Subject: RE: [NSIS] RMD Security

From: [email-masked]
Date: Sat, 30 Jul 2005 12:13:06 +0300

Hannes,

Replying to part of this mail:

> The first very important aspect that I had to realize was the there is
> always a message exchange like the  one shown in Fig. 1. This message
> exchange below takes place even if there is no end-to-end signaling
> session. If RMD is triggered based on an e2e signaling  session then the
> RESERVE is created by a node  outside the RMD domain and will
> subsequently travel further on (e.g., to the data receiver). Such an
> exchange is shown in Fig. 3 of [RMD]. Hence, the security of RMD should
> always been seen as a combination  of these two exchanges. 

Should we write-up some considerations that the combination of the
two exchanges are a potential security mechanism?  What I mean is if they
can be matched and this match is used to verify authenticity of the
reservation, then this could be used a protection against DoS attacks,
especially if state is not created until the RESERVE' is received and
matched against the RESERVE message.  This is somewhat conceptually related
to return routability in MIPv6.

thoughts?
John

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From: "Hannes Tschofenig" <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 30 Jul 2005 13:45:20 +0200

hi john,

>to return routability in MIPv6.

you are right. i also think that the discussions we had in the rmd context 
could be valuable for other areas.
we haven't updated the rmd document with regard to this aspect but we 
certainly should. still, i think further analysis is need to complete the 
picture.

ciao
hannes