Subject: [nfsv4] Stephen Farrell's No Objection on draft-ietf-nfsv4-rfc5666bis-10: (with COMMENT)

From: Stephen Farrell <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2017 15:49:53 -0800

Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-nfsv4-rfc5666bis-10: No Objection

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COMMENT:
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- 3.4.5: Can a requester DoS a responder by asking the
latter to read giga- or tera-bytes?  And the same question
the other way about for 3.4.6.

- 4.4.1: not having access to memory allocated for
"cancelled RPCs" also seems like a potential DoS that ought
be noted. Is it?

- General: I was surprised see no mention of DoS. Is that
covered in some reference? Even if so, I'd have expected
some discussion of DoS attacks and mitigations.

- 8.2.1: "Protection below the RDMA layer is a more
appropriate security mechanism for RDMA transports in
performance-sensitive deployments." I think that's a bit
over-stated. A deployment could be performance-sensitive
but yet prioritise application layer crypto for various
reasons. As you're really just talking about trade-offs,
and I think that's sufficiently explained already, I figure
you could omit that sentence.