Subject: [netlmm] #144: New paragraph 2 in Section 3.5 sounds like a deployment requirement

From: netlmm <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2006 17:30:43 -0000

#144: New paragraph 2 in Section 3.5 sounds like a deployment requirement
------------------------------------------+---------------------------------
 Reporter:  [email-masked]      |       Owner:  [email-masked]
     Type:  defect                        |      Status:  new                     
 Priority:  minor                         |   Milestone:  milestone4              
Component:  draft-ietf-netlmm-nohost-req  |     Version:  2.0                     
 Keywords:  REQ draft                     |  
------------------------------------------+---------------------------------
 Sam Hartman, Security AD, filed the following DISCUSS comment on the new
 text in paragraph 2 of Section 3.5:

 >> In NETLMM, the network (specifically the MAG) derives the
 >> occurrence of a mobility event requiring a routing update
 >> for a mobile node from link layer handover signaling or IP
 >> layer movement detection signaling. This information is
 >> used to update routing for the mobile node. The handover or
 >> movement detection signaling must provide the network with
 >> proper authentication and authorization so that the network
 >> can definitively identify the mobile node and determine its
 >> authorization. The authorization may be at the IP level,
 >> for example using something like SEND [3] to secure IP
 >> movement detection, or it may be tied to the original
 >> network access authentication and link layer authorization
 >> for handover. Some link layers, especially cellular
 >> protocols, feature full support and strong security for
 >> handover at the link level, and require no IP support for
 >> handover. If such link security is not available, however,
 >> then it must be provided at the IP level. If NETLMM
 >> security is tied to link layer authentication and
 >> authorization for network access, then such authentication
 >> and authorization is required on handover in order that the
 >> mobile node can be definitively identified. Security
 >> threats to the NETLMM protocol are discussed in [2].
 >
 > This is basically OK, although it is worded in such a manner that it
 > sounds like a deployment requirement rather than an implementation
 > requirement.  We don't want to require people deploy security, only
 > that they implement it.

-- 
Ticket URL: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netlmm/trac/ticket/144>
netlmm <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netlmm/>
_______________________________________________
netlmm mailing list
[email-masked]
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/netlmm

---

From: netlmm <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2006 17:31:34 -0000

#144: New paragraph 2 in Section 3.5 sounds like a deployment requirement
-------------------------------------------+--------------------------------
  Reporter:  [email-masked]      |       Owner:  [email-masked]
      Type:  defect                        |      Status:  closed                  
  Priority:  minor                         |   Milestone:  milestone4              
 Component:  draft-ietf-netlmm-nohost-req  |     Version:  2.0                     
Resolution:  fixed                         |    Keywords:  REQ draft               
-------------------------------------------+--------------------------------
Changes (by [email-masked]):

  * resolution:  => fixed
  * status:  new => closed

Comment:

 I've modified the text to remove any implication that it is a deployment
 requirement. The new text is:

 In NETLMM, the network (specifically the MAG) derives the occurrence of a
 mobility event requiring a routing update for a mobile node from link
 layer handover signaling or IP layer movement detection signaling from the
 mobile node. This information is used to update routing for the mobile
 node at the LMA. The handover or movement detection signaling must provide
 the network with proper authentication and authorization so that the
 network can definitively identify the mobile node and determine its
 authorization. The authorization may be at the IP level, for example,
 using something like SEND [3] to secure IP movement detection signaling,
 or it may be at the link level. Proper authentication and authorization
 must be implemeted on link layer handover signaling and/or IP level
 movement detection signaling in order for the MAG to securely deduce
 mobile node movement events. Security threats to the NETLMM protocol are
 discussed in [2].