Subject: Re: [netlmm] Reminder: Last Call on Threats Draft

From: Andy Huang <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 01 Aug 2006 20:49:09 +0800

I have read the draft and I have some commets.

[quote]
Any particular mobile node's route
   terminates at a mobile access gateway (MAG) which the mobile node
   uses as a default router on its current access link.

1) MAG must be used as default router for MN?  I don't know for sure, but it 
seems in tha air now according to the discussion in the mail list.

2) A malicious MN may trigger MAG to initiate NetLMM protocol by  tricking 
MAG into believing that a large number of MNs have attached to MAG.  A 
compromised MAG can attack LMA much easier than MN by tricking LMA into 
believing that MNs have attached to MAG. LMA and MAG will have to establish 
route entries for these nonexistent MNs. It can lead to a kind of DoS 
attack. However, it is not mentioned in the draft.

 As to other parts of draft, it is fine with me.

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "James Kempf" <[email-masked]>
To: <[email-masked]>
Sent: Tuesday, August 01, 2006 4:55 AM
Subject: [netlmm] Reminder: Last Call on Threats Draft

> Folks,
>
> We are now entering the second week of our last call on the threats draft 
> (draft-ietf-netlmm-threats-02.txt). So far, there has not been much 
> comment on the list about the draft. If you haven't read the draft, please 
> try to make time to check it out this week. If you have and you think the 
> draft is ready to go to the IESG, please send a short comment to the list. 
> Also, if you have any specific comments on the draft, please send them as 
> well.
>
> Thanx.
>
>             jak
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> netlmm mailing list
> [email-masked]
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/netlmm
> 

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---

From: Christian Vogt <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 01 Aug 2006 20:14:29 +0200

Hi Andy,

thanks for the review!

> 1) MAG must be used as default router for MN?  I don't know for sure,
>  but it seems in tha air now according to the discussion in the mail
> list.

That's true.  But I think we should wait for the NETLMM architecture to
mature before we change the Threats draft in this regard.  The Threats
draft depends on the architecture, not vice versa.  Would you agree?

> 2) A malicious MN may trigger MAG to initiate NetLMM protocol by 
> tricking MAG into believing that a large number of MNs have attached
> to MAG. A compromised MAG can attack LMA much easier than MN by
> tricking LMA into believing that MNs have attached to MAG. LMA and
> MAG will have to establish route entries for these nonexistent MNs.
> It can lead to a kind of DoS attack. However, it is not mentioned in
> the draft.

Yes, you are right, there are two more DoS attacks (malicious MN +
malicious MAG).  So I presume the concern with both of these attacks is
signaling load within the NETLMM access network, and memory exhaustion
(due to fake routing table entries) on the MAG and LMA.

Kind regards,
- Christian

-- 
Christian Vogt, Institute of Telematics, Universitaet Karlsruhe (TH)
www.tm.uka.de/~chvogt/pubkey/

"Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler."
(Albert Einstein)

Andy Huang wrote:
> [quote] Any particular mobile node's route terminates at a mobile 
> access gateway (MAG) which the mobile node uses as a default router 
> on its current access link.
> 
> 1) MAG must be used as default router for MN?  I don't know for sure,
>  but it seems in tha air now according to the discussion in the mail 
> list.
> 
> 2) A malicious MN may trigger MAG to initiate NetLMM protocol by 
> tricking MAG into believing that a large number of MNs have attached 
> to MAG.  A compromised MAG can attack LMA much easier than MN by 
> tricking LMA into believing that MNs have attached to MAG. LMA and 
> MAG will have to establish route entries for these nonexistent MNs. 
> It can lead to a kind of DoS attack. However, it is not mentioned in 
> the draft.
>

---

From: Christian Vogt <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 01 Aug 2006 20:51:08 +0200

> It can lead to a kind of DoS attack. However, it is not mentioned in

There is actually a 3rd version of this DoS attack:  The LMA, too, may
be able to initiate spurious route setups.

It is up to the NETLMM protocol whether or not the LMA is enabled to
initiate route setups.  But since the Threats draft should not depend on
specifics of the NETLMM protocol, this 3rd DoS version should be
included in the Threats draft as well.

- Christian