Subject: [Mipshop] Revised I-D: draft-ietf-mipshop-cga-cba-02.txt

From: Christian Vogt <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2006 20:09:28 +0100

Hello folks,

we submitted a new version of draft-ietf-mipshop-cga-cba, which is
available at the following URL:

http://doc.tm.uka.de/2006/draft-ietf-mipshop-cga-cba-02.txt

The document includes a list of changes that we applied during the
revision in the Change Log section starting on page 55.  You may also
want to take a look at the diff's between the previous document version
and this new one, which you find here:

http://doc.tm.uka.de/2006/draft-ietf-mipshop-cga-cba-01to02.html

The new document version addresses the comments from James Kempf and
Zhen Cao.  James suggested to include time-sequence diagrams to make the
Protocol Operation section more easily understandable.  Those have been
included.

Zhen Cao addressed the issue with increasing the minimum length for CGA
keys beyond the 384-bit limit prescribed RFC 3972.  While we found
during the discussion that a higher minimum key length is not necessary,
 we agreed to document this decision in the Security Considerations
section.  This security considerations also elaborate on upcoming
changes to RFC 3972 [draft-bagnulo-multiple-hash-cga-01] and how those
might affect the CGA application in draft-ietf-mipshop-cga-cba.

An earlier mailing list discussion, which Manhee Jo had initiated,
tackled the well-known vulnerability to spoofed Binding Acknowledgment
messages from on-path attackers.  Such attackers could trick a mobile
node into accepting a bogus permanent home keygen tokens, thereby
rendering the mobile node unable to pursue further binding updates with
a correspondent node.  This vulnerability can only be fixed through
strong correspondent node authentication, e.g., by leveraging the
correspondent node's CGA public key.  We initially did not fix this
vulnerability because it exists already in the non-mobile Internet.
OTOH, there also were no objections against adding stronger
correspondent node authentication during the presentation in Montreal,
so we finally decided to add support for optional CGA-based
correspondent node authentication.  See sections 4.3, 4.4, and 6.7.

All the best,
- Christian

-- 
Christian Vogt, Institute of Telematics, Universitaet Karlsruhe (TH)
www.tm.uka.de/~chvogt/pubkey/

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