Subject: [OPSAWG] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on draft-ietf-opsawg-coman-probstate-reqs-04: (with DISCUSS)

From: "Kathleen Moriarty" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 19 Feb 2015 08:10:02 -0800

Kathleen Moriarty has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-opsawg-coman-probstate-reqs-04: Discuss

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DISCUSS:
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I have not had time to read the full draft, but do see a gap in the
security requirements that I'd like to see if we can address.  The
section on access controls for management systems and devices reads as
follows:

  Req-ID:  6.003

   Title:  Access control on management system and devices

   Description:  Systems acting in a management role must provide an
      access control mechanism that allows the security administrator to
      restrict which devices can access the managing system (e.g., using
      an access control white list of known devices).  On the other hand
      managed constrained devices must provide an access control
      mechanism that allows the security administrator to restrict how
      systems in a management role can access the device (e.g., no-
      access, read-only access, and read-write access).

   Source:  Basic security requirement for use cases where access
      control is essential.

The way I read this, there is no statement about general access
protections to the device outside of what is designated by a security
administrator.  I would think a statement on access controls on the
device would be very important in consideration of safety concerns that
put a strong need for security on such devices (medical, environmental
monitors, etc.).  Are there additional access mechanisms to the device
besides what is possible by the management connection?  Could there be
factory defaults in place with local access work-arounds or even wireless
int he even that there are issues accessing devices from management
stations?  Do these cause security problems?  Are there ports other than
those for management open that could lead to security breaches?  Or are
these out-of-scope because the discussion is about management
connections?  If it's out-of-scope, it would be good to state that it is
even though that would be a concern.  Text on this should be added to the
security considerations section as a general discussion if it's a
concern, but not in scope, similar to what was done for privacy.