Subject: [Pana] pana-fwk section 4 text

From: "Alper Yegin" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 26 Dec 2005 18:59:00 +0200

And this is the revised text for Section 4.

4.  Environments

   The PANA protocol can be used on any network environment whether
   there is a lower-layer secure channel prior to PANA, or one has to be
   enabled upon successful PANA authentication.

   With regard to network access authentication two types of networks
   need to be considered:

   a. Networks where a secure channel is already available prior to
   running PANA

      This type of network is characterized by the existence of
      protection against spoofing and eavesdropping.  Nevertheless, user
      authentication and authorization is required for network
      connectivity.

      One example is a DSL network where the lower-layer security is
      provided by physical means (a.1).  Physical protection of the
      network wiring ensures that practically there is only one client
      that can send and receive IP packets on the link.  Another example
      is a cdma2000 network where the lower-layer security is provided
      by means of cryptographic protection (a.2).  By the time the
      client requests access to the network-layer services, it is
      already authenticated and authorized for accessing the radio
      channel, and link-layer ciphering is enabled.

      The presence of a secure channel before PANA exchange eliminates
      the need for executing a secure association protocol after PANA.
      The PANA session can be bound to the communication channel it was
      carried over.  Also, the choice of EAP authentication method
      depends on the presence of this security during PANA run. For example,
      weak authentication methods, such as EAP-MD5, may be used for such
      networks but not for the others.

   b. Networks where a secure channel is created after running PANA

      These are the networks where there is no lower-layer protection
      prior to running PANA.  A successful PANA authentication enables
      generation of cryptographic keys that are used with a secure
      association protocol to enable per-packet cryptographic
      protection.

      PANA authentication is run on an insecure channel that is
      vulnerable to eavesdropping and spoofing.  The choice of EAP
      method must be resilient to the possible attacks associated with
      such an environment.  Furthermore, the EAP method must be able to
      create cryptographic keys that will later be used by the secure
      association protocol.

      Whether to use a link-layer per-packet security (b.1) or a network
      layer security (b.2) is a deployment decision and outside the scope
      of this document.  This decision also dictates the choice of the
      secure association protocol.  If link-layer protection is used, the 
      protocol would be link-layer specific.  If IP-layer protection is 
      used, the secure association protocol would be IKE and the per-packet 
      security would be provided by IPsec AH/ESP regardless of the 
      underlying link-layer technology.

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From: Yoshihiro Ohba <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 29 Dec 2005 11:22:27 -0500

OK, with s/The PANA protocol/PANA/.

Yoshihiro Ohba