Subject: [mobile-ip] MIPv6 - Focus of the security discussion

From: "Patil Basavaraj (NET/Dallas)" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 3 Oct 2001 21:22:25 -0500

Hello,

Over the last week or so, I have seen a lot of discussion on the list
about how to secure MIPv6 Binding updates using IPsec. I just want to
make sure that the WG is really focused on the right set of issues
here:

   Binding updates need to be authenticated. The WG needs to develop a
   solution that essentially addresses the concerns raised by the IESG
   (see Jeff's slides for the set of issues, presented at IETF50). The
   intent should be to develop a solution that does not rely on IPSec,
   while making it possible for IPSec to be used. The reason why we
   are currently discussing this topic is because we need to develop a
   mechanism that does not rely on IPSec.  There needs to be a
   security association between the MN and the CN in order to secure
   the BU (I am leaving the MN-HA SA out or the moment). If there
   exists an IPsec SA between the two, that has been established via
   some means, it should be possible to use that SA to authenticate
   the BU. The problems associated with selector granularity,
   piggybacking etc. should be dealt with separately. The point is
   there should be at least an equal effort in trying to develop a
   scheme for securing BUs that does not rely on IPsec.  The
   discussion so far has been centered on how to make IPsec work for
   MIPv6. It is important to find a solution that allows the use of
   IPsec, but it should be done as a lower priority item. I believe
   the discussion needs to be on how to secure binding updates in the
   absence of IPsec while keeping IPsec as an optional mechanism. This
   will enable getting the MIPv6 spec out the door faster.

-Basavaraj

---

From: Francis Dupont <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 04 Oct 2001 14:13:57 +0200

Binding updates need to be authenticated.

=> I have a little concern about this. Even if authentication can be
the first step towards a solution, the real need is not authentication
but some kind of authorization (cf. authorization vs. authentication
and strong authentication == global PKI past threads).

Regards

[email-masked]

---

From: Michael Thomas <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2001 18:06:21 -0700 (PDT)

Patil Basavaraj (NET/Dallas) writes:

  [about relegating IPsec to low priority: ]

 >    (I am leaving the MN-HA SA out or the moment).

   Why?

   An attack against the MN/HA security would be
   far more catastrophic than the MN/CN. There is
   absolutely no reason why we should not have 
   strong authentication for this security
   association, and it should be a *mandatory*
   part of any compliant MIPv6 implementation.

	   Mike

---

From: Francis Dupont <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 06 Oct 2001 17:50:31 +0200

>    (I am leaving the MN-HA SA out or the moment).
   
(from  Michael Thomas <[email-masked]>)

      Why?
   
=> because this is easy (see assumption 1 in the threat draft)

=> I agree but we have no global PKI problem is this case and
many solutions, for instance IPsec (this is a variant of the "road
warrior" case), AAA (even if Eric should not agree :-), etc.
(Note: the HA is the main one, not a transient HA in a previous visited
link).

Regards

PS: to attack the hard part first is courageous, you shouldn't complain (:-).