Subject: [NSIS] RE: rsvp doi draft

From: Tschofenig Hannes <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 2 Feb 2004 11:08:19 +0100

hi luu, 

> hi hannes,
> 
> i see two approaches:
>  -you define a new doi (as in your draft)
>  -you only define a new protocol-id in the ipsec doi
> 
> in the second one, it will be easier if you want to change from one
> security protocol (prococol-id) to the others, and it reduces 
> the database
> for two doi (in the second approach). i've discussed with ibrahim the
> tls/ssl, it seems that he follows the second. however, for the other
> reasons, i agree the first is more reasonable.

reading their papers i got the impression that they also follow the first
approach. maybe i should also discuss this issue with them. 
tls uses algorithms which are not negotiated by ike. hence, i think you have
no other choice than defining a new doi. 

> 
> in the msec wg, i see the value doi=2 is used for group 
> multicase doi. i'm
> interested in this approach and i think you might like it.

i like the work of the msec working group. the interest in multicast
signaling approaches (in case of nsis) is quite low. 
do you plan to take a closer look at it?

> cheers,
> Nary Tra
> ENST,Paris

ciao
hannes

> 
> 
> thanks for making me aware of these documents. i have asked 
> the authors to
> send me a copy and they did it. i have read these two 
> document to address
> your question. you asked whether it would be possible to 
> register a new doi
> value only (without anything else) - if i remember it correctly.
> 
> after reading the paper i must conclude that the approach for 
> writing a doi
> seems to be reasonable. the authors of the above-mentioned papers also
> follow the same approach as we did it. their intention is, however,
> different.
> 
> ciao
> hannes
> 
> 

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