Subject: [OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-16.txt

From: [email-masked]
Date: Mon, 05 Oct 2020 08:35:15 -0700

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Web Authorization Protocol WG of the IETF.

        Title           : OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice
        Authors         : Torsten Lodderstedt
                          John Bradley
                          Andrey Labunets
                          Daniel Fett
	Filename        : draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-16.txt
	Pages           : 50
	Date            : 2020-10-05

Abstract:
   This document describes best current security practice for OAuth 2.0.
   It updates and extends the OAuth 2.0 Security Threat Model to
   incorporate practical experiences gathered since OAuth 2.0 was
   published and covers new threats relevant due to the broader
   application of OAuth 2.0.

The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics/

There is also an HTML version available at:
https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-16.html

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-16

Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

---

From: Daniel Fett <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2020 16:29:54 +0200

Hi all,

the most important changes for this version are as follows:

  * New advice: For public clients, nonce is not sufficient to protect
    against authorization code injection. PKCE is now a MUST for public
    clients.
  * We have refined the guidance on using nonce for code injection
    protection, for example if multiple ID tokens are returned
    ("response_type=code id_token").
  * The draft now covers the PKCE Downgrade Attack and countermeasures.
    Authorization servers MUST follow special rules when allowing
    non-PKCE and PKCE flows for the same client.
  * Native apps with a "localhost" redirect URI can be exempt from exact
    redirect URI matching: Port numbers may differ, as in RFC8252,
    Section 7.3.
  * And finally, some clarifications on refresh token
    sender-constraining and mTLS.

-Daniel

Am 05.10.20 um 17:35 schrieb [email-masked]:
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