Subject: Re: Standardize RSA/SHA256 ?

From: "Hilarie Orman" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 8 May 2006 15:57:45 -0600

Without a risk analysis specific to DNSSEC, I cannot support standardization
of RSA/SHA256.

Hilarie

--
to unsubscribe send a message to [email-masked] with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>

---

From: Simon Josefsson <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 09 May 2006 13:46:11 +0200

> Without a risk analysis specific to DNSSEC, I cannot support standardization

I'm inclined to agree.  What problem would we be solving by moving
from RSA-SHA1 to RSA-SHA256?  SHA-2, and RSA-SHA256, has seen less
scrutiny by experts than RSA-SHA1.

Perhaps we can specify RSA-SHA256, and keep RSA-SHA-1 and RSA-SHA-256
at the same SHOULD/MUST-level.  In other words, I'd like to see an
argument that deprecating RSA-SHA1 in favor of RSA-SHA256 actually buy
us anything that we believe anyone that will deploy DNSSEC care about,
before spending the cycles on it.

/Simon