Subject: [P2PSIP] KBR and DHT Security beyond nodeID generation

From: Ingmar Baumgart <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 06 Dec 2007 09:53:45 -0800

The current security discussion was mainly focused on the secure
generation of nodeIDs to limit Sybil/Eclipse attacks. The P2PNS
draft proposes several additional security mechanisms, namely:

KBR layer:
- Routing over disjoint paths
- Secure routing table maintenance (currently only for Kademlia)

DHT layer:
- Replication on neighbor nodes
- Owner pushes records to all replicating nodes
- Replicating nodes pull records to handle churn (majority vote)
- Unique AoRs (only one AoR per key allowed)
- Prevention of insertion DoS attacks

Some of these are only slightly ripped in the current draft. Is there
any interest in discussing threats beyond nodeID generation?

Regards,
  Ingmar

-- 
Dipl.-Inform. Ingmar Baumgart
Institut für Telematik, Universität Karlsruhe (TH)
Zirkel 2, 76128 Karlsruhe, Germany
Phone: +49 721 608 8281, Fax: +49 721 608 6789

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