Subject: [nfsv4] Issue 28 denial of service in NFSv4.x state management

From: Mike Eisler <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2006 11:46:01 -0700 (PDT)

email thread starts at:

http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/nfsv4/current/msg02910.html

My proposed edits are here:

http://www.nfsv4-editor.org/cgi-bin/roundup/nfsv4/file9/sessions-dos-changes.txt

In summary two new ops are added: BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION and
SET_SSV. The former binds a connection to a session. The
latter establishes a shared secret key between the client and
server for the purpose of authenticating BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION
operations.

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From: "Talpey, Thomas" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 09 Jun 2006 08:53:11 -0400

We need to do this, in order to complete the security model for a session.
The original Sessions protocol (2003-2004) had a "BIND_CHANNEL" operation
which was removed due to problematic linkage of transport connections
with server operation context. The current version simply includes the
sessionid in each SEQUENCE.

Your proposal cryptographically closes the hole which might allow an
eavesdropper to attack a session. The existing proposal relies on prior
authentication, which can lead to requiring machine creds to implement.
We don't want that, therefore your proposal is good.

Accepting these new ops will change some discussion in the sessions
text around session establishment and reconnection. I don't see a way
to cross-reference issues in the tracker, so I'll add text I guess.
Definitely issues 27 and 30 will be affected.

Tom.