Subject: [Pana] Nonce AVP

From: Yoshihiro Ohba <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 19 Oct 2006 00:29:01 -0400

In the current specification, Nonce AVP is carried in either PSR/PSA
exchange or the first PAR/PAN exchange in authentication and
authorization phase depending on whther stateless handshake is
performed or not.

This means that nonces are not supposed to be exchanged in
re-authentication phase.  Thus, the same nonces used for the
authentication and authorization phase will be used when re-keying
PANA_AUTH_KEY.

If we modify the specification such that nonces are always carried in
the first PAR/PAN exchange in both authentication and authorization
phase and re-authentication phase, PANA_AUTH_KEY re-keying is possible
with fresh nonces.  Also, this would make the protocol a little bit
simpler in that nonces are carried in one specific message type (i.e.,
PANA-Auth), instead of "either PANA-Start or PANA-Auth".

To summarize, I propose to:

[1] Remove Nonce AVP from PSR and PSA.

[2] Specify that Nonce AVP is carried only in the first PAR/PAN exchange
in both authentication and authorization phase and re-authentication
phase.

[3] Specify that nonces exchanged in re-authentication phase are used
for re-keying PANA_AUTH_KEY.

Yoshihiro Ohba

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From: "Alper Yegin" <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 21 Oct 2006 17:58:13 +0300

That makes sense.

Alper

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Yoshihiro Ohba [mailto:[email-masked]]
> Sent: Thursday, October 19, 2006 7:29 AM
> To: [email-masked]
> Subject: [Pana] Nonce AVP
>