Subject: Re: A $25,000,000,000 PKI Was:Spec. on QC-low-fat & QC-heavy-bio

From: Stefan Santesson <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 07 Apr 1999 10:48:17 +0200

Anders,

At 06:34 AM 4/7/99 +0100, Anders Rundgren wrote:
<snip>
>1) The problem is that the private keys to a company purchaser cert are
>not "yours".  I.e. they are owned by the company that can control their
use 100%
>if they never leave their secure server.  That is a very good working model.

Who owns a private key??? I don't care.
The thing that interests me is who have the exclusive right to use the key,
and that this right is protected. 

>
>2) I think that the thin client solution has more with sw distribution which
>is a true bottleneck recognized by most of the IT-industry 
>

You are solving yesterdays problems. 

The problem with exporting client software is a general problem which a
whole industry is working on. Java is one step along the line and we will
see more and better solutions. In a world where bandwidth are increasing we
will se more of "download what you need, when you need it" type of
approaches. This does not require the private keys to be used within a server.

I could support almost any type of client server solution where "thin"
clients gets software on demand to deploy what ever they are used for. But
I'll never like as a general tradeoff that private keys MUST be operated by
the server. 

To me you can put everything BUT the private keys (and one basic
certificate) in the server.

<snip>
>
>Initially PKI was about certs and global X500 directories - Did not happen
>
>Now it is zillions of certs distributed in various ways - Slow deployment
>
>So I do really believe there is room for a "third wave"
>

Yes there are, but is surely won't be private key servers.

However, a layered structure with a few long lived general certificates
(QC) that support a large number of specialized short lived certificates,
may very well be part of that "third wave".

And that seems to be not that far away from your thoughts.

>Anders

/Stefan
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Stefan Santesson                <[email-masked]>
Accurata Systemsäkerhet AB      http://www.accurata.se
Slagthuset                      Tel. +46-40 108588              
211 20  Malmö                   Fax. +46-40 150790              
Sweden                        Mobile +46-70 5247799

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---

From: "Anders Rundgren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 1999 21:45:00 +0100

Is this a battle between two Swedes only? Come on guys!

Stefan, my original spec on the low-fat/heavy-bio, did never got a reaction.

<snip>

>and that this right is protected. 

Agreed, except that I don't see why such a right should/must be exclusive.

>approaches. 

You are almost right.  Security-critical sw developed by several different 
companies requires signed code that you must trust.  This complicates
things considerably.  My approach does probably (not 100% sure here since
CyberPhone is currently only a glossy broschyre) NOT require download
of security-code from independent sources as it is a "Generic Security Platform".

>This does not require the private keys to be used within a server.

This is definitely another question and I would say (while taking on my
marketing hat) that CyberPhone is a "thin PKI" (new sexy term born
this very second) solution that could solve even harder problems than the
"thin client" did.

> But I'll never like as a general tradeoff that private keys MUST be operated by
>the server. 

They don't.  Only in the case they belong to a server-based resource like
a SET account, OBI purchaser

<snip>

>may very well be part of that "third wave".

Hum, another IETF-Swede said in another mailing-list that the need for a static
indentity (like an SSN) in a cert is not at all required to maintain a long-lasting
certificate-based relationship in a convenient way.  I asked him if for a
high-level spec. on how he thought that that would work.  He never did it.  I
feel the same thing for your suggestion.  How?  Please...

If you take my "Dynamic Certificates" paper and try to cast that
into conventional PKI you will end up in misery.  Misery = twice the cost,
twice the PITA. and a big chance to be bypassed by other solutions.

Anders

---

From: "Aram Perez" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 08 Apr 1999 10:23:01 -0700

Stefan Santesson wrote:

> Anders,
> 
> First of all - I'm not a lawyer. All I'm saying is just my opinion.

Neither am I (but I'll give my opinion anyway :-).

>
> Second. The person responsible for a signature, regardless of type, is the
> person who created it and whose intent it expresses.
>
> I.e. You are ALWAYS responsible for signatures created by YOU and you are
> NEVER responsible for signatures created by someone else.

I don't believe this is legally correct. I can give a "power of attorney" to
someone else who can sign for me and I will be responsible for what that
person signs.

[snip]

Regards,
Aram Perez
Apple Computer, Inc.