.g., MIH 
registration). Confidentiality is not
a must.

Btw, below are the 802.21 requirements on security that are currently at 
the annex of .21 draft specification.

SR1.    The IETF security mechanism must provide a common security 
association (SA) negotiation method regardless of the network location 
of the MIH service entity e.g. on the same subnet, or deep within the 
network.
SR2.    The IETF security mechanism must provide mutual authentication 
of MIH end nodes.
SR3.    The IETF security mechanism may provide one way authentication 
of either of MIH end nodes.
SR4.    The IETF security mechanism must provide integrity protection 
for MIH communications.
SR5.    The IETF security mechanism may provide confidentiality for the 
MIH communications.
SR6.    The IETF security mechanism must protect against replay attacks.
SR7.    The IETF security mechanism may protect MIH service entities and 
discovery resources against denial of service attacks.
SR8.    The IETF security mechanism must not be dependent on the MIH 
protocol information.
SR9.    The IETF security mechanism may provide means to reuse or fast 
reestablishment the SA due to host mobility.

-Subir

---

From: "sam xia" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 21 Jun 2007 15:54:59 +0800

Subir,

Even SR2 requires mutual authentication which should be necessary, I don't
know why.  It's only useful at some situations wherein  MIH nodes (MIHF
users) discover a lot of MIHF peers some of which may be unlegal.  But i can
not imagine that this situation will happen.  This should happen on
condition that the discovering procedure is not creditable.

BestRegards;
Sam(Zhongqi)Xia;
-----Original Message-----
From: Subir Das [mailto:[email-masked]] 
Sent: Thursday, June 21, 2007 3:53 AM
To: [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked]; [email-masked]
Subject: Re: [MIPSHOP-MIH-DT] security thread

John,
I agree with you that "Authentication" and "Replay Protection" are
important. However. I would like to add "Mutual Authentication" instead of
just "Authentication" and also "Integrity Protection". I do not think that
we need to provide any "Authorization" at the transport level. If at all,
this is required, it should done at the registration/subscription level
(e.g., MIH registration). Confidentiality is not a must.

Btw, below are the 802.21 requirements on security that are currently at the
annex of .21 draft specification.

association (SA) negotiation method regardless of the network location of
the MIH service entity e.g. on the same subnet, or deep within the network.

-Subir

[email-masked] wrote:
> Sam,
>
> Let's not put the horse before the cart.  Before chosing IPSec (or 
> TLS, DTLS, SMIME, etc.) what are the things we need?
>
> I guess we need
> 1) Authentication
> 2) Replay protection
>
> I am unsure if we need

---

From: Subir Das <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 21 Jun 2007 10:58:02 -0400

Sam,
Mutual authentication would be required even if  device MIHF discovers one
network MIHF node. This is to mitigate the rough MIHF. 

Thanks,
-Subir

---

From: "sam xia" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 22 Jun 2007 00:54:35 +0800

hi, all

 It seems that we have concensus on the requirement of security as follows:
1: authentication (mutual); must
2: replay protection; must
3: integrity; must
4: confidentiality; option

now it's time to discuss the security model as well as security mechanism.
Let me take the ball first.

1: end 2 end security or hop by hop security?
I prefer to the end2end security model because it is suited to the
application scenario. And at the same time, end2end security can apply to
the hop by hop security.
Views?

2: What's the most favorite security mechanism for MIH transportation?

Because the MIHF in the mobile node maybe establish several SAs with
different MIHF in the network,  how to distribute the cryptographical
material(shared key, or certificate) between/among MIHF entities in the
network is very important issue. 
If certificate is used, then PKI should be deployed widely. But the truth is
that now no pki is deployed in use. And some key exchange protocol like IKE
is not associated with AAA protocol, authorizaiton is a problem even though
authoriation is outside of the transportation scope. IKEv2 addresses the AAA
issue, but it is not mature and is moving forward. Most of all, IPSec/IKE is
not deployed in IPv4 network.
If shared key is used, then AAA protocol may be used to help distributed
authenticaiton of mobile node to the MIHF enitities in the network. But it
is a question how the MIHF entities in the network authenticate them to
mobile node. (mutual authentication).  And at the same time it is a question
how the mobile node establishes SAs with MIHF peers away from home network
of mobile node.

to be continued....

BestRegards;
Sam(Zhongqi)Xia;
-----Original Message-----
From: Subir Das [mailto:[email-masked]] 
Sent: Thursday, June 21, 2007 3:53 AM
To: [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked]; [email-masked]
Subject: Re: [MIPSHOP-MIH-DT] security thread

John,

-Subir

---

From: "sam xia" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 22 Jun 2007 04:56:23 +0800

one requriement more:

prevent DoS attack.

BestRegards;
Sam(Zhongqi)Xia;
-----Original Message-----
From: sam xia [mailto:[email-masked]] 
Sent: Friday, June 22, 2007 12:55 AM
To: 'Subir Das'; [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: RE: [MIPSHOP-MIH-DT] security thread

 hi, all

to be continued....

BestRegards;
Sam(Zhongqi)Xia;
-----Original Message-----
From: Subir Das [mailto:[email-masked]]
Sent: Thursday, June 21, 2007 3:53 AM
To: [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked]; [email-masked]
Subject: Re: [MIPSHOP-MIH-DT] security thread

John,

-Subir