Subject: [Openpgp-dt] 2022-03-16 design team notes

From: Stephen Farrell <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 16 Mar 2022 14:18:03 +0000

OpenPGP Design Team
2022-03-16 meeting

Present:
dkg
gniibe
justus
daniel H
stephen
paul
jeffrey

# Agenda

Current draft agenda: 
https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/113/materials/agenda-113-openpgp-02

Slides for IETF 113

SF: mea culpa, didn't get anything done:-(
ACTION: SF - do the administrivia slides, include aksing who's read 
draft and if they wanna add any items for discussion (now or on list)
ACTION: SF/DKG - chase other presenters for slides
dkg created a repo
   justus uploaded stuff 
https://gitlab.com/openpgp-wg/openpgp-wg-admin/-/tree/main/ietf-113/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-05
ACTION: All to review justus' list in next 24 hours and suggest 
additions where something is missing (either by editing .org file or 
sending mail to DT list)
- ACTION dkg: add a high level overview as to how we envisage the v5 
parts working, not so much for WG discussion but more scene-setting
- Justus happy to present, daniel H as in-room backup

topics to cover @ meeting where we want to encourage disucssion:
- daniel H: #134/#153, ACTION daniel H will make 1/2 slides
- paul: do we need to talk about the pain of keyIDs and humans? yep 
ACTION: paul will make slide
- dkg: framing of this - maybe we agree to not solve this (now)?
- paul: we kind of owe readers at least some text/hints
- dkg: issue #99, retcon sha1 collision detection
- less an issue DT need to get more input on, more a heads-up
- justus: algorithm (sha1-cd?) maybe not well enough defined?
- daniel H: library support?
- certificate structure: !153 and !134
- daniel H: will add a slide or two
- goal here is partly that v5 certs do differ so the spec can be 
followed and useful without requiring as much folklore as has been the case
- daniel H: 134 tried to keep 2 sigs "mandatory" for certs, 153 
considers an  apossible weakness...
- dkg: when is it useful that primary key holder has explicitly agreed 
to the name on the primary key, maybe UKS attacks?
- dkg: self-sig over userid maybe not useful 100% of time but not 0%?
- daniel H: self-sig over userid helps verifier
- ACTION: daniel h to update !153 with where he landed on it