Subject: Re: NR -- what the real issues are, and a proposal

From: "Bob Blakley" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 1999 16:38:42 -0500

Bob Blakley wrote: 
    >In addition, I propose that we create an additional indicator of a 
    >human being's conscious and willful intent to be legally bound by 
    >a digital signature that would be applied on a message by message 
    >basis. This additional indicator would require, as an integral part of 
    >its semantic definition, that an explicit computer-to-human interaction 
    >be required to provide some reasonable level of ceremonial and due 
    >caution warning be provided to the user.  In addition, the semantics 
    >of this indicator should specify that its use must be ENABLED by the 
    >NR bit ( as redefined) in the certificate which includes the corresponding 
    >public key.  If the certificate does not have the bit turned on, the 
    >application is not obligated to request the ceremonial, due caution 
    >approval; and relying party software should ignore a per-message 
    >indicator even if present in that case. 
    This is the real crux of the matter and is another good suggestion, in my 
    view. 
    How we assure that the CHI has taken place is of course a theological 
    discussion...

>Let the lawyers worry about the law. I think we're spinning our wheels here. Frankly, we could argue "proof" and "truth" until we're blue in the >face, but with each argument we step further away from technical/business requirements and closer to legalspeak. 

I think that was my point (unless I was encouraging theological discussions; I can't remember... :-)

--bob

Bob Blakley ([email-masked])
Chief Scientist, Dascom

---

From: "Bob Blakley" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 19 Aug 1999 09:46:45 -0500

Ivan

>Bob J - >>
>Bob B - >
>
>>....  Perhaps we'd have to look at a two-stage process, whereby
>>a non-binding cert would be generated and distributed, and then a request
>>for a binding cert would be generated and signed using the non-binding
cert...
>
>Presumably the user/RA/CA could archive the CRMF message where the NR bit was
>set.

A good idea!

--bob